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SUMMARY 
In this thesis I assess Susan George's proposed solution to the 
Third World debt crisis in the light of two contemporary and 
competing theories of justice which have international application. 
The two theories against which George's proposal is assessed are 
Onora O'Neill's Kantian-inspired theory of justice and R.M. Hare's 
preference utilitarianism. These theories are firstly located 
amongst various ethical traditions that have been applied to 
international relations and are selected as significant contenders in 
their relevance to an issue such as the Third World debt crisis. 
After outlining George's account of the importance and origins of 
the Third World debt crisis, I set out the details of her solution to 
that crisis. This proposed solution is then assessed in the light of 
the two theories of justice selected. In the final chapter I conclude 
that most aspects of George's proposal meet the requirements of 
justice according to both competing theories of justice. However, I 
argue that her insistence on démocratisation is problematic on both 
theories. 
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PREFACE 
One basic way of dividing up ethical traditions that apply to 
international relations is into traditions which are consequence-
oriented and traditions which are rule-oriented. In this thesis, I 
consider one concrete proposal to solve the Third World debt crisis. 
This is the proposal put forward by Susan George in A Fate Worse 
Than Debt. I consider this proposal in the light of two ethical 
theories that clearly apply to issues of international justice, 
especially in relation to extensive distributive inequalities. The two 
theories on which I concentrate are R. M. Hare's preference 
utilitarianism and Onora O'NeiU's Kantian-inspired, deontological 
theory. Hare's theory falls within the consequence-oriented 
tradition, while O'Neill's theory falls within the rule-oriented 
tradition. 
I have set myself a limited, applied project. I wish to 
examine how a well-known, well-respected, anti-establishment 
proposal for solving the Third World debt crisis fares in the light of 
two significant, competing, contemporary ethical theories. Third 
World debt is a major contributor to widespread hunger and 
destitution among ordinary people in the Third World. It is also a 
significant cause of deprivation among ordinary people in the First 
World. Susan George offers a considered, practicable solution to the 
debt crisis in an attempt to alleviate the suffering caused, in part, 
by that crisis. It is therefore important to judge how just George's 
solution is. The present inquiry contributes to that task. 
I develop my thesis in the following way. In Chapter 1, I 
present a survey of some major ethical traditions that apply to 
international relations. The survey largely, but not wholly, relies on 
secondary sources. I am not especially concerned with assessing 
these various ethical traditions as theories of ethics. The main point 
of the survey is to locate the two contemporary applied ethical 
theories that are in focus in the thesis among some of the chief 
ethical traditions that have been applied to international, as 
opposed to only domestic, affairs. As part of this contextualising 
task, I review what I take to be the salient, generic advantages and 
disadvantages of these ethical traditions in their application as 
theories of international ethics. 
In Chapter 2, I concentrate on George's book A Fate Worse 
Than Debt. I outline her analysis of why Third World debt is such a 
problem for various groups of people in both the Third and First 
Worlds, give her account of how Third World debt came about, and 
detail her proposed solution. I also refer to a more recent book by 
George, The Debt Boomerang, in which she amplifies her account of 
the effects of Third World debt on both the Third and First Worlds. 
I shall not be challenging George's account of how the Third World 
debt crisis came about and of what effects it has had. Along with 
many others, I take her account to be incisive and authoritive. 
In Chapter 3, I provide an account of Hare's theory of justice, 
both formal and substantial, and relate it to his theory of e t h i c s -
preference utilitarianism. My principal aim in this chapter is to 
establish the background for assessing George's proposed solution to 
the Third World debt crisis in the light of Hare's account of 
Ill 
distributive justice, as this has international application. In Chapter 
4, I assess how just George's solution is in the light of Hare's account 
of justice. I argue that, while George's solution to the Third World 
debt crisis looks good on several counts, f rom a preference-
utilitarian perspective on justice like Hare's, there is a problem 
about how genuinely sensitive her solution is to the actual 
preferences of all the affected parties, given her insistence on 
democratic values. 
In Chapter 5, I characterise Onora O'Neill's Kantian-inspired 
theory of justice and identify the essential features of that theory 
against which to assess George's proposal. In Chapter 6, I then 
proceed to assess George's proposal in the light of O'Neill's theory of 
justice. I argue that this proposal has many virtues, under O'Neill's 
theory; but again, George's insistence on democracy is morally 
problematic—in this case because it is arguably coercive in a 
fundamental way. I conclude the thesis with a brief summary in 
Chapter 7. 
CHAPTER 1 
A SURVEY OF SOME MAJOR ETHICAL TRADITIONS AS APPLIED TO 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
In the present chapter, I characterise some of the main ethical 
theories that apply to international relations and locate among 
these the two applied theories in focus in this thesis. I also 
comment on what I take to be the primary, generic advantages and 
disadvantages of these various theories as theories of international 
ethics. First, I briefly look at natural-law theory, which is included 
in the rule-oriented class of ethical theories. I then make some 
remarks on Kantianism, rights theories, and contractarianism, all of 
which also count as rule-oriented theories. Finally, I make some 
observations about utilitarianism, as a consequence-oriented theory 
of ethics, applied to issues of international relations. 
In my review of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
various theories of international ethics, I make some fairly standard 
assumptions about desiderata in a theory of international ethics. 
For example, I assume that a good theory of international ethics 
would include features like the following: (1) it would be 
cosmopolitan; (2) it would be accessible to those to whom it applies; 
(3) it would have the resources to provide for a contextually 
sensitive critique of current values within groups; (4) it would have 
a perspicuous decision-procedure that was relevant to non-
idealised agents and agencies; (5) it would allow for a plurality of 
agents and agencies; (6) it would be informative, in a world of need, 
about moral obligations that extend beyond the strict requirements 
of justice.1 I return to the issue of desiderata in a theory of 
international ethics in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Natural Law 
(i) Distinguishing Features 
The natural-law tradition within ethics is often associated 
with developments in Christian moral philosophy and thought, 
particularly in Catholicism, since the time of Aquinas (Boyle 1992, 
p. 112). The natural-law tradition, however, is not restricted to a 
religious view. Rather, natural-law theorists maintain that, through 
use of practical reason, rational beings can identify basic human 
goods and the moral precepts through which these human goods 
can be attained. 
It is convenient to call the nonreligious component of the 
natural-law tradition 'common morality'.2 Joseph Boyle depicts four 
features of common morality shared by natural-law theorists. First, 
the precepts of the Mosaic decalogue are taken as "established 
beyond question, even though these precepts are most often 
regarded as the implications of more fundamental principles" (Boyle 
1 These criteria strongly overlap with the standards of applied ethical 
reasoning about problems of the public domain set by Onora O'Neill (O'Neill 
1986, p. 49). 
^This term was coined by Alan Donagan (Boyle 1992, p. 117). 
1992, p. 117).3 Second, common morality treats some of the 
precepts of the decalogue as absolute prohibitions on some kinds of 
action (Boyle 1992, p. 118). Such prohibitions can hold even when 
there is a strong positive obligation to promote an overriding good 
or to avoid an urgent disaster. Further, when deliberating on which 
course of action is the right one, natural-law theorists maintain that 
the intention of the agent is important. They interpret St. Paul's 
dictum that 'one must not do evil that good may come of it', when 
applied to actions that harm human beings, as referring to harms 
that are intended. In cases where the harm comes about as a side-
effect of the action, the action might still be wrong, but it might also 
be permissible. (The doctrine of double effect instantiates this 
idea.) Third, the moral norms of common morality are agent 
relative. (They direct the actions of agents rather than the 
production of outcomes.) A moral norm, such as the proscription of 
murder "is addressed to every person and directs each not to 
murder" (Boyle 1992, p. 118). The focus of moral responsibility is 
put on the agent, such that each is responsible for their own choices 
and intentions. These three features of common morality fall 
within the spectrum of deontological moral theory. 
The fourth feature of common morality is its universalism. It 
is universal in that it provides a basis for how one is to treat all 
human beings in virtue of our shared humanity. According to 
Boyle, "common morality...rejects those forms of relativism that 
locate moral standards in the lived values of specific communities" 
^For Boyle, more fundamental principles would include the love 
commandments or the Golden Rule or, in the Kantian tradkion, the 
implications of the categorical imperative or, in the Thomist tradition, the 
demands of right reason (Boyle 1992, p. 117). 
(Boyle 1992, p. 122). So, while all people have rights, these rights 
are implied by the obligations which stem from the fundamental 
principles of common morality. As an aspect of its universalism, 
common morality includes a general duty to help others. The scope 
of this duty stretches beyond the boundaries of one's own 
community or nation. So, for example, this general duty to help 
others may mean that "when many in the third world face 
imminent starvation relatively wealthy people in richer parts of the 
world have a serious moral obligation to come to their aid" (Boyle 
1992, p. 123). 
(ii) The Advantages of Natural-Law Theory 
Natural-law theory has several advantages in its application 
to international relations. First, the theory's universalism tends to 
make it cosmopolitan in its outlook. Certain moral prescriptions and 
proscriptions that apply transcend national and cultural boundaries. 
One's neighbour can include the whole of humanity. 
Second, natural-law theory provides a method for the 
development and revision of moral principles ( reform of 
commitments). Normative moral deliberation within natural-law 
theory involves casuistry, which is used to develop and revise 
moral principles. According to Boyle, "no one is stuck with a set of 
values that cannot be criticised by appeal to a higher standard" 
(Boyle 1992, p. 124). So, even within common morality, 
deliberation need not be tied to established or establishment 
values . 
Third, natural- law theory construes moral discourse or 
dialogue in terms of values that are in principle accessible to all. 
The basic precepts of common morality are accessible to human 
reason, and so knowable by anyone capable of thought and action 
(Boyle 1992, p. 123). As Boyle comments: according to the theory 
"moral d ia logue with others has a chance to succeed 
because...neither one's own contribution to the dialogue nor that of 
others is simply a function of values and concerns to which the 
other party cannot have access" (Boyle 1992, p. 124). Unlike 
utilitarianism, which is algorithmic, the casuistry of natural-law 
theory does not fundamenta l ly involve a ca lcula t ion and 
comparison of likely outcomes. Rather, "possible actions are 
considered in relat ion to already established principles and 
norms.. .and the investigation is designed to clarify which of the 
norms applies" (Boyle 1992, p. 120). This procedure of 
classification is taken to be accessible to all in principle. 
Fourth, natural-law theory provides for the resolution of 
moral dilemmas in a contextually sensitive way. Two important 
features of the model of resolution in cases where there is an 
apparent conflict of obligation are the appeal to the doctrine of 
double effect and the application of practical wisdom, or prudentia. 
When indeterminacies remain after rational investigation has done 
its best, prudentia is necessary for resolution. Prudentia 
"presupposes a feel for the concrete emotional appeal of the 
par t iculars of action that requires possession of the moral 
virtues...and includes a responsiveness to the possibilities for doing 
good that is irreducible to reasoning" (Boyle 1992, p. 126). 
(in) The Disadvantages of Natural-Law Theory 
Despite its advantages, natural-law theory has severe 
drawbacks in its application to international issues. Central among 
these is that the theory does not provide a very perspicuous 
procedure for the application of moral principles to difficult cases. 
Certain pivotal notions—like the 'common good'—are opaque, as are 
certain other aspects of the decision-making process—like the role 
of the virtuous leader's practical wisdom in assessing the concrete 
details of difficult cases (Boyle 1992, p. 116). Within natural-law 
theory, the common good is the basis for the authority of political 
society and its leaders. Yet a central, controversial issue in the 
application of the theory to international issues is how plausibly the 
notion of the common good might be extended to embrace the 
entire social world, given present levels of communication and 
interdependence (Boyle 1992, pp. 128 ff.). The decision-making 
process, within natural-law theory, can be uncertain in its 
application because only basic principles are thought of as natural 
and so readily knowable by mature human beings. Judgements on 
particular, practical issues are then derivative from these basic 
principles. As there can be several forms of derivation, it can be 
uncertain which course of action is the right course of action (Boyle 
1992, p. 125). 
Kant ianism 
(i) Distinguishing Features 
Kant's moral theory falls into the category of rule-oriented 
theories. It is thoroughly deontological. It is agent-centred (placing 
an emphasis on agents' motives and intentions) and interprets right 
action as action of a certain kind. Kant's moral theory sharply 
contrasts with consequentialism, which holds that the rightness or 
wrongness of an action is determined only by considerations of 
consequences. 
For Kant, right action—including right action in international 
relations—lies in responding to an a priori demand of reason, the 
categorical imperative. This highest of moral principles bids each of 
us to "[a]ct only on that maxim through which you can at the same 
time will that it should become a universal law" (Kant 1948, p. 84, 
emphasis original). A practical imperative that Kant derives from 
this is to "[a]ct in such a way that you always treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never 
simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end" (Kan t 
1948, p. 91, emphasis original). 
Kant's approach to international ethics has three main aspects. 
These are (1) that the state is a moral person, (2) that all persons 
originally held the earth's land in community, and (3) that there is a 
demand on all individuals and nations to strive for perpetual peace 
(Donaldson 1992, pp. 145 ff.). The third aspect of Kant's approach 
to international ethics reflects the centrality of cooperation in Kant's 
international ethic. International cooperation is an a priori demand 
of reason. 
(ii) Advantages of Kant's Theory 
One promising feature of applying Kantian ethics to 
international affairs is that it is deeply cosmopolitan. For Kant it is 
a demand of reason, manifest in the categorical imperative, that we 
treat all of humanity as ends in themselves. Accordingly, we have 
obligations to all humans (and they have correlative human rights). 
So, for Kant there are some cross-cultural moral requirements 
which are implicit in the categorical imperative. The universalism 
of Kantian ethics contrasts with cultural relativism. 
According to Kant's international morality, there is a demand 
for international cooperation. For Kant, international cooperation is 
an a priori demand of reason. Kant's justification for international 
cooperation is founded on morality. In this way he contrasts with 
Hobbes, who bases international cooperation on the expected 
benefits, and with Rawls, who sees cooperation as the basis for 
moral obligations. For Kant, actual or potential international 
reciprocity is largely irrelevant for determining the obligations of 
international agencies. 
Kant's metaphysical notion of the state, that it has 
personhood, gives the state virtually every moral obligation that 
morally rational individuals possess. These obligations include 
keeping promises, refraining from lying, and furthering the 
happiness of individuals, including individuals in other states. It 
could even ground the moral obligation of one state to save the 
lives of individuals starving in other states (Donaldson 1992, p. 
149). This is an obviously promising feature of Kantian moral 
theory, as it applies to international affairs, since it does not restrict 
obligations of justice to individuals. Furthermore, by giving states 
the property of personhood, Kantian ethics can determine the moral 
obligations of one state to another (Donaldson 1992, p. 144). 
A further advantageous feature of Kant's personification of 
the state, and the moral obligations which go along with his 
conception of the state, is that it gives grounds for objection to the 
"functional specialisation" argument. According to the functional 
specialisation argument, the roles and duties of agencies, such as 
nation-states and international organisations like the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), are determined by their function. Nation-
states, for example, have it as their function to secure the welfare of 
their citizens and they have no duties to others outside their nation. 
The function of the IMF, some may argue, is to provide short-term 
assistance to nation-states for balance of payment problems and 
does not include any duty to secure human rights (Donaldson 1992, 
pp. 152 f.). On a Kantian account, by contrast, agencies such as 
nation-states have moral responsibilities which are not restricted to 
their own citizens but which extend to others outside the nation-
state. More generally, agencies that act on principles which neglect 
human rights act on principles that are nonuniversalizable, and so 
act in ways that are morally reprehensible. 
Yet another promising feature of Kantian morality is that it 
places emphasis on duties rather than rights and so tells us not only 
which actions are forbidden but also which actions are obligatory. 
Onora O'Neill makes use of Kant's distinction between perfect duties 
and imperfect duties.^ On the Kantian account, perfect duties are 
actions which are required in order to avoid acting on principles 
which are nonuniversalizable on logical or conceptual grounds. 
Perfect duties include duties of justice, which include acting on 
principles of noncoercion and nondeception. According to Onora 
O'Neill, the fulf i lment of one's perfect duties not only requires 
avoidance of certain actions but may require an agent to perform 
some action which is necessary to avoid acting on principles of 
coercion and deception. Imperfect duties arise from special 
consideration of our limited capacities and material needs as 
embodied , human beings.^ In order to engage in autonomous 
action, needy and finitely rational beings standardly need help and 
cooperation from others. Because of our limited capacities and 
material needs as humans, acting on principles of disrespect and 
neglect of beneficence is nonuniversalizable. Accordingly, this gives 
rise to imperfect duties such as duties of beneficence and respect. 
Such imperfect duties can play an important role in moral issues 
that arise f rom Third World debt because of the help and 
cooperation that is often needed to secure the autonomy of agents 
affected by Third World debt.6 
^O'Neill points out that the Kantian distinction between perfect duties and 
imperfect duties is different from the distinction made by rights theorists 
and consequentialists (O'Neill 1986, pp. 102 & 138 ff.). 
5Unlike perfect duties, imperfect duties are selective. Nonetheless, imperfect 
duties are duties and it is not permissible not to act on them. 
6For further discussion of the relation between justice and imperfect duties, 
see my Ch. 5, the section, 'Justice and Imperfect Duties'. 
(in) Disadvantages of Kant's Theory 
There are at least three problems with Kant's theory, as an 
ethical theory with application to international relations. First, it 
suffers from incompleteness. For example, it is not clear just how 
nation-states really can be Kantian moral agents—with rational, 
autonomous 'noumenal' selves (Donaldson 1992, p. 154). Second, 
there is a problem about whether a thoroughgoing deontologism can 
be sustained. As Donaldson remarks, "[s]o few principles appear to 
be truly universalizable" (Donaldson 1992, p. 154). Any general 
principle such as 'never lie' or 'never harm innocents' seems 
susceptible to counterexamples. Such a principle would then 
warrant being refined in a way which makes it less general and 
more specific. Donaldson argues that it would seem difficult to 
justify the more specific form of the principle without appealing to 
considerations of consequences. If this is the case then the 
deontological principles seem hostage to consequent ia l is t 
considerations after all. 
Finally, Kantian deliberation can be criticised for its 
abstractness, especially in relation to its idealised account of human 
agency. This apparently renders Kantian ethics irrelevant to the 
moral deliberation of actual, nonidealized humans. Onora O'Neill, 
for example, maintains that since Kant's moral prescriptions amount 
to "a unique set of rules...and those rules could guide the action only 
of idealized, individual agents, then Kant's own specific ethical 
conclusions would be irrelevant in all human affairs" (O'Neill 1986, 
p. 137). However, while O'Neill thinks that there is a serious 
problem in this aspect of Kantian theory, she also thinks that a 
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revised version of Kantian ethics is salvageable. In Chapters 5 and 
6, I discuss O'Neill's application of a revised version of Kantian 
ethics to problems of the Third World in considerable detail. 
Rights 
(i) Rights talk common to various ethical traditions 
Rights talk seems to be common to competing ethical 
traditions and there have been deontological and consequentialist 
attempts to justify rights claims. Some central features of rights 
talk (especially human rights talk) are these. First, rights talk tends 
to locate the notion of human dignity as the central notion in moral 
discourse. Rights are taken to reflect one's status as a person. 
Second, neglect or violation of rights are typically invoked to 
criticise the unfortunate conditions under which people find 
themselves (Vincent 1992, p. 254). Third, talk of rights as natural 
or human identifies them as species-specific, and not as culture-
specific (Vincent 1992, p. 255). 
The possessors of rights (moral or legal) can be divided into 
three categories: individuals, states, and groups other than states. 
The rights of individuals include what are often referred to as 
human rights or natural rights, and these are considered to be 
possessed by each and every individual who is a member of 
humankind. Such rights are typically considered to be moral rights. 
The rights of states come about from the society of coexisting states. 
States are the principle subjects of international law and so the 
1 3 
rights of states are usually thought of as legal rights or political 
rights. Rights typically associated with states are the right to 
security of territory, the right to liberty as an independent polity 
and the right to economic sovereignty. Groups other than states, 
which include multinational corporations, churches and political 
groups, also play a role in international politics and are the subjects 
of rights. The rights of agencies other than states are at times 
considered as moral rights and at times considered as legal rights. 
Rights talk figures in rule-oriented ethical theories.^ While 
Kantian deliberation is typically articulated in the form of moral 
imperatives or duties, it is not uncommon for Kantian-centred 
deliberation to be in the form of rights talk. As Donaldson points 
out, "Kant would defend the existence of global obligations, and 
their corollaries, global human rights" (Donaldson 1992, p. 144). 
Kant, at times refers to the rights of states: "According to Kant, each 
state has an 'original right' to defend itself from harm" (Donaldson 
1992, p. 145). 
Within the contractarian tradition, rights have played an 
important role. John Rawls, for example, in developing a theory of 
justice for domestic liberal society, has as his first principle of 
justice that "each person is to have an equal right to the most 
^Each of these three categories of rights—the rights of individuals, states and 
non-state groups—can be variously considered as legal or moral rights. 
While we normally think of human rights as moral rights they can be 
considered as legal rights, as is the case with the United Nations declaration 
of human rights. Similarly, reference to the rights of states is normally a 
feature of legal discourse, but reference to such rights is also found in moral 
t h e o r y . 
^Natural-law theorists like Aquinas do not speak of rights, but modern 
natural-law theorists like John Finnis accord them a central role (Mapel & 
Nardin 1992, p. 311). 
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others" 
(Rawls 1972, p. 60). In Rawls' later work, in developing a theory of 
international justice, the rights of peoples (or states) play an 
essential role. Rawls also maintains that in order for a society to be 
well-ordered it must respect basic human rights (Rawls 1993, p. 
62). 
Rights talk has also found its way into consequentialist theory. 
John Stuart Mill, for example, thinks that to have a right "is to have 
something which society ought to defend me in the possession of" 
(Mill 1991, p. 189). For Mill, the justification of why society ought 
to defend one's possession of rights is grounded in personal 
security. Without this security, we could only find gratification in 
the moment as we could lose whatever we had the following 
moment by anyone who at the time was stronger than ourselves. 
Rights also play an important role in some contemporary 
consequentialist theories. Richard Hare, for example, maintains that 
rights "are, indeed, an immensely important element in our moral 
thinking—important enough to justify, in many cases, the claim that 
they are 'trumps'" (Hare 1981, p. 155). For Hare, rights play an 
important role at the intuitive level of moral reasoning and gain 
their justification at the critical level on account of their acceptance 
uti l i ty.9 That is, rights are justified, at the critical level of moral 
reasoning, if their general acceptance in the society in question will 
maximise the interests of all those in that society, considered 
impartially (Hare 1981, p. 156). 
91 elaberate on the contrast between the intuitive and critical levels of moral 
reasoning in Chs 3 and 4. 
(ii) Advantages of appeal to rights 
One promising feature of an appeal to rights, in deliberation 
on international relations, is that talk about rights is already so 
widespread. International agencies such as the United Nations and 
Amnesty International often refer to universal human rights and 
appeal to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is not 
uncommon for people to talk about the rights of women and the 
rights of children. Not only are the rights of states referred to, but 
also the rights of nations, peoples and races. So, it would seem that 
appealing to rights would be an accessible place to start in 
deliberation on international ethics. 
Another promising feature of the language of rights, applied 
to international relations, is that those who incur duties that 
correlate with rights are said to include a wide range of agencies 
and agents. Not only do states have rights but they also have 
duties. The duties of states may include the duty to ensure that the 
human rights of their citizens are not violated. Rights talk can 
apply to groups other than states. The rights of one group may 
ground a correlative duty for another group. For example, "a duty 
to avoid depriving may require a particular kind of provision from 
a mining company to a community habitually dependent on a 
subsistence agriculture that would be disrupted by development" 
(Vincent 1992, p. 260). 
(Hi) Disadvantages of appeal to rights 
Even so, this last virtue should not be exaggerated. For one 
problem associated with rights talk, particularly talk of human 
rights, is that it carries a vague message as to who actually has the 
correlative obligation. This is especially the case for positive 
rights—those rights which people have which require the assistance 
of others (O'Neill 1986, p. 117 ff.). For example, it is arguable that 
human rights include welfare rights such as the right to minimal 
subsis tence. However, in cases where individuals ' minimal 
subsistent needs are not met (or cannot be met) by their own 
government, it is not clear on whom the correlative obligation falls. 
According to O'Neill, within the discourse of rights, meeting 
the needs of those in extreme poverty is typically an imperfect 
duty which may be bestowed at will. The point here is that 
de l ibera t ion which takes r ights rather than obl igat ions as 
fundamental sees beneficence as less important. Since no one can 
meet the needs of all the extremely poor, meeting their needs 
cannot be a universal obligation. According to O'Neill, within rights 
theory, feeding the poor cannot be a perfect obligation but is rather 
an imperfect obligation. O'Neill maintains that imperfect obligations 
are seen by rights theorists as a matter of charity or optional 
beneficence (O'Neill 1986, p. 102). 
Another problem with making an appeal to rights central in 
dealing with ethical problems that arise out of international 
relations just is the fact that rights claims do not seem to be morally 
basic. They need to be justified in terms of further theory—be this 
deontological or consequentialist. So, while rights claims may play 
some role in moral theory, it is important not to take the rights 
claims as central. 
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A further possible problem with an appeal to rights, applied 
globally, is that it may not be sensitive to non-western values. It 
could be argued, for example, that the notion of human rights, as 
normally construed, reflects Western or Northern values—that the 
idea behind human rights, so construed, is to preserve and nurture 
one's individuality. Yet individualism is not a central value to all 
cultures. For example, within Socialist theory, it is not the 
individual which is the focus of moral importance but rather the 
group. As Vincent remarks: "because a socialist society has 
transcended the individualist self-interest of bourgeois society, the 
social grouping that achieved this became itself the subject of 
rights" (Vincent 1992, p. 263). Further, a Western construal of 
human rights may be inappropriate for those cultures in the South 
which take social harmony and the preservation of the fabric of 
social life as central political values. In such cultures, individuals 
gain their identity through a group rather than against it. This 
generates the idea that one has obligations to the group rather than 
rights claims against it, and that the rights of the group are more 
important than the rights of the individual. 
Finally, there are some problems with the extension of talk of 
rights beyond individuals to social or political entities like states. 
For example, some theorists argue that the (implicit or explicit) 
consent of individuals who make up the state gives the state certain 
rights; the idea being that the state then in return serves to further 
the interests of its members. Two problems with this are (i) that 
only those states which did have the consent of their members 
would enjoy the relevant rights, and (ii) that states tend not to be 
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the sorts of entity with which people can freely associate and from 
which people can freely disassociate. The first problem means that 
nondemocratic states are likely to lack the moral prerequisites to be 
rights holders. The second problem raises a general doubt about 
whether citizens can ever give the required noncoerced consent to 
their membership of a state. 
C o n t r a c t a r i a n i s m 
(i) Distinguishing Features 
The contractarian tradition typically falls into the category of 
rule-oriented theories. However, some theorists have maintained 
that some construals of the contractarian method yield utilitarian, 
consequentialist principles. What distinguishes contractarianism 
from other ethical traditions is the idea that moral principles, 
especially principles of justice, are developed and derive their 
justification through a social contract. While there has been wide 
disagreement among contractarians on what principles of justice are 
derived from social contract theory, there is considerable similarity 
in their method. Three common aspects of contractarian theory are: 
determining the circumstances under which justice is possible and 
necessary, a description of the moral constraints under which 
principles are chosen, and a theory of rational choice which explains 
why the relevant principles are chosen (Mapel 1992, p. 182). 
While a description of social circumstances is important to 
contractarian theories, there are varying views amongst competing 
theories as to what are the conditions or circumstances of justice. 
One way in which contractarians differ is in relation to the 
assumptions made concerning the motivations of individuals, or 
agencies such as states, towards social cooperation. Some assume 
that individuals or states are altruistic and law-abiding; while 
others assume that individuals or states are competitive and that 
social cooperation only comes about in the light of sanctions. 
Another important feature of contractarianism is that there 
are ethical constraints built into the initial 'contractual agreement'. 
But again, there is considerable disparity amongst the competing 
theories about what these ethical constraints are. Rawls, for 
example, develops his theory of justice around the participants 
having little detail about their actual circumstances in order to 
ensure that the principles agreed to would be impartial. By 
contrast, Hobbes develops his contractarian theory around the 
participants having considerable knowledge of their circumstances. 
Locke makes some extra-contractarian presumptions; for example, 
that individuals have certain natural rights. 
A feature common to contractarianism is that all have a 
theory about rational choice, which explains the principles which 
are generated. Here too there can be considerable divergence 
among the compet ing cont rac tar ian theor ies . Class ica l 
contractarians such as Hobbes focus on minimising certain harms. 
Contemporary contractarians such as Rawls maintain that the 
original choosers would want to maximise certain preferences 
within certain constraints. In his discussion of domestic justice 
within a liberal society, Rawls claims that individuals would want to 
maximise the benefi ts of the worst off members in society. 
Typically, the principles generated by contractarianism are not 
consequence-or iented principles. Rather, contractarian theorists 
tend to argue that contractarian reasoning generates principles 
which see rights as more important than some consequence-
oriented end state. 
Another area in which contractarian theorists diverge is in 
relation to their views on the likelihood of applying a contractarian 
theory of justice internationally. According to Mapel, classical 
contractarians such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau have deep 
affinities with classical political realism (Mapel 1992, pp. 186 ff.). 
Mapel argues that classical contractarians "[w]ith the partial 
exception of Locke. . . tend to regard individuals outside of civil 
society as primarily motivated by scarcity, fear, or a desire to 
dominate" (Mapel 1992, p. 187). While classical contractarians are 
inclined to view international cooperation as possible, they are 
dubious about its eventuality. Both Hobbes and Locke maintain 
that the preservation of the state is of more importance than 
maintaining cooperation at the international level. Accordingly, 
they see the possibility of international law and reciprocity as 
limited (Mapel 1992, pp. 188 f.). 
Contemporary contractarians, on the other hand, are more 
optimistic about the possibility of international justice. One such 
con tempora ry cont rac tar ian , who opt imis t ica l ly sketches an 
international theory of justice, is John Rawls. I shall focus the rest 
of this discussion on Rawls' recent work on an international theory 
of justice. 
(ii) Rawls' International Theory of Justice 
Ideal Theory 
In his Oxford Amnesty Lecture "The Law of Peoples", Rawls 
sets out to give a sketch of "how the law of peoples may be 
developed out of liberal ideas of justice similar to but more general 
than the idea [he] called justice as fairness and presented in [his] 
book A Theory of Justice" (Rawls 1993, p. 42).lo 
In developing a global theory of justice, Rawls attempts to 
include liberal societies and nonliberal societies. Three conditions 
that a society must satisfy to be included in Rawls' theory of the 
law of peoples are: that the domestic system of laws within that 
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society are seen as legitimate in the eyes of its own people, that the 
society honours basic human rights, and that the society respects 
principles of peace and is not expansionist. Rawls calls those 
nonliberal societies which satisfy these conditions well-ordered 
hierarchical societies. 
In determining principles of international j u s t i c e , w h i c h 
apply to both liberal and well-ordered hierarchical societies, Rawls 
sets up a method similar to his method used in A Theory of Justice. 
However, in the case of determining the law of peoples, each 
society's interests and conception of justice is secured by a 
lORawls makes a distinction between the law of peoples and international 
law. The former is made up of political concepts which include principles of 
right, justice and the common good. The law of peoples provides the concepts 
and principles by which international law can be judged (Rawls 1993, pp. 50 
f . ) . 
11 That is, the law of peoples. 
representative of that society. 12 Each representative is subject to 
the veil of ignorance and the parties then deliberate among 
available principles regarding the law of peoples. Being behind the 
veil of ignorance they do not know such things as the size of their 
territory, their population or the relative strength of the people 
whose fundamental interests they represent (Rawls 1993, pp. 54 & 
64).13 
Using this method, Rawls maintains that a set of familiar 
principles would be agreed upon. These principles include 
independence of peoples, peoples' right to self-defense, duties to 
observe treaties and undertakings and the duty to observe human 
rights (Rawls 1993, p. 55). According to Rawls, human rights 
include "the right to life and security, to personal property, and the 
elements of the rule of law, as well as the right to a certain liberty 
of conscience and freedom of association, and the right to 
emigration" (Rawls 1993, p. 68). 
Rawls argues that the principles of well-ordered liberal 
societies can be extended to well-ordered hierarchical societies. 
Rawls set out to show that "in the original position the 
representatives of well-ordered hierarchical societies would adopt 
the same law of peoples that the representatives of liberal societies 
l^Rawls regards his method of considering representatives of societies as the 
original choosers, rather than representatives of all individual persons of 
the world, as broader. According to Rawls, the alternative method would not 
take proper account of people's societal and cultural values and runs the risk 
of being too liberal (Rawls 1993, pp. 65 f.). 
13 In initially determining these international principles of justice, Rawls 
includes only the representatives of liberal societies behind the veil of 
ignorance. He then argues that the principles generated would be 
considered as reasonable principles by representatives of well-ordered 
h ierarchica l societ ies . 
do" (Rawls 1993, p. 60). Rawls does this in part by setting out three 
requirements for a society to be well-ordered. First, in order to be 
well-ordered a society "must be peaceful and gain its legitimate 
aims through diplomacy and trade, and other ways of peace" (Rawls 
1993, p. 61). Given this as a requirement, representatives of a 
well-ordered hierarchical society, who are behind the veil of 
ignorance, arguably would accept the same principles of 
nonexpansionism and peaceful conduct to which representatives 
from well-ordered liberal societies would agree. Second, the system 
of law of a well-ordered society must be guided by a common-good 
conception of justice. According to Rawls, this secures for each 
member of society certain minimal rights. These rights include the 
"means of subsistence and security (the right to life), to liberty 
(freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupations) and 
(personal) property as well as to formal equality...(for example, that 
similar cases be treated similarly)" (Rawls 1993, p. 62). The third 
requirement on a well-ordered society is that such a society 
respects basic human rights. 
Nonideal Theory 
Rawls' theory deals not only with well-ordered societies, both 
liberal and hierarchical, but with societies which lack the 
requirements to be well-ordered. This includes both those societies 
which refuse to acknowledge a reasonable law of the peoples and 
those societies which, because of their circumstances, find it 
difficult or impossible to become a well-ordered regime. 
Those regimes which refuse to acknowledge the reasonable 
law of peoples are what Rawls refers to as outlaw regimes. Outlaw 
regimes, according to Rawls, come in many forms. Some outlaw 
regimes "are headed by governments that seem to recognise no 
conception of right and justice at all; often their legal order is at 
bottom a system of coercion and terror" (Rawls 1993, p. 72). While 
Rawls acknowledges that, at best, law-abiding societies can reach a 
modus vivendi with outlaw regimes, they still have "a duty to the 
well-being of peoples subjected to outlaw regimes, though not to 
their rulers and elites" (Rawls 1993, p. 73, emphasis original). 
Rawls further addresses those societies that "lack the political 
and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and the 
resources, material and technological, that make well-ordered 
societies possible" (Rawls 1993, p. 74). In such cases, Rawls 
maintains, each society that is so burdened should be assisted in 
reaching conditions which make becoming a well-ordered society 
possible. Rawls advocates the security of human rights everywhere 
and that well-ordered societies have a duty to ensure that basic 
human needs are met everywhere. Such principles, according to 
Rawls, are not tied to a liberal conception of justice since they are 
principles of the law of peoples, which include well-ordered 
nonliberal societies. Rawls rejects the idea of applying the 
difference principle in such cases because he claims that it is liberal 
principle of justice, which some well-ordered nonliberal societies 
may reject. 
(Hi) Disadvantages of Rawls' Theory of International Justice 
Rawls' theory of international justice is not without its 
problems. According to Stanley Hoffmann, Rawls makes an 
unwarranted assumption in setting up the conditions under which 
the principles of justice are determined. In not asking the delegates 
of democratic peoples, who are to determine the international 
principles of justice, to ignore their political cultures, Rawls assumes 
that the diversity of political cultures, and the holds such cultures 
have on people's minds, are irremediable (Hoffmann 1992, p. 52). 
Rawls can be further criticised for developing principles of 
justice which pertain only to states and not to other of the world's 
agents and individuals. As Hoffmann points out, international 
society is made up of ''both a society of separate states (or peoples) 
and a society of individuals, who play an important role in world 
affairs" (Hoffmann 1992, p. 55). Rawls' "legalist" model does not 
properly take into account the ways in which individuals and 
agencies like international corporations can move across borders 
and disrupt states. Individuals and other non-state agencies can act 
across borders in ways which affect the economies of other states 
by such means as investment (Hoffmann 1992, p. 53). Other 
contractarians, such as Brian Barry, develop a theory of 
international justice by considering international society as being a 
society of individuals. (Rawls, himself, criticises this approach 
because it is too liberal and so doesn't take proper account of 
nonliberal conceptions of justice (Rawls 1993, p. 66).) So, while 
Rawls attempts to be sensitive to nonliberal political values, he 
neglects the role of individuals in international society. 
Another problem with Rawls' law of peoples is that it is not 
clear what would define a legitimate political unit. Rawls refers to 
peoples as "corporate bodies organised by their government [which] 
now exist in some form all over the world" (Rawls 1993, p. 50). 
This does not make it clear what a people's relation is to a state. As 
Hoffmann maintains, if we are to understand peoples as states "we 
need to know what groups of persons are entitled to establish one, 
and who is entitled to become a citizen" (Hoffmann 1992, p. 53). If 
peoples can be understood as states, further issues would also need 
to be addressed, such as the treatment of minorities. 
Another important issue on which Rawls' theory is fairly 
silent is conflict resolution when states are promoting their 
interests across borders. Rawls says too little about principles for 
forming and regulating possible associations of democratic societies 
and about standards for fair trade. Some recent difficult cases of 
states having conflicting interests include Japanese-American trade 
relations and Spanish and Canadian fishing practices (Hoffmann 
1992, p. 53). Moreover, even if Rawls did include a fuller account 
of such principles, it would be difficult on Rawls' view to justify a 
world government powerful enough to enforce them.^^ 
It is arguable that, even if Rawls' law of peoples was put into 
practice, there would still remain a highly unequal world of rich 
l^ In following Kant, Rawls maintains that a world government with legal 
powers exercisable by some central government "would be either a global 
despotism or else a fragile empire torn by frequent civil strife as various 
regions and peoples try to gain political autonomy" (Rawls 1993, p. 55). 
and poor states. While Rawls maintains that the delegates would 
agree to mutual assistance between people in times of famine and 
drought, this falls a long way short of his principles of distributive 
justice for liberal domestic society, which he earlier developed in A 
Theory of Justice (Hoffmann 1992, p. 53). 
Further problems arise in relation to the issue of determining 
principles to which representatives of "well-ordered hierarchical 
societies" would agree. First, given that such societies don't have 
free elections, it would be difficult to establish whether their 
governments and systems of law would be seen as legitimate in the 
eyes of their peoples. Second, it is difficult to give any clear answer 
to whether societies whose principles are built on ideological or 
religious doctrines are likely to respect human rights (Hoffmann 
1992, p. 55). 
Finally, there is a problem with the ways in which Rawls' 
theory of international justice is developed at the level of ideal 
theory. This is problematic, in dealing with a theory of 
international justice, because "in thinking about international affairs 
the best we can come up with, in 'ideal theory', is very thin. It may 
produce the Utopia of world government, or else take the form of 
Rawls's meagre law of peoples, which does not add much to old 
liberal notions of world harmony" (Hoffmann 1992, p. 55). As 
Hoffmann points out, Rawls has too little to say about non-ideal 
theory, which covers conditions of great injustice and social evil— 
conditions which are central to so many of the ethical issues that 
surround international justice. Rawls leaves us with only some 
vague objective: to "seek effective ways permitted by the law of 
peoples to move the society [that is, those societies that are not 
well-ordered] some distance toward the goal [of being a law-abiding 
society]" (Rawls 1993, p. 72). 
U t i l i t a r i a n i s m 
(i) Distinguishing Features 
The utilitarian tradition is a thoroughly consequence-oriented 
theory. While some utilitarians advocate rule utilitarianism, any 
justification for rules is dependent on the likely consequences of 
implementing those rules. There are two central features of 
utilitarianism. First, the only thing that is intrinsically good is 
utility or w e l l - b e i n g . Second, the only morally relevant factor in 
determining whether an action is right or wrong is its overall 
consequences, viewed impersonally. These two central features of 
utilitarianism amount to the claim that an agent ought to perform 
an action if and only if that action maximises utility. 
The foundations of utilitarianism are normally attributed to 
Jeremy Bentham. Bentham, however, was influenced by several of 
his predecessors, especially David Hume. Hume, who was not, 
strictly speaking, a utilitarian, set out to describe how our moral 
reactions have come about. For Hume, the feeling of moral approval 
is aroused by the disposition in people to promote the public good. 
He argues that such a disposition is approved of because it is 
15 Utilitarians differ in how they identify utility or well-being. For example, 
some identify it with pleasure, some with happiness (often construed as 
pleasure), some with the satisfaction of desires. 
socially useful, that is, it has utility. Hume, however, does not use 
'utility' in any strict utilitarian sense and does not claim that utility 
ought to be maximised. 
According to Bentham, all action is motivated by self-interest. 
In particular, one could act only to promote one's own happiness, 
which, for Bentham, is indistinguishable from pleasure. On the 
other hand, for Bentham, our moral duty is to promote general 
happiness, and this gives rise to a tension between our duty and 
our motive. For Bentham, this tension is resolvable. According to 
Anthony Ellis, there are factors which can make it in our interest to 
pursue general happiness, and "[t]he most interesting to Bentham 
were those that are provided by the government through the law: 
the various sorts of punishment and penalty (various sorts of pain) 
that the law exacts for actions that damage the general happiness" 
(Ellis 1992, p. 160). 
While utilitarians differ on what it is exactly that ought to be 
maximised, once they have agreed to the principle "that our duty is 
to secure the general happiness, then the rest of morality, political 
as well as individual, would reduce to a matter of empirical 
calculation" (Ellis 1992, p. 163). Calculations may then still be quite 
complex. Bentham, for example, proposed his 'felicific calculus' 
which was comprised of seven dimensions by which pleasure and 
pain are to be measured. These dimensions included intensity and 
duration; and so, for example, a brief, intense pain can be traded off 
for a mild but enduring pain. 
While Bentham identified utility (or happiness)—which was 
the only thing that was intrinsically desirable—with sensational 
pleasure, John Stuart Mill thought that some pleasures were more 
desirable than others. Mill maintains that "[i]t is quite compatible 
with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of 
pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others." (Mill 
1991, p. 138, emphasis original). For Mill, those pleasures that 
come about by exercising the higher faculties are of higher quality 
than those pleasures that are merely pleasures of sensation. 
An issue which has generated significant controversy is the 
role of justice within utilitarianism. Important issues on the role of 
justice include problems surrounding the distribution of utility. 
Firstly, if (given a stable population,) utility could be maximised by 
two different distributions, one where the utility was concentrated 
in a few, and the other where it was distributed equally but more 
thinly, which distribution is preferable? While some utilitarians 
maintain that neither distribution is preferable, others opt for a 
principle of equality, though it is difficult to see how that can be 
required under utilitarianism. A further issue that arises is 
whether or not utility is to be distributed according to some other 
criteria such as desert, need or merit. Some utilitarians, such as 
Mill and Hare, have argued that distribution in accordance with 
principles of justice does indeed maximise utility, 
Injustice plays an important role in Mill's theory of utilitarianism. Mill 
maintains that "[j]ustice is a name for certain classes of moral rules, which 
concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore 
of more absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life" 
(Mill 1991, p. 195). In Hare's case, principles of justice are important in 
maximising utility. I discuss Hare's moderate egalitarianism in Ch. 4. 
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Henry Sidgwick, an important figure in the development of 
utilitarianism, raised another issue for the theory that has been 
much discussed; namely, whether or not we should maximise total 
utility or average utility. This issue has often been related to 
problems with population policy. Is it preferable to have a small 
population where the happiness for most people is very high, or to 
have a very large population where the happiness for most people 
is quite low? In the first case, the average utility is likely to be very 
high but total utility relatively low whereas, in the second case, the 
average utility is likely to be quite low but the total utility 
relatively high (Ellis 1992, p. 168). A related question which could 
also arise concerns the control of death rates. If one aimed to 
maximise average utility, and those members of society who were 
less happy than average could be eliminated without decreasing the 
happiness of others, then it seems those members ought to be 
eliminated. On the other hand, if you aimed at maximising total 
happiness, which Sidgwick thought you ought to aim at, then you 
ought to increase population to the point where to increase it any 
further would decrease overall utility. In the latter case, this could 
very well mean that the average utility is relatively low. 
There have been various versions of utilitarianism, including 
rule utilitarianism. Rule utilitarianism contrasts with act 
utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism holds that "the right act is always 
that which maximizes utility" (Ellis 1992, p. 170). Rule 
utilitarianism holds that "[t]he correct rules are those the general 
observance of which maximises utility, and the correct action is 
always that which is in accord with such a rule even if, in a 
particular circumstance, it fails to maximise utility" (Ellis 1992, p. 
170). Richard Hare, whom I will be discussing in more detail in 
Chapters 3 and 4, is a preference utilitarian. Hare maintains that it 
is desires that ought be ranked preferentially, both intra-personally 
and inter-personally, and that one ought to aim at maximally 
satisfying desires generally. Hare tries to combine the virtues of 
both act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. He maintains that 
"we would be wise to be guided, not by a felicific calculation on 
each occasion, but by a set of well chosen prima facie principles, if 
we want to achieve those acts which even act-utilitarianism...would 
in full knowledge pronounce to be right" (Hare 1981, p. 192). Hare 
thinks that deliberating about each individual act would tend not to 
maximise utility; rather, we should follow those rules that have 
been tried and tested. He also maintains that we should develop 
our sentiments to make it difficult for us to act against those rules 
except in exceptional circumstances. 
(ii) Advantages of Utilitarianism 
One promising feature of applying ut i l i tar ianism to 
international affairs is that it is not tied to a narrow account of 
agency and so it does not presuppose that agents have idealized 
capacities to reason (O'Neill 1986, pp. 35 & 53). Being a 
consequence-oriented theory, actions and policies, quite generally, 
are open for assessment based on the actual or likely results of 
those actions or policies. 
Utilitarian reasoning also has the advantage, in its application 
to international affairs, of being accessible in a certain way. 
Consequential reasoning is entrenched in the decision-making 
procedures of individuals and agencies at various levels (O'Neill 
1986, p. 53). It is quite standard for individuals, institutions and 
agencies to decide on some course of action over the available 
courses of action in terms of which is likely to produce the best 
results. Policies of individuals and social agencies are often 
determined by some cost-benefit deliberation. 
Utilitarianism is deeply cosmopolitan and can allow for 
communitarian sensitivity. It is cosmopolitan in that one's moral 
obligation includes a duty to mankind in general. It allows for 
duties one may have to their nation, family or friends, but only 
insofar as such a duty is conducive to maximising overall utility. 
Utilitarianism allows for communitarian sensitivity insofar as it 
recognises that, because of human social and communal nature, the 
cultivation of communities and their particular values is often 
conducive to promoting the interests of the members of those 
communities. 
Utilitarianism can be deployed to justify political systems—for 
example, the existence of political entities like states. From a 
utilitarian point of view, however, political systems are merely 
instrumental to maximising the general good; so, the justification of 
states, or of any political institution or set of arrangements, depends 
on how well these promote the general good. While there have 
been some who have argued that utility would be maximised by 
some other system such as a world government, it seems that most 
utilitarians argue that utility is maximised by the existence of 
nation-states (Ellis 1992, p. 173). Moreover, utilitarianism can, in 
principle, tell us not only whether certain political institutions 
should exist; it can also tell us what aims and functions these 
institutions and entities ought to have. On the theory, the function 
of states and other institutions is to maximise utility. While, in the 
case of states, this perhaps would best come about normally by 
states maximising the utility of their own members, in some cases, 
when states have conflicting interests, the principle of utility would 
instruct states to maximise global utility. 
(in) Disadvantages of Utilitarianism 
One problem with applying utili tarianism to practical, 
international issues is the difficulty in reaching some conclusive 
decision on what ought to be done. One reason for this difficulty is 
that, when engaging in the empirical calculations of expected 
consequences, it can turn out that the consequences are so far 
reaching that it is practically impossible to reckon what they are 
with any certainty. Another reason why appying utilitarian 
reasoning to practical, international issues can be inconclusive is 
that, because of our cognitive limitations, it is difficult to consider 
every possible course of action. Consider the way in which 
utilitarians differ on what ought to be done in relation to the 
practical issue of famine relief. Garrett Hardin and Peter Singer, 
both of whom argue f rom uti l i tar ian premisses , defend 
diametrically opposed conclusions on what we ought to do in 
relation to global famine and starvation. Peter Singer argues that 
we (that is, the moderately well-off people in wealthy countries 
such as Australia) ought to give up our material resources to relieve 
the suffering associated with famine "until we reach the level of 
marginal utility—that is, the level at which, by giving more, I would 
cause as much suffering to myself or my dependents as I would 
relieve by my gift" (Singer 1979, p. 32). Garrett Hardin, on the 
other hand, argues that we ought not to give aid to famine victims 
because giving aid would allow the poorer nations to increase in 
population at a rate greater than they would otherwise, which in 
the end would result in more people suffering from famine (Hardin 
1977, p. 279 ff.)- On the one hand, it could be argued that Singer 
does not consider the far reaching consequences of famine relief; 
alternatively, it could be argued that Hardin does not consider the 
consequences of all the possible courses of action, such as aid in the 
form of population control. 
A related problem with applying utilitarianism to issues of 
international relations is that there are often considerable 
inaccuracies in determining which acts or policies would maximise 
utility. One reason for this is that there can be difficulties in 
identifying, without bias, those acts which would maximise utility. 
For example, while the meeting of basic needs is typically taken 
into consideration when deliberating about the preferences of 
others, some preferences, which are tied to other peoples' cultures, 
are often overlooked—preferences concerning such matters as land, 
caste, tribe, tradition and religious affiliation. ̂  ^ 
Finally, Onora O'Neill criticises utilitarian reasoning because it 
cannot be both critical of established ethical outlooks and accessible 
l^O'Neill raises this objection in O'Neill 1986, p. 67. See my Ch. 5 , the section, 
'O'Neill on the Virtues and Vices of Consequentialism', subsection (ii), 'Vices 
of Consequentialism', part (a), 'Calculating benefits and O'Neill's third 
s t a n d a r d ' . 
to the relevant agents and agencies. In brief, utilitarian reasoning 
aspires to accurate, perspectiveless, empirical deliberation. In the 
case of global issues, such deliberation, even if possible, would be 
accessible only to certain experts, and so would not be accessible to 
many of those whose action is needed (O'Neill 1986, p. 84 ff.).i8 
Conclusion 
So far I have characterised some of the main ethical theories 
that apply to international relations and I have given what I take to 
be their chief, generic advantages and disadvantages. In the 
chapters that follow I consider Susan George's proposal to solve the 
Third World crisis, especially in relation to extensive distributive 
inequalities, in the light of two ethical theories that clearly apply to 
issues of international distributive justice. One theory is Hare's 
preference utilitarianism and the other is O'Neill's Kantian-inspired 
theory. I have chosen to assess George's proposal in terms of these 
two theories for the following reasons. First, each theory represents 
a relevant contribution to the solution of problems of international 
justice that arise in relation to Third World poverty and debt. 
Second, each theory represents such a contribution to issues of 
justice for the Third World from within a different and important 
ethical tradition. Among the ethical theories that apply to 
18See my Ch. 5, the section, 'O'Neill on the Virtues and Vices of 
Consequentialism', subsection (ii), 'Vices of Consequentialism', part (b), 
'Reckoning the consequences and O'Neill's second standard'. 
international relations that I have reviewed above, utilitarianism 
and Kantianism are significant contenders.!^ 
19of course, as I comment in Ch. 3, Hare sees himself as reconciling central 
aspects of Kantianism and preference utilitarianism. However, the 
reconciliation is controversial (See Ch. 3, fn. 5). 
CHAPTER 2 
SUSAN GEORGE'S ANALYSIS OF THE THIRD WORLD DEBT CRISIS AND 
HER PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Before proceeding to assess Susan George's proposed solution 
to the Third World debt crisis in the light of Hare's and O'Neill's 
ethical theories, I need to outline the salient details of George's 
analysis of the debt crisis and her proposed solution. i I appeal to 
Susan George's analysis and proposed solution as she is well-known 
and highly regarded for her independent contribution to discussion 
of the Third World debt crisis.^ In this chapter, I set out George's 
account of (i) why Third World debt is such a problem and (ii) some 
of the central, contributing causes of Third World debt. I then 
outline George's own proposed 3-D solution^ to the debt crisis and 
contrast it with the IMF solution. In subsequent chapters, I consider 
how just a solution to the problem of Third World debt George's 3-D 
solution is.4 
1 While Susan George's book A Fate Worse Than Debt was first published in 
1988 and reprinted with revisions in 1989, in the foreword to the 1994 
printing, George maintains that 'Third World debt is, so to speak, flourishing 
and that this book is more relevant than ever" (George 1994, p. ix). 
^Barry Wilkins is among those who hold George's independent analysis of 
Third World debt in high regard. Wilkins refers to George's analysis as 
powerful and incisive (Wilkins 1992, p. 182). 
3George calls her solution the 3-D solution because she proposes to use the 
debt crisis as a means of promoting democracy and sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t . 
4Before proceeding it is important to make some general remarks on the 
vocabulary used. Throughout the literature to which I refer, a distinction is 
often drawn between the South and the North. This is simply because the 
wealthier, developed countries (members of the so called First World) tend to 
be in the northern hemisphere whereas the poorer, developing countries 
(members of the so called Third World) tend to be in the equatorial regions 
and in the southern hemisphere. There are, however, some exceptions to this 
Why Third Word Debt is Such a Problem 
In this section, I detail Susan George's account of Third World 
debt. In particular, I focus on what George claims to be the problem 
with Third World debt. I indicate her views on how this debt 
affects ordinary people in First World and Third World countries. 
(i) Debt serviceability 
According to Susan George, Third World debt topped the 
trillion-dollar mark in 1986 (George 1989, p. 12). 
George points out that debt is not necessarily a bad thing. 
Many people profit from borrowing money. Companies borrow and 
pattern. For example, Australia and New Zealand are countries that are 
geographically south but have, for most of their population, present living 
standards which are comparable with First World standards. So, in the 
literature, the 'North' is used to refer to First World countries, even though 
some of these countries are in the southern hemisphere and the 'South' is 
used to refer to Third World countries. 
Throughout the relevant literature, there is also a distinction often 
made between creditor and debtor nations. Susan George often uses this 
terminology. However, some First World governments such as those of 
Australia and the United States are in debt but have living standards which, 
for most of their population, are considerably better than those in most other 
nations. For George, a 'debtor' country is one which is in considerable debt 
and is having great difficulty in servicing its loans. A typical characteristic 
of what George refers to as a 'debtor' country is the implementation of 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies (which are often imposed). In 
general, I will refer to such 'debtor' countries as Third World countries. 
Throughout this thesis, I will mostly employ the contrastive terms 
'First World' and 'Third World' to mark the widely different conditions under 
which the peoples of the world live. I will refer to Third World countries as 
those which, for the most part, have a standard of living which is 
considerably less than that presently enjoyed by most of the population in 
nations such as Australia and the United States. It is difficult to define exactly 
what constitute Third World conditions. Such conditions would include 
considerable undernourishment due to lack of food, high mortality rates 
among infants, a generally low life-expectancy, and widespread suffering 
brought about by poverty. It is possible for countries which presently count 
as First World countries to be temporarily placed in Third World conditions, 
say in the event of war or natural disaster. The focus of this thesis, however, 
is long standing Third World conditions brought about, at least partly, by 
in ternat ional debt. 
at times are perceived as functioning well when they are deep in 
debt, since this indicates that they are credit-worthy. Governments 
borrow from their citizens in terms of government securities, from 
banks and from international institutions. The United States (US) in 
1986 had a public debt of $(US) 2 trillion, which was twice that of 
the Third World.5 
The problem is not simply that countries are in debt, nor is it 
necessarily the size of the debt. Debts become critical when they 
can no longer be serviced. When the cost of servicing debts or 
paying back the interest becomes so high that new loans are 
needed, the problem becomes critical. 
In order to service debts, debtor countries need money. This 
money can be obtained either by a trade surplus or by borrowing 
more money. If there is not a surplus of trade there is a need to 
borrow. If such a process continues then the debt grows to a point 
where even paying back the interest becomes unmanageable and 
the country falls into a spiral where the debt continually increases 
with no end in sight. 
As George points out, in the case of the Third World, debt is at 
the point where servicing under present terms involves massive 
sacrifice for most of those in the Third World. For some countries, 
full servicing seems impossible. The money borrowed has often 
been unproductively used, and further money is being borrowed to 
5 Following George I use the US convention for 1 trillion, which is 1 million x 
1 million. Furthermore, all monetary figures I quote will be in $(US), for 
which I will simply use '$'. 
service the debt. This drives the debtors further into debt and is 
again unproductive.6 
(ii) Poverty and inequalities 
When a country's debt comes to an alarming level and 
problems in serving the debt become apparent, both external and 
internal pressures are applied to the people of the debtor country in 
order to service the debt. Taxes are often increased, wages 
decreased, and basic food items are increased in price. Due to a 
reduction in government spending, people often lose their jobs. 
This pressure is not felt uniformly across the population. According 
to George, it is typically the poorest who are hardest hit. By the 
1980s organisations such as the World Food Assembly (WFA) 
maintained that debt "was becoming the great, unsung cause of 
increased hunger and lack of food security" (George 1989, p. 1). 
George gives detailed accounts of the poverty and suffering 
which have arisen from Third World debt. She describes the 
conditions under which a large portion of the population in Third 
World countries lives. Basic needs such as food, education and 
medicines have become increasingly unaffordable to the poorest in 
the Third World. While debt has meant hardships and suffering to 
the poor in Third World countries, there are power elites in the First 
World and Third World who profit handsomely from Third World 
debt . 
^This further borrowing is unproductive insofar as the newly incurred debt 
is not conducive to development. 
The burden of Third World debt is carried not only by people 
in the Third World debtor nations. Many people in the First World 
creditor nations are also bearing the burden. 
(in) The Debt Boomerang 
According to George, the majority of citizens from First World 
countries are also bearing the debt burden in what she describes as 
the six boomerangs: environmental destruction, drugs, cost to tax 
payers, unemployment and lost markets, immigration pressures, 
and heightened conflict and war. George uses the term boomerang 
to describe how the Third World debt "strikes the North as it flies 
back from the South" (George 1992, p. xiii). 
First, debt-induced poverty causes those in the Third World to 
exploit natural resources in the most immediately profitable way. 
This is typically the least sustainable use of natural resources. 
Among the consequences are an increase in global warming and a 
depletion of genetic bio-diversity (George 1992, pp. 1 ff.). 
Second, illegal drugs such as cocaine are the major earners for 
heavily indebted Latin-American countries such as Peru, Bolivia 
and Columbia. According to George, these countries can earn more 
export dollars from producing and processing coca than they can 
from legal crops. The social and economic cost of drug consumption 
in the creditor countries is extreme. According to George, it costs 
the US $60 billion per year (George 1992, pp. 34 ff.). 
Third, governments in the First World, such as the US and the 
United Kingdom (UK), have used their tax payers' money to give 
banks tax concessions so that they can write off so-called 'bad 
debts' from Third World countries (George 1992, pp. 63 ff.). But in 
most cases this has not reduced the actual debts of the Third World 
debtor countries. George claims that by 1991 the larger banks in 
the UK had gained tax credits for half their exposure (George 1992, 
p. 79). 
Fourth, due to the indebtedness of the Third World, imports of 
First World goods have become unaffordable. Consequently, the 
countries of the First World have lost markets, which has resulted 
in the loss of jobs in the First World. In 1990, at a sub-committee 
of the US Senate Finance Committee, Stuart Tucker estimated that 
the loss of jobs due to these lost exports accounted for one fifth of 
the total US unemployment (George 1992, p. 101). The Third World 
countries have also increased production of selective crops (cash 
crops) which were traditionally produced in the First World. This 
has resulted in further job losses in the First World. 
Fifth, the number of immigrants and refugees from Third 
World countries has been increasing. People are fleeing the poverty 
and hardships (brought about, at least in part, by economic policies 
imposed by the IMF) of their Third World countries in hope for a 
better future in the First World. According to the International 
Labour Oganisation (ILO) there were more that 100 million legal or 
illegal immigrants or refugees in the world in 1991 (George 1992, 
pp. 112 & 186). 
The final boomerang that George discusses is the threat of war 
that results from the debt crisis (George 1992, pp. 136 ff.). 
According to George, Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 largely in 
retaliation of Kuwait's insistence that Iraq repay a $12 billion loan 
(George 1992, pp. 154 ff.).^ Third World countries typically spend 
heavily on militarization. While lacking in economic bargaining 
power, they can often appeal to their military power. 
(iv) Debtor nations have little bargaining power and are open to 
exploitation 
George points out that if the debtor nations are to service 
their loans, they need to obtain money by exporting more than they 
import (George 1989, pp. 58 ff.). Debtor nations are being 
prevented from exporting because of the tariffs in the First World. 
The tariffs make the price of the goods produced in the Third World 
too expensive to compete with the domestically produced goods. 
The Third World countries are also not getting a fair price for their 
goods. As a result, they are not exporting more than they import. 
To service their loans they then need to borrow further. Some 
effects of this are that the debtor countries go further into debt, 
there is a reduction in overall international trade, the debtors are 
unable to purchase the equipment they need to boost production, 
and they are unable to afford such essentials as medicine and 
foodstuffs (George 1989, p. 59). 
Because of the disadvantaged economic position of the debtor 
nations, they are susceptible to coercion.8 For instance, due to the 
success of the Brazilian computer industry, IBM computers were 
7 George uses the US convention for 1 billion, which is 1 thousand x 1 million. 
81 use the term 'coercion' here in a fairly broad sense. I discuss different 
notions of coercion in detail in Ch. 6. 
losing their export profits from Brazil. In May 1986, the US sent 
their Under-Secretary of State to warn Brazil that they could lose 
their steel, shoes, and orange juice markets to the US if they didn't 
allow IBM to supply the computers (George 1989, p. 72). 
In summary, the problem with Third World debt is that the 
debt is so large that servicing it has become impossible. The debt 
results in poverty and hunger for a large portion of the people in 
the Third World; but the debt also affects detrimentally many in the 
First World. Because of their desperate circumstances, many of the 
people in the Third World are open to exploitation, especially the 
poorest of the poor. 
The Causes of Third World Debt 
George outlines a number of central, contributing causes of 
Third World debt. One of these causes is what is known as the 
development model, which she sometimes dubs 'the mal-
development model'. 
(i) The development model 
The development model embraces the policy that it is in each 
country's interest to participate as much as possible in world trade. 
The IMF was set up at the end of the Second World War to 
implement such a policy as best it could. This policy was adopted 
by both the First World and the Third World. It was an outer-
directed, export-oriented policy. It favoured economic growth, 
industrialisation and modernisation. 
George describes this model as imitative. The Third World 
wanted to become like the rich First World. However, George 
maintains that such a model did not take into account some 
important features of the local cultures in the Third World. 
Typically, the Third World was predominantly dependent on small-
scale peasant agriculture (George 1989, pp. 14 f.). The history and 
social foundations of the First World were very different from the 
history and social foundations of the Third World. 
Part of the development model also involved modernisation, 
which included consumerism. An example of relentless 
consumerism, which was part of the image of modernisation, is the 
buying spree that was rampant in Chile from 1979 to 1982, where 
people could exchange Chilean pesos, which were unrealistically 
overvalued, for American dollars. As a result of this, middle-class 
Chileans were purchasing imported rather than nationally made 
goods. This resulted in Chilean firms not being able to sell their 
goods and consequently they went out of business. Trade deficit 
and unemployment soared. In 1988 Chile had a debt of $19 billion 
($1540 per head), $11 billion of which was owed to banks due to 
such spending sprees (George 1989, pp. 15 f.). 
The development model that proved expensive to Chile was 
typical of the development model that was applied to Third World 
countries. This development model, and the borrowing that 
accompanied it, gave some of the power elites the opportunity to 
gain at others' expense by way of capital flight and corruption. 
(ii) Capital flight and corruption 
According to George, corrupt government officials who took 
out loans in the name of their country often reinvested large 
portions of this money in First World commercial banks, in their 
own private accounts. The debtor country was still left with the 
debt to pay, with no investment or little investment in the debtor 
country. National companies were also known to partake in similar 
practices. Companies have been known to borrow money from 
abroad, have their government guarantee their debt on the 
pretence that they will invest at home, and then, rather than invest 
at home, reinvest abroad (George 1989, pp. 19 ff.). In 1986, Morgan 
Guaranty estimated that seventy per cent of the new loans from 
1983 to 1985 to the big ten Latin American^ debtors resulted in 
capital flight. In that period, it is estimated that Mexico had an 
estimated $16 billion worth of capital flight with new net 
borrowings of only $9 billion, lo 
Much of Third World debt can be accounted for by what 
George describes as outright theft. For example, there were a 
number of loans made to Nicaragua under Somoza for the 
reconstruction of Managua after an earthquake in 1972. Most of 
this money was pocketed by Somoza (George 1989, p. 18). Another 
example of such corruption that George mentions is the Philippines' 
^The big ten Latin American debtors at this time were Brazil, Mexico, 
Venezuela, Peru, Columbia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile. 
l^The recently deposed president of Zaire (now The Democratic Republic of 
Congo), General Mobutu Sese Soko, was estimated to have squandered the 
equivalent of the entire country's debt, in the form of capital flight and 
extravagances such as several european châteaux. The Zairian debt in 1987 
was estimated at $6 billion (George 1989, pp. 106 ff.). 
Morong (Bataan) nuclear power plant which was ordered in 1976 
from Westinghouse for a price of $2.1 billion. This purchase was 
made against a quote by General Electric for half this amount. 
Westinghouse acknowledges paying a 'commission' to Marcos which 
is believed to have been $80 million. Because the plant was found 
to be located in a zone of high seismic activity, it was never 
operational (George 1989, pp. 18 f.).ii 
(Hi) Militarisation 
George cites the purchasing of arms as another form of non-
productive spending that has helped to boost Third World debt. She 
estimates that by 1987, 20 per cent of Third World debt could have 
been attributed to the purchasing of arms. The IMF, as part of its 
adjustment programs, insists that debtors make drastic reductions 
in civil s p e n d i n g . By contrast, it doesn't insist on the reduction of 
arms spending, giving as its reason that that would be "interfering 
in the internal affairs of sovereign nations" (George 1989, p. 22). 
As George points out "an obvious but often conveniently forgotten 
point is that arms purchases are never productive. They produce 
no wealth and, when not manufactured locally, they don't even 
create jobs or inject money into the local economy" (George 1989, p. 
l i l t is also claimed that by 1988 up to $40 billion of Brazil's debt was due to 
non-operational nuclear reactors (George 1989, pp. 18 f.). The pursuit of 
prestige has also contributed to corruption. For example, not only did 
General Mobutu of Zaire transfer his squandered money overseas, but he also 
built Presidential mansions in each of the country's eight provinces. He was 
said to own over fifty Mercedes and jet planes which were, in part, paid for 
by national borrowings (George 1989, pp. 106 ff.). 
Areas typically targeted are welfare, education, health, housing, public 
transport—essential services for reasonable living standards. 
13 It is quite ironic that they give this as a reason since the IMF adjustment 
programs typically interfere with other internal affairs of sovereign states. 
24). Armies are unproductive and expensive to keep, both in times 
of peace and in war.i^ 
(iv) The money mongers 
George describes much of the Third World debt as due to 
recklessness on the part of the bankers and borrowers. The 
borrowers often took out loans for non-productive projects and for 
militarisation. The bankers, those who arranged the loans, often 
saw the nature of their work as only to ensure that these loans 
were made. When giving these loans, considerations of how 
productive the projects might be were typically not their concern. 
They often realised that if they didn't lend the money, others 
would. At times they even realised that the project was not 
productive for the country of the borrower, and further, they had 
good reason to believe that it would be squandered by those in 
power and that there was a high risk that the debtor could not 
repay the loan (George 1989, pp. 30 ff.). 
According to George, the lenders, the international bankers, 
typically took no interest in the local people to whose country they 
were peddling money. Unlike domestic banking, where lenders 
make sure a company has enough assets to cover its debt, credit-
worthiness was typically not taken into consideration in 
international banking. The bankers would ensure that the loans 
were guaranteed by a central bank or from the government (George 
1989, p. 31). This was the common practice of bankers at least until 
14it can be conceded that the military may provide emergency assistance 
during natural disaster or ward off pirates stealing what has already been 
produced. (Gun boats were recently purchased by the Philippines from 
Australia for protecting their fisheries.) 
the early eighties. It was believed that countries could not go 
b a n k r u p t . 
The banks had lent money frivolously. This not only left the 
Third World in debt but it also generated fear in the First World 
that the banks would become insolvent. The US Treasury stepped 
in and sheltered the banks from their ill-advised lending decisions 
at the tax-payers' expense. As a result, the big nine banks of the US 
profited handsomely in this time from 1982 to 1986 because their 
dividends increased and there was a rise in share values (George 
1989, p. 39). 
In many cases, according to George, "banks were simply 
financing US and European corporations that wanted to sell their 
products in the Third World. Banks thus had no reason to care 
about what was happening inside the borrowing country: they were 
f inancing not the Philippines and Brazil but Boeing and 
Westinghouse, usually in partnership with the Export-Import Bank 
(and other national equivalents)" (George 1989, p. 45). Those left 
with the debt burden were the citizens of the debtor countries. 
George notes two other contributive causes of Third World debt. First, in 
the 1980s, interest rates didn't fall as much as inflation rates. Previous to this 
time, particularly in the mid to late 1970s, inflation was greater than interest 
rates. The net effect of this was that people were being paid to borrow. It was 
cheaper for countries to borrow than to dip into their reserves. "New loans 
were sought to pay off old ones. Indebtedness snowballed" (George 1989, p. 
28) . 
Another detrimental feature for the Third World, especially for non-
oil exporting countries, was the rise in oil prices. There were sharp rises in 
1973_74 and again in 1979-80. In the 1974-82 period, these countries imported 
nearly $345 billion. Had oil prices increased at the same rate as other 
commodities, the Third World would have paid only $85 billion (George 1989, 
p. 28). Even oil-exporting countries such as Mexico weren't prevented from 
falling deep into debt. "PEMEX, the Mexican state oil corporation, borrowed 
$20 billion all by itself—a quarter of the total Mexican debt in 1982" (George 
1989, p. 29). 
5 1 
The IMF Solution to Third World Debt 
George focuses on the IMF because it is an agency which has 
played a large role in 'solving' the debt crisis. George maintains that 
its 'solutions' have not helped the debtors economically and have 
had disastrous social consequences.^ ^ 
In the 1970s, the IMF played a relatively small role. "In those 
days nobody wanted the IMF around—the lenders because they 
were self-congratulatory about their efficient recycling of petro-
dollars, the borrowers because they had no desire to submit to the 
Fund's stringent conditions... .Between 1974 and 1979 the IMF 
supplied less than 5 per cent of the financing needs of the 
developing countries" (George 1989, p. 48). In the early eighties, in 
the wake of global recession, the lending banks realised that they 
could have serious repayment problems with their Third World 
loans. 
The banks could then see that it was to their advantage to 
have an international agency such as the IMF which had "both the 
l^George also finds the Baker plan, proposed by James Baker in 1985, 
unsatisfactory as it is not significantly different from the development model 
and the austere strategies of the IMF (George 1989, pp. 190 f.). George finds 
Bradley's proposal, put forward by Senator Bill Bradley, more satisfactory 
than Baker's and that of the IMF, as it is more sensitive to those in the Third 
World who are bearing the burden of the debt (George 1989, p. 193 f.). George 
also discusses a number of proposals and strategies that have been 
implemented from within the South. While some, such as the initiatives of 
the Cartagena Group, the Peruvian president Perez, and the People's 
Economic Organizations, work independently towards greater equality and 
the meeting of people's basic needs, there is, according to George, a need for 
such groups to unite in their efforts. These are not criticized by George for 
their motives but, rather, for their incompleteness. These initiatives are not 
effective when operating in isolation. This is why George emphasises the 
need to act in concert (George 1989, pp. 213 ff.). 
l^This problem was worsened by the increase in the rise in real interest 
r a t e s . 
clout to force repayment and the capacity to mobilize enough 
financial resources to make repayment possible" (George 1989, p. 
49) . xhe banks also saw it to their advantage to have someone 
else lend their money. The IMF is said to be funded by member-
states' quotas and other contributions.^9 This money which funds 
the IMF comes from the states, a practice which "enforces taxation 
without representation on the citizens of the industrialized 
countries" (George 1989, p. 49). 
The IMF was created at the end of the Second World War 
when the US was in need of an institution that would help re-
establish and promote trade. The IMF had as its objective to 
promote the growth of world trade (George 1989, p. 50). If 
countries were importing more than they were exporting, the IMF, 
through adjustment programs, would force them "to increase that 
participation, even if this is demonstrably against the best interests 
of the people concerned" (George 1989, p. 50). 
George describes the IMF as powerful and influential. If the 
IMF does not approve loans to a country then other sources see that 
country as a considerable credit risk. Debtor countries are reluctant 
to resist the IMF's proposals because there is little hope of obtaining 
loans from other sources without the 'IMF's stamp of approval' 
(George 1989, p. 51). 
18 The IMF has the clout that (say) banks or creditor governments don't have 
because countries in need of borrowing, especially Third World countries, 
depend on IMF approval to borrow from other financial institutions. If a 
country is considered a 'bad debtor' by the IMF, then other financial 
institutions will see that country as too high a risk to lend money to. 
l^The IMF was set up to assist and promote world trade. A number of 
governments contributed to the IMF resources which were then meant for 
borrowing in times of need. 
The way the IMF programs are set up is based upon the idea 
of reducing domestic consumption and increasing exports. George 
notes that what these programs usually amount to is: "...devaluation 
of the currency (to discourage imports and encourage exports); 
drastic reduction of government expenditure, particularly social 
spending and elimination of food and other consumption subsidies; 
privation of government enterprises and/or increase in prices 
charged by them (electricity, water, transportation, etc.) and the 
abolit ion of price controls; 'demand management ' (meaning 
reduction of consumption) through caps on wages, along with 
restrictions of credit, and higher taxes and interest rates in an effort 
to reduce inflation" (George 1989, p. 52). 
Two main problems George finds with this are: first, the elites, 
often the military, typically benefit from such measures while most 
of the people are worse off, especially the poorest; second, those 
who suffer from these measures are not the ones who brought 
about or gained from the irresponsible debts in the first place—who 
were again the elites (George 1989, p. 52) 
The IMF has often denied responsibility for the social 
consequences of its policies. George cites Jacques de Larosiere, one 
of the IMF's former managing directors. In his defence of the IMF, 
de Larosiere claimed that the IMF is not responsible for the way in 
which the required effort to repay debts is distributed among the 
various social groups and the various expenditure categories. 
Distribution of burden in any particular country is something that is 
decided by government of that country. De Larosiere commented 
that "the fund cannot take upon itself the role of dictating social and 
political objectives to sovereign governments" (George 1989, p. 53). 
George, on the other hand, believes that the IMF could make 
"greater social equality, access to education, health care and other 
basic services, fairer income distribution, etc." part of its programs 
(George 1989, p. 53). George further claims that those countries 
which have insisted on maintaining social objectives have had the 
greatest difficulties with the IMF. According to George, there is no 
evidence that the IMF wants to apply any of the just mentioned 
social and economic policies. 
The IMF is claimed to be a non-political institution. Voting 
power, however, is proportional to the member-country quotas. 
This, George claims, gives the US de facto veto power on the most 
important policy issues (George 1989, p. 55).^^ 
George picks Jamaica, in the period from 1977 to 1987, as a fair example to 
test the IMF solution to Third World Debt. Jamaica had implemented IMF 
policies over this period of time and it was small enough to be responsive to 
the IMF policies. Jamaica had also been politically cooperative with the views 
of the larger banks, creditor-country governments and their central banks, 
the World Bank and the IMF (George 1989, pp. 171 ff.). 
In assessing the success of the IMF solution, George focusses on two 
key features: the state of the economy as a whole, and how ordinary 
Jamaicans fared. First, in assessing the economic position of Jamaica, George 
claims that the debt in Jamaica rose from $150m in 1971 to $813m in 1976, 
$1.7b in 1979 to $3.3b in 1987 (George 1989, p. 174). There was a drop in real 
incomes of 25 per cent and inflation went up 320 per cent from 1972 to 1980. 
Joblessness hit a record 31 per cent in 1979. Local food production declined 
and food imports rose (George 1989, p. 176). In short, the IMF adjustment 
programs did not solve the economic problems that Jamaica was facing. In 
fact, Jamaica's economic position continually weakened. 
So what did this mean to the Jamaicans? Because of the policies of the 
IMF, such as reducing government spending, health, education and public 
transport became too expensive for the poor and government subsidies 
disappeared. Part of the IMF policy was to devalue the Jamaican dollar. Since 
Jamaica was locked into the international economy, the cost of fuel and food 
products (most of which are imported) became more expensive. 
The IMF had encouraged the government to export and was not 
concerned with supplying food for local people. Prices of things that were 
essential to small farmers rose so much that many went out of business. The 
small farmers relied on machinery, fertilizers and seeds, the prices of which 
sky-rocketed. Malnutrition rose in Jamaica in this period (George 1989, p. 
185). Furthermore, due to devaluation, and since most basic drugs were 
Goerge's 3-D Solution 
George points out that the effectiveness of her own 3-D 
solution will be conditional on greater unity among the debtors and 
on the political backing of both the First and Third Worlds. It will 
also require that moves be made away from international markets 
and that there be a focus on meeting the real needs of the people at 
t̂ jQ the grass-roots of society in the Third World. George's solution 
is agriculturally based, gives rural people representation, and gives 
priority to the landless and to women. George argues that Third 
World debt could be used to promote democracy and real 
development in the Third World. She also thinks that First World 
governments and institutions are unlikely to deviate from the 
development model unless there is strong and sustained popular 
p res su re . 
In her 3-D solution, George proposes that the debts be paid in 
two ways: reimbursement in cash and reimbursement in kind. The 
first instance of debt that she addresses is low-income African debt 
which accounts for at most 7 per cent of global Third World debt. 
Since only 10-15 per cent of Africa's debt is owed to banks, George 
maintains that there is opportunity "to experiment, innovate, and 
take modest risks in managing the reimbursement process to the 
ultimate benefit of everyone involved" (George 1989, p. 246). 
imported, many had to do without basic medical needs (George 1989, p. 186). 
Also, hygiene in the hospitals worsened. Health care and hospitals became 
increasingly more expensive and, for many women, pre-natal care and birth 
delivery in hospitals was too expensive. 
(í) African debt 
(a) Reimbursement in cash 
Reimbursement in cash involves paying back the debt in the 
debtors ' local currencies. George proposes that African 
governments make regular interest payments into a national 
development fund. Each state's fund would be represented by 
democratically elected representatives of the civil society and 
representatives of the state. The fund would then make loans to 
small-scale farmers and rural entrepreneurs. "Each payment made 
by a government into its own national development fund would 
trigger a corresponding reduction (or, on the matching-grant 
principle, double or triple reduction) of its external debt in hard 
currency by the IMF, the multilateral development banks and the 
official bilateral creditors" (George 1989, p. 249). The creditors, 
however, would not receive any further repayments, since the 
money that the development fund receives would be reused 
internally in that country. 
George points out that repressive governments, especially 
military regimes, would be resistant to such programs. This is why 
she thinks outside pressure is necessary. However, because 
virtually everyone is losing from the present debt management 
strategies, there are presently opportunities for such groups as 
"peace activists, women's movements, trade unions, farmers and 
export orientated industries" to coalesce in pushing the debt crisis 
into a means of genuine development and democracy (George 1989, 
p. 244). Such a coalition could "oblige Western governments to put 
their money where their mouths are in defending democratic 
values" (George 1989, p. 244). 
The 3-D solution requires that the debtor governments 
redirect economic activity away from the international markets and 
towards an inner-directed economy which focuses on satisfaction of 
their people's real needs. Especially for the least developed 
countries of Africa, this would mean a strong agricultural emphasis 
aiming to supply food crops and renewable energy sources (George 
1989, p. 245). 
The foundations of social policy would be "health care, 
literacy, education, the promotion of women. Available foreign 
exchange would be used to acquire capital goods and basic 
equipment—not to pay for debt service, arms or prestige items" 
(George 1989, p. 245). George further advocates the full 
participation of both Northern and Southern Non Government 
Organisations (NGOs). NGOs, according to George, have a proven 
record of project management and innovative ideas. They are also 
usually less corrupt than entrenched bureaucracies and local elites. 
George maintains that, because her proposal is political, it 
would need to start with public debt (which accounts for most of 
the debt). However, this proposal is also affordable to banks: 
George claims that "by 1988 Third World loans accounted for only 6 
per cent of their total loan exposure" (George 1989, p. 245). 
(b) Reimbursement in kind 
The other type of repayment that George proposes is what she 
calls 'reimbursement in kind'. She claims that even poor African 
countries contain "natural, material and cultural treasures that are 
part of humankind's heritage", such as wilderness areas, traditional 
agricultural techniques, and local languages (George 1989, p. 250). 
Under the present socio-economic conditions in the Third World, 
these treasures are being squandered, eroded or irrevocably 
des t royed . 
As examples of reimbursement in kind, George lists such 
things as: conservation and reproduction of species (both animal 
and vegetable); soil conservation; reforestation (especially with local 
varieties); development and improvement of wells and small-scale 
irrigation techniques; recording and implementing traditional 
earthen architecture; recording traditional agriculture; medical and 
pharmaceutical knowledge; and compilation of dictionaries and 
grammars of local languages (George 1989, p. 250 f.). 
The idea of reimbursement in kind is to allow indebted 
countries in Africa to 'pay off part of their debt by preserving their 
own heritage. George points out that African elites have been keen 
to imitate the West in culture and life-style. By working on, and 
being paid to work on, heritage-preserving programs, people may 
also find a new pride in their cultures. 
George proposes that the work done in these projects be 
progressively written off against the debt as these programs 
progress. The work that people do on such a reimbursement-in-
kind program will need to be paid for as the people will not 
otherwise have time to take themselves from their daily necessary 
duties. They will need to be paid by the development fund which 
could be topped up with fresh money by the First World. 
The aims of the 3-D solution are to give recognition and 
remuneration for the African people's contribution to our common 
heritage, to strengthen the "peasantry, the pastoralists and the 
agricultural sector, and thus work towards the elimination of 
hunger and the poverty on which hunger thrives, [and] to 
rehabil i tate the environment and provide income-generating 
activities for people who live in it" (George 1989, p. 251). 
(ii) Latin American debt 
George claims that Latin American debt is more complicated 
than African debt. First, Latin America's debt is much larger; and 
second, Latin American debt is divided into about one-third public 
debt and about two-thirds private debt (George 1989, pp. 252 f.). 
One complication with applying the 3-D solution to Latin America, 
which involves a more efficient and more autonomous development 
model, is that it would be far less expensive than the 'mal-
development' model. So the 3-D solution 'comes on the cheap' 
relative to the size of the debt that needs to be discharged. A 
second complication has to do with the banks. Banks, to which Latin 
America is heavily in debt, are extremely unlikely to partake in 
political innovations unless they are forced to do so. Furthermore, 
Latin America will be dependent on fresh capital for the foreseeable 
future (George 1989, p. 253). So, according to George, any proposals 
which ignore the participation and the interests of banks are a non-
s ta r te r . 
According to George, the Latin American case requires that 
the 3-D solution be supplemented. Further, a problem that needs to 
be overcome for even the supplemented 3-D proposal to come to 
frui t ion is the lack of unity between the Latin American 
governments. Indeed, those in political power typically benefit 
from the present arrangements. Unity, according to George, can 
only be reached by popular movements where the people within 
Latin America pressurise their governments. George discusses a 
number of further strategies that could be applied to Latin America. 
She points out, however, that these strategies are dependent on 
unity and solidarity in the Third World. 
The first proposed strategy consists in exploiting present 
conflicts of interests that exist between transnational banks and 
other sectors of the First World economies. Because debtors are 
financially committed to debt repayments, they are unable to afford 
products from First World farms and firms. The proposal is that the 
debtors reduce their imports to that which could not be produced 
within their country and restrict purchases of foreign goods to 
goods which are vital to development, such as fertilizers, food stuffs 
and machinery. They then buy these from the creditor nations in 
proportion to the debt held by the particular creditor (George 1989, 
pp. 254 f.). The cost of the products can be deducted from the debt 
owed to that creditor country. 
By implementing such a strategy, money would be returned to 
the creditor economies, but it would be spread more between their 
industrial suppliers, their farmers and their banks. This would help 
to maintain jobs in the industrial countries as well as free up hard 
currency for the debtors to purchase items necessary for genuine 
development. If the creditors thought it necessary to compensate 
their own banks, George thinks this would be possible by increased 
tax revenue due to increased business. 
The second proposed strategy consists in fixing a minimum 
price on the commodities sold by the debtors to the prices they 
were attracting before global price reductions (George 1989, pp. 256 
ff.). George claims that the commodity prices were depressed, in 
part, due to IMF and World Bank adjustment programs which 
insisted that a large number of debtor countries export a limited 
range of products. In receiving more payment for their export 
products, the debtors will be more able to repay their creditors. 
The third proposed strategy is that the unified debtor 
governments insist on the banks returning, or loaning back at 
reduced interest rates, the flight capital of their own nationals 
(George 1989, pp. 258 f.). Such a measure would free up capital for 
debt repayment or allow the debtors much needed fresh capital for 
deve lopment . 
George's Reasons Against Unconditional Cancellation or 
Repudiation 
It is noteworthy that George's 3-D Solution to the Third World 
debt crisis does not involve an unconditional cancellation or 
repudiation of the debt. George argues against unconditional 
cancellation or repudiation for four main reasons.^^ 
First, uncondit ional wri te-offs would reward the most 
repressive, profligate and corrupt regimes which borrowed the most 
for the worst reasons, while penalising the more prudent countries 
who have been doing their best to reimburse their creditors (George 
1989, p. 240). 
Second, a generalized wipe-out would give the West a perfect 
excuse to cut off all aid. If the debtors were to repudiate, their 
credit-worthiness would drop to zero for some time. Credit-
worthiness or new money is something that George thinks the Third 
World will be in dire need of for a long time to come (1989, p. 
240) .22 George maintains that the debtors should honour their 
debts to suppliers; otherwise, they would not have access to 
imported basic necessities. "Greater self-reliance is a worthy goal; 
forcible cut-off from the rest of the world is not" (George 1989, p. 
240). 
Third, George argues that partial cancellation of the debt 
would not make conditions any different for the debtors. As it 
21 George clarifies the difference between different types of default. 
Creditors cancel, debtors repudiate (George 1989, p. 238). 
22George maintains that one possible exception to this is Brazil because Brazil 
could develop satisfactorily by depending entirely on local resources. 
stands now, Latin America is only paying 50 percent of its interest 
charges. This is why the debt keeps piling up. If the debt were to 
be reduced by 50 per cent or less, the rate of repayment would not 
decrease. At best the debtors could pay off the interest and the 
debt would stop piling up or pile up at a slower rate. In such 
circumstances "Latin America would become worse, or would be 
unchanged" (George 1989, p. 240). 
Fourth, George thinks that even if there was total cancellation 
and fresh money (an unlikely scenario), governments would be 
likely to go back to the development models that got them into 
trouble in the first place. The benefits of such cancellation are 
unlikely to 'trickle-down' to the majority. The elites in the Third 
World would be the only ones to benefit (George 1989, pp. 241 ff.). 
Morally Relevant Features of the Third World Debt Crisis 
George's account of Third World debt and her subsequent 
proposed solutions draw out and emphasise a number of morally 
relevant features of the debt crisis. 
First, Third World debt has fuelled inequities in both the 
Third World and the First World. The financial and political elites 
have profited handsomely from the crisis. The bankers who have 
arranged the loans have enjoyed very high salaries. The Third 
world elites have often squandered the money on prestigious 
projects at home or invested the money in private bank accounts 
overseas. On the other hand, workers in the First World have lost 
their jobs due to the loss of markets and taxpayers have 
reimbursed the First World banks. The poor in the Third World 
have borne the burden of repaying the loans. 
Second, the poor in Third World countries are repaying the 
debt that they had no say in acquiring. That is, the loans were 
made by those in power but the burden of repayment has fallen on 
the poorer citizens of the country. Often those in power have been 
military dictators and not elected governments. Even when they 
have been elected governments, the projects on which the borrowed 
money has been spent have often not been in the interests of the 
citizens, especially the poorest. 
Third, the poverty that has been caused by Third World debt 
and debt associated oppression has caused hunger and suffering 
from avoidable diseases. 
Fourth, the debt crisis has been a major contributor to 
envirocide. Forests have been logged at rapid rates in the Third 
World to sell timber and to make way for cash crops or cattle farms 
so that export dollars can be earned to service the debt. Fewer 
environmental restrictions have been placed in Third World 
countries; this has licensed transnational companies to pollute at 
rates prohibited in the First World. 
Fif th, democracy is something that many First World 
institutions claim to value. The current Third World debt crisis has 
denied people their democratic rights. This crisis, however, gives 
First World institutions an opportunity to ensure that people's 
democratic rights in the Third World are met. The 3-D solution 
could give the oppressed in the Third World an opportunity to take 
control over their lives. 
George also thinks the 3-D solution has prudential value for 
the First World—she thinks, for example, that this is the only 
feasible way to prevent Africa from withdrawing from the world 
sys tem. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have characterised Susan George's analysis 
of the origins and significance of the Third World debt crisis and her 
own proposed 3-D solution. In Chapter 3, I set the scene for 
assessing George's 3-D solution in the light of R. M. Hare's account of 
justice, as this applies to issues of international distributive justice. 
CHAPTER 3 
HARE'S PREFERENCE UTILITARIANISM AND HIS PRIMA FACIE 
MODERATE EGALITARIANISM 
In this chapter, I give an account of R. M. Hare's theory of 
justice, both formal and substantial, and relate it to his moral 
theory. My aim is to expound rather than to critically assess Hare's 
position. The main point of the chapter is to provide a context 
within which to assess George's proposed 3-D solution to the Third 
World debt crisis in terms of Hare's theory of distributive justice, as 
this has international application. 
Hare is a utilitarian who maintains that justice plays a central 
role in moral theory. The moral theory that Hare defends is 
preference utilitarianism, which aims at maximising people's 
preferences. Hare maintains that preference utilitarianism of the 
type he defends marries crucial aspects of Kantianism and act 
utilitarianism (Hare 1981, pp. 4 f. & 42 f.).i Hare distinguishes 
between meta-ethical constraints on normative ethics and the 
substantial normative ethics such constraints govern. Within 
normative ethics, he distinguishes between two levels of thinking. 
He connects the meta-ethical constraints—which supposedly follow 
from the meanings of moral words—with considerations of formal 
iHare is an indirect or rule utilitarian in tliat he maintains that utility is 
maximised by applying prima facie principles which we use at the intuitive 
level of moral thinking, but he is a direct ov act utilitarian at the critical 
level. I characterise the difference Hare draws between the intuitive and the 
critical levels of moral thinking below (Hare 1981, p. 43). See also fn. 6, this 
c h a p t e r . 
justice. The two levels of normative-ethical thinking are the 
intuitive and the critical. Principles of substantial justice, according 
to Hare, are prima facie moral principles which belong to the 
intuitive level of normative thinking. Conflicts between such 
principles are resolvable at the critical level of thinking where 
considerations of maximal utility (preference-satisfaction) are 
overriding. 
Two Levels of Normative Moral Thinking 
For Hare there are two levels of normative moral reasoning. 
He calls these levels the critical level and the intuitive level. At the 
intuitive level we have a set of prima facie principles which we 
apply in day-to-day life. This intuitive level is not self-sustaining, 
according to Hare, and so there is a need for a critical level of moral 
thinking. 
(i) The intuitive level 
The intuitive level of moral thinking consists of relatively 
simple, prima facie, intuitive principles. According to Hare, our 
moral education plays an important role in the formation of our 
intuitive principles (Hare 1981, pp. 30 f.). If we have been well 
brought up, we acquire certain sentiments and reactions towards 
actions of different types. When we do things which we normally 
consider as wrong, such as breaking promises or telling lies, we can 
have involuntary physical reactions such as blushing or a change 
might occur in the electrical properties of the skin. In such cases 
we also find ourselves with a feeling of compunction.2 
According to Hare, when we find ourselves in a situation 
where we make a judgement that it would be best, all things 
considered, to lie on that occasion, we may still have a feeling of 
compunction when lying. This residual feeling of compunction or 
guilt is closely tied to a sense of ought in which we continue to 
think that we ought not to be telling the lie. In such cases, 
however, there is another sense of ought which is relevant, namely, 
one such that we think that, all things considered, we ought to tell 
the lie. Hare thinks that people often confuse these different senses 
of ought, one of which is operating at the intuitive level and the 
other at the critical level. 
On Hare's view, the relatively simple, prima facie principles 
that are held at the intuitive level of moral thinking are a necessary 
part of human moral thinking, though they do not exhaust it. 
''Having the principles, in the usual sense of the word, is having the 
d i spos i t i ons to exper ience the fee l ings , though it is 
not...incompatible with submitting the principles to critical thought 
when that is appropriate and safe" (Hare 1981, p. 39, emphasis 
original). 
Our prima facie principles, according to Hare, are best kept 
relatively simple and general for reasons of practicality. Basically, 
no two situations and no two people are ever exactly like each 
^Hare gives some detailed discussion of the differences among negative 
responses like regret, remorse, compunction and guilt. The generic point is 
that, in such cases, there is a negative psychological response. 
other. The principles are needed to cover a range of situations 
which have some particular morally relevant feature in common. 
Any two situations will have some features in common and some 
differing features. When the differing features of a situation are 
not different to a previous situation in a way that is morally 
relevant, then the previously learnt principle will normally be the 
appropriate principle. There may, however, be some cases where 
there is reason to be critical of a previously learnt principle. At the 
same time, one must be careful not to be critical of previously 
learnt principles in a spontaneous and irrational way. 
Hare notes that problems can arise at the intuitive level of 
moral thinking, where we rely on our relatively simple, prima facie 
principles, as "we are bound to find ourselves in situations in which 
they conflict and in which, therefore, some other, non-intuitive kind 
of thinking is called for, to resolve the conflict" (Hare 1981, p. 40). 
Critical level thinking is needed to resolve such conflicts among 
relevant prima facie principles. Critical level thinking requires, in 
such cases, that we question the intuitions that we have, that we 
question whether past decisions were the right ones, and that we 
review our dispositions which have been formed by our upbringing. 
(ii) The critical level 
It is at the critical level of moral thinking that we justify the 
principles that we are to apply at the intuitive level. According to 
Hare, "there is a need for a critical level of thinking by which we 
select the prima facie principles for use at the intuitive level, settle 
conflicts between them, and give to the whole system of them a 
justification which intuition by itself can never provide" (Hare 
1978, p. 117).3 
Critical thinking, according to Hare, "consists in making a 
choice under the constraints imposed by the logical properties of 
the moral concepts and by the non-moral facts, and by nothing else" 
(Hare 1981, p. 40). Unlike the prima facie principles at the intuitive 
level of thinking, critical moral principles can be of unlimited 
specificity. Both the critical and the intuitive principles, however, 
are universal prescriptions. 
(a) Universalizability at the critical level 
Critical thinking, according to Hare, operates under a 
constraint of universalizability. Universalizability requires that if 
we make a moral judgement about any particular situation, then we 
must be prepared to make that same judgement in morally relevant 
similar circumstances. These similar circumstances need not be 
actual circumstances but logically possible, hypothetical, similar 
circumstances. Hare says that "critical thinking has to...find a moral 
judgement which the thinker is prepared to make about this 
conflict-situation and is also prepared to make about all the other 
similar situations" (Hare 1981, p. 42). 
Universalizabil i ty is the requirement, in making moral 
prescriptions, to make the step "from prescriptions which I accept 
for my own experiences to prescriptions which I must accept for 
experiences I should have, were I to be in someone else's position 
3 Hare thinks that, without critical thinking, moral systems lack the 
wherewithal for such justification. Intuitionist moral theories, on his view, 
are unable to settle conflicts that arise between principles. 
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with his preferences" (Hare 1981, p. 108). It follows from 
universalizability that, if I prescribe that I do a particular act or 
refrain from a particular act that affects others, then I must be 
prepared to prescribe that others do or refrain from doing the act, if 
our roles were reversed, including our motivational states.^ 
Moral reasoning, for Hare, involves more than merely formal 
constraints on reasoning which follow from an understanding of the 
language of morality. The substantial premises are also crucial. 
Universa l izabi l i ty , he claims, demands that we treat the 
prescriptions of others (i.e. their desires, likings, and, in general, 
preferences) on a par with our own original prescriptions (Hare 
^Hare claims that universalizability is a logical requirement of morality 
which is built into the meaning of moral terms. John Mackie has argued, 
however, that while universalizability is a logical requirement of morality, it 
is not extendible to the degree that Hare claims. Mackie distinguishes three 
stages of universalisation. 
The first stage of universalization Mackie calls 'the irrelevance of 
numerical differences' . Mackie interprets this first stage as a requirement 
of the meaning of moral terms and the logic of moral statements. This 
requirement can be simply that individual reference to individuals, nations 
and so on are eliminated (Mackie 1977, p. 83). 
Mackie then characterises a second stage of universalization, which 
he calls 'putting oneself in the other person's place'. As the name suggests, 
this stage of universalization requires that the asserter imagines herself in 
the other person's place and asks whether she can accept the maxim as a 
directive guiding the behaviour of others towards herself. 
Mackie then introduces the third stage of universalization, which he 
calls 'taking account of different tastes and rival ideas'. This third stage 
involves "putting oneself even more thoroughly into the other person's 
place, so that one takes on his desires, tastes, preferences, ideals, and values 
as well as his other qualities and abilities and external situation" (Mackie 
1977, pp. 92 ff.). The purpose of this stage of universalization is to find 
action-guiding principles which take into consideration the tastes and ideals 
of others who may be affected by the actions. It is by adopting this stage and 
by weighting equally the actual interests of those who may be affected that 
some kind of utilitarianism is reached. 
Mackie contends that "it is at most the first stage, the ruling out of 
purely numerical differences as morally irrelevant, that is built into the 
meaning of moral language" (Mackie 1977, p. 97). For his part, Hare denies 
that there are these different stages of universalization in moral judgements 
and contends that Mackie has only pointed out a "progression in the use we 
make of this single logical property as we develop our theory of moral 
reasoning" (Hare 1981, p. 108). 
1981, p. 16 f.). So, what is essential in generating moral principles 
at the critical level is universalizability informed by the relevant 
non-moral facts—including, especially, facts about the prescriptions 
(preferences) of parties affected by the action at issue. 
Hare's conception of rationality also plays an important role in 
his account of sound moral reasoning. For what such reasoning 
requires is universalizability rationally applied. Rationality, on 
Hare's view, requires that one be cognisant of the facts surrounding 
the application of the prescription in consideration. This will 
include, for any affected individual, "facts about his position as it 
affects him with his preferences" (Hare 1981, p. 89). Since only an 
archangel can be aware of all the facts, the sort of critical thinking 
that is required—which is the closest approximation to an archangel 
to which we human beings can aspire—is that we take into account, 
as best we can, what we take to be the salient facts. 
Hare's thesis of universalizability, as has been noted, requires 
that one take into consideration what it would be like, in some 
course of action, to have the preferences of the other affected 
person (or persons). Universalizability does not require simply that 
one imaginatively consider what it would be like for oneself to be in 
the situation of the other. It is not enough to consider how oneself 
would feel, or consider what one's own preference would be, with 
one's own present set of desires and values. One must 
imaginatively project oneself into the situation taking account of the 
other's set of preferences, (Hare 1981, pp. 94 ff.). It is important to 
keep in mind that "the motivational states he actually now has may 
run quite counter to [one's] own present ones" (Hare 1981, pp. 108 
f-). 
Hare maintains that, since critical thinking, properly applied, 
includes that the critical thinker "occupies, respectively, the 
positions of all the other parties in the actual situation, no 
judgement will be acceptable to him which does not do the best, all 
in all, for all the parties" (Hare 1981, p. 42). The judgements that 
the critical thinker makes, according to Hare, are the ones that an 
act-utilitarian would make. It is in this way. Hare thinks, that 
utilitarianism and Kantianism are synthesized. 
According to Hare, many people wrongly think that Kant and 
utilitarians stand at opposite poles of moral philosophy. For his 
part. Hare claims that "the formal, logical properties of the moral 
words, the understanding of which we owe above all to Kant, yield a 
system of moral reasoning whose conclusions have a content 
identical with that of a certain kind of utilitarianism" (Hare 1981, p. 
4). The sorts of prima facie principles that a Kantian would choose 
at the critical level by applying the categorical imperative are the 
same as what a utilitarian would select (Hare 1981, p. 50).5 
(b) Utilitarianism at the critical level 
The critical thinker that Hare describes as 'archangelic' is 
impart ial , rational and benevolent, when deciding on what 
principles to apply at the intuitive level. Hare thinks that such a 
critical thinker would agree to principles that an act preference-
5It is a contentious issue, however, whether the marriage Hare forges 
between utilitarianism and Kantianism really works. See Persson 1983, pp. 43 
f f . . 
utilitarian would agree to.^ The justification, in brief, is that, when 
considering all the possible outcomes of a particular action, it would 
be rational—as a solution to an intrapersonal conflict that has been 
induced by imaginative projection—to prefer the situation in which 
utility, construed as preference satisfaction, is maximised. 
Hare's requirement of universalizability, which he claims is a 
purely formal property of moral reasoning, requires that we treat 
all preferences, including the preferences of others, with equal 
weight. It is required further that one's universalizing be rationally 
applied. Hare's notion of rationality includes that one take account 
of all the relevant facts surrounding the proposed prescription. 
Salient among such facts, on Hare's theory, are the preferences of 
the affected parties. To know what another's preferences are one 
needs to imaginatively project what it would be like to be the other; 
or, in other words, to imaginatively identify with the other. Once 
identifying with the other, one takes on preferences corresponding 
to the preferences of the other in the form: "I now prefer with 
strength S that if I were in that situation x should happen rather 
than not" (Hare 1981, p. 95). In this way one is meant to acquire a 
desire equal in strength to the desire of another. Since the desire of 
another actually becomes matched by a desire of oneself, what was 
6Hare sometimes refers to act utilitarianism and at other times to preference 
utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism often contrasts with rule utilitarianism. 
Hare maintains that there could, strictly speaking, be a difference between 
happiness and preference utilitarianism. This difference would be that the 
happiness utilitarian would consider only now-for-now preferences and 
then-for-then preferences. A preference utilitarian would consider all 
preferences, including now-for-then preferences (Hare 1981, pp. 103 ff.). 
Hare also thinks that the distinction that many often make between act and 
rule utihtarianism is confused. For Hare, critical thinking is act utilitarian, 
which can also be rule utilitarian if the rule is to be of unlimited specificity. 
Rule utilitarianism, normally construed, comprises prima facie principles at 
the intuitive level (Hare 1981, p. 43). 
an interpersonal conflict becomes an intrapersonal conflict, which 
requires rational resolution. Such rational resolution consists in 
maximal preference satisfaction—in the simplest case of two 
competing desires, satisfying the strongest desire. 
Hare illustrates how a critical thinker will come to rationally^ 
prescribe util i tarian principles by considering the following 
bilateral example which involves a conflict in interests between two 
people. One person has a bicycle parked in a position where 
another person wants to park his car. 
The other party wants me not to move his bicycle, but I 
want more to move it in order to park my car. I am fully 
aware of the strength of his desire, and therefore have a 
desire of equal strength that, were I in his situation, the 
bicycle should stay where it is. But I also have my original 
desire to move it in order to park my car. This later desire 
wins by superior strength....We see here in miniature how 
the requirement to universalize our prescriptions generates 
utilitarianism (Hare 1981, p. 111). 
While Hare uses this simple bilateral case to illustrate how 
preference utilitarianism is reached by universalizing, he claims 
that there is in principle no difficulty in extending the method to 
multilateral cases. The diffículties that arise, he says, are practical 
The notion of rationality that Hare appeals to here is similar to the notion of 
rationality that is often appealed to in discussions of prudence. In the case of 
prudence, it is rational to treat one's own future preferences as of equal 
weight to one's present preferences. What is prudentially rational is to 
maximise the satisfaction of one's present and future preferences. What is 
morally rational, in accordance with universalizability, is the maximising of 
others' and one's own preferences. 
ones of having full knowledge of what the involved parties' 
preferences are and of performing the complicated thought 
processes. Hare admits that in many cases of moral problems it 
would be too difficult for humans with limited cognitive capacities 
to perform an elaborate calculation of utilities and that only an 
archangel could perform them (Hare 1981, pp. 121 f.). We would 
do better he thinks to stick to well tried and fairly general 
principles. 
The Role of Justice in Hare's Moral Theory 
The following section characterises the role of justice in Hare's 
moral theory. Hare distinguishes formal justice from substantial 
justice. According to Hare, formal justice is the requirement that 
moral principles be universalizable, whereas substantial principles 
of justice are those prima facie principles of justice that we adopt in 
everyday life. 
(i) Formal justice 
Formal justice, according to Hare, is simply the requirement 
that moral principles be universalizable (Hare 1978, p. 117; 1981, p. 
157). So, formal justice consists in the observance of a set of canons 
in our moral arguments, which are derivable from the formal, 
logical properties of the moral words, and from the requirement 
that individual references be excluded from the moral principles. 
The canons that Hare refers to would include that "we are not 
allowed to discriminate between individuals unless there is some 
qualitative difference between them which is the ground for the 
discrimination; and...that the equal interests of different individuals 
have equal moral weight" (Hare 1978, p. 117). Hare uses an 
example to illustrate how something could be formally unjust. "If I 
have to give a single indivisible cream puff to one or other of my 
twins, who both want it equally, it may be morally right to toss a 
coin, rather than give it to neither.. . .What would be at fault 
(logically) would be to make the moral judgement that I ought to 
give it to one twin rather than the other, when there was nothing to 
differentiate them. That is why we toss coins in such cases, to 
introduce a difference" (Hare 1981, p. 157). 
Formal distributive justice, however, is not sufficient to get to 
substantial justice. Hare maintains that formal justice will not, for 
example, tell us whether or not "people with big houses should get 
greater political power" (Hare 1981, p. 157). What is needed, in 
addition to the formal constraints on justice, are the empirical facts, 
especially facts about what people's preferences are. 
(ii) Substantial (material) justice 
Formal justice, and the formal impartiality associated with it, 
are insufficient for developing substantial principles of distributive 
justice, as these require only that we treat everybody's interests as 
of equal weight. Hare illustrates this with the following example. 
Suppose that we were to take a dollar from every person in town 
and that the resultant loss in purchasing power of each person was 
hardly noticed and so the resultant utility enjoyed by each is not 
much diminished. Further suppose that this large sum of money 
was given to one man such that he could subsequently buy himself 
a holiday which he could enjoy very much. If we were to take a 
completely impartial point of view, we would have to regard who 
has the holiday as irrelevant. Now, allowing that the losses in 
utility of the many were exactly outweighed by the gain in utility of 
the fortunate individual, then the requirements of formal 
impartiality would be met. However, while such a redistribution 
would meet the requirements of formal justice, Hare maintains that 
most of us would consider such a distribution as unjust (Hare 1978, 
p. 123). 
According to Hare, the substantial principles of distributive 
justice are the prima facie principles we adopt in everyday life 
which critical thinking will endorse. These principles of justice will 
be built around our conception of fairness and desert. Such 
principles will depend on the empirical facts of what we would be 
prepared to accept as distributively preferable, if we were in the 
shoes of the other affected parties, as it were. Hare concedes that 
substantial principles of just distribution will differ between 
societies. Of course, these principles can only be obtained when 
conceptions of fairness or desert pass the test of universalizability. 
But what people's conceptions of fairness and desert^ are is an 
empirical matter. All such "principles of 'particular' substantial 
justice are prima facie and not critical principles" (Hare 1981, p. 
158). 
^Mill writes extensively on the different conceptions of justice which 
include rights of personal liberty and property, desert, the keeping and 
breaking of faith, partiality and equality (Mill 1991, pp. 178 ff.). Like Hare, 
Mill thinks that the competing principles of justice surrounding these 
notions is ultimately to be adjudicated in terms of utility. 
Hare as a Prima Facie Moderate Egalitarian 
As has been noted, Hare acknowledges that substantial 
principles of distributive justice will vary between societies. In this 
way, the principles of justice one ought to propagate vary with the 
probable effects of propagating them, and these effects importantly 
depend on the dispositions of people in the society in question 
(Hare 1978, p. 130). Hare himself advocates moderate 
egalitarianism as the substantial theory of justice for at least 
Western liberal societies.9 Hare points out that "neither political 
liberty nor economic equality are of necessity good things in 
themselves" (Hare 1981, p. 166). How important they are, and 
what degree of liberty or economic equality people ought to have, 
depends on what peoples' actual preferences in a given society are. 
There can be good reasons for some inequality, such as the need for 
differentials to provide incentives. It even seems reasonable to 
think that some inequality would be best for all. Hare points out 
that egalitarian principles would support progressive taxation of the 
rich but this could come into conflict with utility (Hare 1978, p. 
125). Such principles, if enforced, could diminish incentives and 
reduce the overall goods to be distributed. Hare gives two reasons 
why the principles of distributive justice, chosen by an impartially 
benevolent critical thinker, would be moderately egalitarian, lo One 
^This appUes not only to those societies that are currently liberal 
democracies. For example. Hare maintains that, in some but not all 
circumstances, in the light of the predictable actual consequences, one could 
justify, on utilitarian grounds, changing a slave-owning society into a free 
and moderate egalitarian one (even through revolution) (Hare 1978, pp. 126 
f f . ) . 
lOHare does not explicitly address the issue of just distribution of power and 
status, but claims that "the method...for determining the just distribution of 
wealth can be used, with necessary changes in empirical premisses, for 
determining the just distribution of power and of status" (Hare 1981, p. 164). 
is diminishing marginal utility and the other is peoples' envy. Hare 
points out, however, that "both of the arguments in favour of 
moderate equality, and all of those against extreme egalitarianism, 
rest on contingent empirical facts or conjectures" (Hare 1981, p. 
166). For this reason it is essential for the critical thinker to find 
out what people's actual preferences are before committing himself 
to prima facie principles. 
As just noted. Hare offers two arguments in favour of 
moderate egalitarian principles of distributive justice (for Western 
liberal societies and relevantly similar ones). One argument relates 
to diminishing marginal utility, while the other relates to people's 
envy. The argument for diminishing marginal utility is based on 
the empirical premise that an increase in money or some other good 
to a poor man increases utility more than the same increase when 
given to a rich man. "In terms of preferences, the impartial critical 
thinker who put himself in the shoes of both of these people would 
prefer that he should, in those cases, be given the increment if he 
were the poor man than if he were the rich man, supposing that he 
could have it in both roles" (Hare 1981, p. 164 f.). The second 
argument in support of moderate egalitarianism is based on an 
empirical premise that inequality "has a tendency to produce envy, 
which is a disagreeable state of mind and leads people to do 
disagreeable things" (Hare 1978, p. 126).ii 
I take it that, for Hare, a moderate egalitarian society is one which has a 
moderately equal distribution of wealth, power and status. While some 
inequality in distribution is permissible, extreme inequality is 
i m p e r m i s s i b l e . 
l i l t is worth emphasising that Hare's arguments in support of moderate 
egalitarianism, including those against extreme egalitarianism, are based on 
empirical assumptions. Whether or not, in its own terms, Hare's moral theory 
supports moderate egalitarianism as the theory of substantial justice when 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have characterised Hare's theory of justice, 
both formal and substantial, and related it to his moral theory. 
Hare, as we have seen, is an act preference-utilitarian (at the 
critical level) who endorses moderate egalitarianism (at the 
intuitive level) as the substantial principle of justice for Western 
liberal societies and societies relevantly like them. Hare's theory of 
just ice applies in an obvious way to issues of international 
distributive justice, as, for example, in relation to Third World debt. 
The central question at the critical level is what substantial 
distr ibutive principles best promote the satisfaction of the 
preferences of all affected parties, in both the Third and the First 
Worlds. George's proposed 3-D solution to the Third World debt 
crisis is apparently egal i tar ian, perhaps even moderately 
egalitarian. In the next chapter, I explore the extent to which her 
proposal is egalitarian and I consider whether it can plausibly be 
said to embody satisfactory principles of distribution from the 
standpoint of act preference-utilitarianism. 
applied to a group of affected people depends on what the people's actual 
preferences are (or predictably would be) and on whether moderate 
egalitarianism is the best way to maximise those preferences. Hare even 
allows for the possibility that democracy may not be the best way to serve the 
interests of a given group (Hare, 1981, pp. 167 f.). 
CHAPTER 4 
ASSESSMENT OF GEORGE'S 3-D SOLUTION IN THE LIGHT OF HARE'S 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 
My principal aim in this chapter is to discuss whether 
George's 3-D solution is a just solution in the light of Hare's theory 
of distributive justice. George's 3-D solution is motivated by a will 
to free people from the poverty and mass starvation which are, in 
large part, products of international debt. Her solution offers what 
she sees as the best, practicable way in which the debt crisis could 
be resolved justly. It is therefore instructive to consider how just 
her proposed solution is, from the standpoint of a significant theory 
of distributive justice like Hare's. 
My discussion falls into two main parts, reflecting the two 
central aspects of Hare's theory of justice. As discussed in Chapter 
3, Hare is an act preference-utilitarian (at the critical level) who 
endorses moderate egalitarianism (at the intuitive level) as the 
substantial principle of distributive justice for western liberal 
societies and relevantly similar ones. Correspondingly, in this 
present chapter, I consider (i) the relation between George's 3-D 
solution and egalitarianism, including moderate egalitarianism, and 
(ii) the more fundamental issue of whether it can plausibly be 
claimed for George's 3-D solution that it would maximally satisfy 
the relevant set of preferences about distribution. 
George's 3-D Solution as Egalitarian 
The burden of the debt crisis, as George characterises it, falls 
unequally on the citizens of both the First World and the Third 
World. The burden falls heavily on the poor in both Worlds while a 
tiny minority, the politically and financially powerful, profit 
handsomely. This results in large inequalities in power, status and, 
more importantly, in resources between the rich and the poor. 
George's proposed reimbursement in cash—which involves 
debtor governments making regular interest payments into a 
national development fund and then reusing the money for projects 
internal to that country, such as small scale farming^—aims at 
redirecting economic activity away from the international markets 
and towards an inner-directed economy which focuses on meeting 
people's basic and non-basic needs. By having a national 
development fund with democratically elected representatives, 
people would have more control over their own lives. By contrast, 
according to George, when people are subjected to the externally 
driven demands of their governments and the IMF, they are far 
more restricted in the choices available to them in terms of the 
crops that they grow and how their collective resources are to be 
distributed. By adopting her solution, George thinks that more 
power would be given to the otherwise disempowered people in the 
Third World. The 3-D solution would allow people to choose 
between their resources being used for such things as health care 
and education, or militarisation and prestige projects.^ 
ISee my Ch. 2, the section, 'George's 3-D Solution'. 
^Under conditions at the time of George's proposal, the governments and 
other power ehtes of Third World countries often used public money on 
To allow people access to such things as the means of 
producing food which they need, and would otherwise do without, 
would be a step towards a more egalitarian society. To make more 
accessible such things as health care and education is also 
egalitarian, insofar as it is likely to put the less privileged people in 
the community in a better position than they would otherwise be. 
Education gives people a greater opportunity to pursue a greater 
number of goals. In the present state of affairs, public resources in 
the Third World are scarcely spent on education, which makes 
access difficult for the poor. Access to health care often gives 
people a better quality of life, which is sometimes available only to 
the wealthy. 
Reimbursement in kind, which involves debt reduction in 
exchange for heritage-preserving programs, is an important feature 
of George's 3-D solution.^ This strategy aims not only to benefit 
mankind collectively, but also to encourage people from non-
western cultures to take pride in their heritage and culture. The 
present international market-driven economy does not incorporate 
as values such things as heritage, culture, language and 
environmental integrity. These treasures, under pressure from 
present 'development' strategies, are being squandered, eroded or 
irrevocably destroyed. The main idea behind reimbursement in 
kind is to recognise and remunerate past and future contributions 
militarisation and prestige projects such as mega-dams and nuclear power 
stations. George still condemns the World Bank and IMF for their prestige 
projects. For instance, in her visit to Australia in April, 1994, she condemned 
the World Bank for policies surrounding the Narmada Valley project, a 
proposed massive and expensive irrigation and electricity generation 
scheme in India. (See also George & Sabelli 1994, pp. 175 ff..) 
3See my Ch. 2, the section, 'George's 3-D Solution'. 
of African peoples to our common heritage and the preservation 
and restoration of the environment, which are public goods.4 
Reimbursement in kind counts as egalitarian because it offers 
economic and political compensation to the poor for their 
contribution to the collection and recording of information on our 
collective heritage and for their contribution to the maintenance of 
the environment.5 Two aspects of this egalitarianism are as follows. 
First, payment to, and political strengthening of, the peasantry, the 
pastoralists, and the agricultural sector aims to eliminate hunger 
and the poverty on which hunger thrives. Second, moving the 
emphasis from income-producing exports to self-sufficiency, 
environmental sustainability, and the recognition of cultural 
diversity as a value aims to allow people in the Third World to 
determine for themselves what their needs are. Given that their 
cultural practices have been sustainable in the past, this will give 
such people a more secure and promising future than the one that 
the present export-oriented culture gives. George claims that the 
"3-D solution seeks greater equality and social justice" (George, 
1989, p. 251). Greater equality, which is central to egalitarianism, 
is sought after by increasing the opportunities and quality of life of 
those furthest down the socio-economic ladder. 
4Reimbursement in kind is applicable not only to Africa. There are a 
number of different cultures in many parts of the Third World outside Africa 
that lack recognition in the present export-oriented context. 
5 Also, by preserving the environment or engaging in environmentally 
sustainable practices, more resources are available in the long run. When 
resources are scarce, they are often affordable only to the wealthy. This, in 
turn, increases the differences between the rich and the poor. 
As discussed in Chapter 2,6 George maintains that, in the case 
of Latin America, additional supplementary measures are needed in 
order to resolve the debt crisis. These measures include indebted 
Latin American countries being more selective in the purchasing of 
foreign goods, raising the price of commodity export products, and 
returning capital flight. 
The first supplementary measure involves indebted Latin 
American countries buying only essential items such as fertilizers, 
pharmaceuticals, machine tools, spare parts, etc., rather than 
making bank repayments. This, together with an emphasis on 
making the Third World more self-sufficient, would count as 
egalitarian in two ways. First, money from the Third World would 
be redirected away from the banks and distributed more between 
industrial suppliers and farmers. Such redirection of money would 
help maintain and restore jobs in First World countries, many of 
which have been shed or are threatened due to a loss of the Third 
World's purchasing power. These measures would work to the 
advantage of the least advantaged people in the First World (i.e. 
the workers and unemployed). Second, an emphasis on improving 
capital equipment, creating jobs, and making the Third World more 
self-sufficient in basic foods, assists the poorest groups by helping 
them to meet their basic needs such as food and nutrition. 
The second supplementary measure consists of Latin 
American countries working collectively to increase the price of 
export commodities. This would not necessarily affect the 
6see my Ch. 2, the section 'George's 3-D Solution', subsection (ii), 'Latin 
American debt" . 
distribution of resources in the Third World. It would, however, 
give the Third World more money which could be used to repay the 
debt and to import essential items. These extra export dollars could 
be used to decrease the inequalities that exist between debtor and 
creditor nations and could also be used to assist the poorer groups 
in the Third World. So, increasing the price of export commodities 
would not be egalitarian in itself, but could be used to promote 
egalitarian distributions if assisted by other strategies. 
As a third supplementary measure, George proposes that 
flight capital be returned to the countries from where it came. This 
money could be used both to repay the debt and to purchase the 
items needed for genuine development. Such measures would be 
egalitarian if the money that was squandered by the power elites, 
when returned, was used to the benefit of the poor. As with the 
extra money available from increased export prices, the 
distribution of the benefits of these measures would determine 
whether or not they counted as egalitarian. 
Is George's 3-D solution moderately egalitarian? 
Hare's notion of moderate egalitarianism is that distribution 
of wealth (and power and status) be nearly equal. Some 
inequalities, however, may be permissible if they promote utility, 
understood as maximal preference satisfaction. 
George's solution is arguably consistent with this notion of 
moderate egalitarianism. First, the 3-D solution clearly aims at 
removing the extremes of present inequalities. Second, the solution 
focuses on materially and politically empowering, through 
structural changes, groups such as the poor, people in rural areas, 
minority ethnic groups, youth, women, artisans and peasants. The 
degree of empowering aimed at is considerable. Third, there is 
little reason to think, however, that George's proposed solution aims 
at an extreme egalitarian rearrangement of economic and political 
life in the Third World. For, as well as the disempowered in the 
Third and First Worlds, her solution takes account of the existence 
and motivations of established institutions such as the IMF, banks 
and national governments. The solution aims at a modus vivendi 
among these competing interest groups which will considerably 
improve the economic and political position of the disadvantaged 
and vulnerable in both the Third and First Worlds. Furthermore, 
George's approach to solving the debt crisis seems to be consistent 
with promoting democratic political structures within mixed 
economies, where there is bound to remain an unequal distribution 
of economic and political power. George's solution, while taking 
account of present powerful and empowering institutions, aims at 
reducing the degree of inequality that exists between the elites and 
the poor; however, presumably for practical reasons, her proposal 
does not aim at the removal of all inequalities. 
It is difficult to judge conclusively whether George's solution 
is moderately egalitarian in principle. Whether or not it would 
count as moderately egalitarian would depend on how much 
inequality she is prepared to allow. Her solution emphasises the 
promotion of greater equality, but George is not explicit on either 
how much equality there ought to be or on how much equality she 
thinks her solution would generate. Her solution would, however, 
count as more egalitarian than the present arrangements under 
IMF strategies and other proposals, such as the proposals of Baker 
and Bradley.'7 
Is George's Solution Sensitive to the Preferences of All 
Those Affected? 
Moderate egalitarianism, on Hare's theory, is a prima facie 
principle, the justification of which depends on whether it would 
best maximise the preferences of the relevant parties. In the case 
of Third World debt, the relevant parties include the whole of the 
global community which can be divided up into the Third and First 
Worlds. Whether or not George's solution is just, on Hare's theory, 
will ultimately depend on whether it would best satisfy the 
preferences of all parties concerned. It is clear from my discussion 
of George's solution and egalitarianism that her solution would 
satisfy many preferences about the distribution of goods that may 
reasonably be credited to ordinary people in the Third World. 
However, a possible objection is that George's 3-D solution is value-
imperialistic, especially in relation to its requirement of democracy, 
and so runs the risk of failing to meet Hare's standards of justice. 
In this section, I discuss whether George's solution is value-
imperialistic in relation to the Third World, and how her proposed 
7See my Ch. 2, fn. 1, and George 1989, pp. 190 ff.. 
solution fares in relation to the preferences of the people in the 
First World, including the lenders. 
(i) Third World preferences and value imperialism. 
An important objection to George's 3-D solution is that, insofar 
as it insists on democratic political structures, it is insensitive to the 
values or preferences of many of the people in the Third World.8 
That is, it could be argued that the démocratisation on which George 
makes reimbursement conditional does not properly take into 
consideration the cultural values (and associated preferences) of at 
least some of the affected people. In short, it could be argued that 
George's solution is an instance of value imperialism. To this kind 
of objection George replies: "Once they have experienced democracy 
and basic freedoms, has any people ever willingly given them up?" 
(George 1989, p. 251). So, George apparently thinks that, while in 
some cultures democracy may not have been a value in the past, if 
the people from that culture were to experience democracy, they 
would very likely adopt it as a value. However, it is arguable that, 
in some other cultures, where such things as hierarchical tribal 
structures (for example) are valued or preferred, democracy may 
conflict with other decision-making processes, which are acceptable 
to a given group despite being undemocratic (as in chieftain 
cultures). 
In many ways, George's 3-D solution is sensitive to the values 
and preferences of the people within the different cultures of the 
Third World (consider some of the proposals in the reimbursement 
81 am assuming that people's values normally correspond to their 
p r e f e r e n c e s . 
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in kind aspect of her solution, for example). However, as in the case 
of the emphasis on the First World value of democracy, she may fall 
short of the sensitivity to the actual preferences of those affected 
which Hare thinks must ground any just ordering of society— 
including any moderate egalitarian, democratic ordering.9 
From Hare's point of view, there is, however, a prima facie 
case for introducing democracy to societies that are currently 
nondemocratic (even those societies that count as well-ordered 
hierarchical societies).lo Hare maintains that when deliberating on 
whether to implement a particular policy, one ought to take into 
consideration both the present and future preferences of the 
affected parties (Hare 1981, pp. 100 f.). As indicated above, George 
is confident that once people have experienced democracy, they 
will be unwilling to give it up. However, it is a difficult empirical 
issue whether George is right in her prediction about the changed 
future preferences of those who now live in nondemocratic Third 
World societies and presently prefer that their societies not be 
democratised. This is not an issue that I am really in a position to 
adjudicate here. I am simply marking it out as a concern in trying 
to assess how just George's 3-D solution is in terms of Hare's theory 
of justice. 11 
9See my Ch. 3, the section, 'Hare as a Prima Facie Moderate Egalitarian'. 
10See Hare's discussion of the pros and cons in relation to changing a slave-
owning society into a moderate egalitarian one (See Hare 1978, pp. 128 f., and 
my Ch. 3, fn.9). 
I l l revisit the objection that George's 3-D solution is value-imperialistic in 
Ch. 6, when considering that solution in the light of O'Neill's theory of 
jus t i ce . 
(ii) First World preferences 
From the perspective of Hare's theory of justice, the 
fundamental issue in assessing George's 3-D solution is the 
following. How well does George's egalitarian solution contribute to 
the maximal satisfaction of the preferences of all the affected 
persons in both the Third and First Worlds? 
But just who are the affected parties? For Hare, the affected 
parties are all those people whose preference satisfaction is 
influenced by any of the possible courses of action. In the case of 
Third World debt, this would cast the net fairly widely, given the 
interconnectedness (economic and environmental) of peoples in the 
contemporary world. Even so, it is fairly easy to identify at least 
some of those (including institutions) who very clearly fall into the 
class of affected parties. For example, in the First World, there are 
the lenders—such as the banks and the bankers. In the Third 
World, there are the urban and rural poor (who so far have been 
the focus of discussion). But others are also clearly identifiable. 
George's book The Debt Boomerang is interesting in this connection, 
in relation to the First World. George maintains that the affected, 
wronged parties of the Third World debt crisis include the poor or 
politically vulnerable in both the Third and First Worlds. 
In the two sections that follow I discuss how George's 3-D 
solution is likely to bear on the preferences of the different, 
affected groups in the First World—exploited and exploiters. It 
turns out that George's 3-D solution is congenial to the preference 
satisfaction of many in the First World, given certain natural 
assumptions about people's preferences. This contrasts with the 
present situation of Third World debt, which thwarts preference 
satisfaction among many in the First World in various ways. 
(a) The debt boomerang and preferences in the First World 
As indicated in Chapter 2, according to George the majority of 
citizens from the First World creditor nations are also bearing the 
debt burden in what she describes as the six boomerangs: 
env i ronmen ta l des t ruc t ion , drugs, cost to tax payers , 
unemployment and lost markets, immigration pressures and, 
heightened conflict and war. 
First, the Third World debt crisis exacerbates the problem of 
global environmental destruction. Among the consequences are an 
increase in global warming and a depletion of genetic bio-diversity 
(George 1992, pp. 1 ff.). Those in the First World have an interest 
in maintaining (or using sustainably) the natural resources of the 
earth. Such things as ozone depletion are already affecting many in 
the First World by means of increases in rates of skin cancer. 
Deforestation is often claimed to play a major causal role in the 
extent to which weather patterns have become more erratic. 
Genetic bio-diversity is something that many in the First World 
value in itself and for the benefits it has in maintaining ecosystems 
from which we all benefit. It is through the natural environment 
that we have reaped and continue to reap benefits from such things 
as medical and biological research. The satisfaction of many 
present and future preferences is dependent on environmental 
p r e s e r v a t i o n . 12 George's 3-D solution aims at environmental 
preservation, which is needed for satisfying important preferences 
of all, including the ordinary person in the First World. 
Second, the Third World debt crisis has forced many in Third 
World countries into producing illegal drugs as the most reliable 
means of earning export dollars. The adverse effects of the drug 
industry on the people in the First World include both monetary 
and social costs (George 1992, pp. 34 ff.). Inseparable from the 
drug industry is organised and street crime. Those at the top of the 
drug industry are the ones typically involved in organised crime. 
The costs to the general population in the US include $2.5 billion 
per year for intensive care for 'crack babies' and the price that 
some users pay is the suffering associated with AIDS. The users 
who become addicted to the drugs often need to resort to such 
crimes as theft, sometimes violent theft, to support their addiction. 
Such crime, and even the threat of such crime, makes for great 
insecurity in a community. The adverse effects of the drug 
industry impede the satisfaction of many preferences of many 
throughout the First World, including addicts and nonaddicts. 
George thinks that a realistic approach to the drug problem, 
including its adverse effects on First World communities, needs to 
address a number of different issues, including the social structure 
12 The preference satisfaction of future generations is something that Hare 
mentions but does not address in detail (Hare 1978, p. 127). He does, however, 
think that the satisfaction of future preferences carries equal moral weight 
to the satisfaction of present preferences (Hare 1981, pp. 100 f.). He holds 
this interpersonally and intrapersonally. It would seem then that, for Hare, 
the preferences of future generations are of equal weight to the preferences 
of present generations. Some problems of unpredictability arise, however, 
which make 'calculations' difficult. Even so, there is a strong prima facie 
case for thinking that future generations would prefer that the present 
generation preserve the environment. 
within First World communities. However, she says, "nothing can 
be accomplished until the deadly debt-drugs link is severed" 
(George 1992, p. 62). George's 3-D solution aims at making 
indebted drug-producing counties more self-reliant and less 
dependent on the production of drugs. 
Third, governments in the First World are bailing out the 
banks for so-called 'bad debts' from Third World countries (George 
1992, pp. 63 ff.). So, ordinary people in the First World are paying, 
in the form of tax concessions, for the banks' 'mistakes'. According 
to George, most people are unaware that their taxes are being used 
in such ways. It is reasonable to expect that people in the First 
World would prefer their taxes spent differently (this may explain 
why First World tax payers are not informed that their taxes are 
used in this way). According to George: "There is nothing banks 
hate more than having the public see that it is 'bailing them out'— 
because there is nothing the public/taxpayer hates more! That, 
however is precisely what is happening" (George 1992, p. 65). 
George's 3-D solution aims at controlling the way banks benefit 
from profits while they are at the same time 'bailed out' by 
taxpayers for their bad debts. "Help to any banks, large or small, 
ought to be accompanied by an equivalent popular control over the 
profits. Such help could, for example, be tied to better terms for 
farmers, small business, etc." (George 1989, p. 259). In this way, 
George's aim of making banks more accountable would assist in 
satisfying the preferences of ordinary people in the First World 
such as the farmers and the taxpayers. 
Fourth, the Third World debt crisis has resulted in the loss of 
jobs in the First World as imported First World goods have become 
unafordable for ordinary people in the Third World and some items 
traditionally produced in the First World are being produced in the 
Third World. George's 3-D solution, however, would encourage and 
enhance the opportunities for the unemployed in the First World to 
get jobs. This would work in two ways. On the one hand, George's 
proposal includes a move for the Third World away from cash-crop 
export-orientated economics. This would give those in the First 
World an opportunity to produce once again those products that 
they traditionally produced. On the other hand, there would be 
some items of which those in the Third World would be in need, 
such as farming equipment, which are typically produced in the 
First World. This would give further employment opportunities for 
those in the First World. So, in respect of the preference for 
employment, common in the First World, an application of George's 
3-D solution would also contribute to the preference satisfaction of 
many in the First World. 
Fifth, the Third World debt crisis and the effects of the 
subsequent IMF adjustment programs have made l ife so 
unbearable for many in the Third World that they have fled their 
countries. This has effectively increased the number of immigrants 
and refugees, putting more pressure on the First World to 
accommodate them. For the people in the First World, this often 
means racial tension, including violent clashes. George maintains 
that there is a need to make immigration less necessary; otherwise 
"clashes in the North are likely to become not only more frequent 
but far uglier" (George 1992, p. 112). By implementing the 
proposals of the 3-D solution, conditions in the Third World are 
likely to be such that there would be less need to emigrate from the 
Third World. Also, immigrants from the First World often compete 
with the workers in the First World for jobs. Not only does this 
create racial tension among the workers, but it also means that jobs 
that would otherwise go to First World workers are going to the 
immigrants. Once again, more preferences all round would seem 
satisfied by the application of George's 3-D solution. 
The final boomerang effect that George discusses is the threat 
of war that results from the debt crisis (1992, pp. 136 ff.). Military 
spending and debt accumulation are inseparable. The military 
spending and associated debt applies not only to the Third World. 
Military spending accounts for a large part of the debt of the US. A 
solution, such as George's proposed 3-D solution, which includes the 
use of resources to meet people's basic needs, requires at least a 
reduction in military spending. As the recent example of the Gulf 
War s h o w s , 1 3 the threat of war is a threat that can be realised. The 
costs of that war were very high indeed—not only to the people in 
the Third World but also to ordinary people in the First World, 
which is evident from the casualties among First World combatants 
and the costs to First World taxpayers. Insofar as an application of 
George's 3-D solution would reduce the threat of war that results 
from the debt crisis, it would obviously promote preference 
satisfaction among many in the First World—and in the Third World. 
13See my Ch. 2, the section 'Why Third World Debt is Such a Problem', 
subsection, '(Hi) The Debt Boomerang'. 
(b) The lenders and preferences in the First World 
George's 3-D solution proposes a renegotiation of debt 
repayment and contrasts with any recommendation simply to 
cancel the debt, in whole or in part. It has to be remembered that 
George opposes both unconditional and partial cancellation of the 
debt. 14 Her proposal is for 'creative reimbursement'. What can we 
say about George's 3-D solution in relation to the preferences of the 
First World lenders—the banks, bankers and financial institutions of 
the First World? I think the following is a plausible claim. No 
doubt many First World lenders currently favour the repayment of 
Third World debt under existing arrangements. However, there are 
strong reasons for First World leaders to favour George's 3-D 
solution (and its supplements) over existing arrangements and 
some of them could be expected to change their current preferences 
upon reflection on George's proposal, 
First, the lenders, if they are to be consistent with their own 
public 'rhetoric', ought to welcome the democratising element in the 
3-D solution. George explicitly makes this point (George 1989, p. 
252). The debt crisis gives First World institutions an opportunity 
to spread democracy in the Third World. 
Second, George's 3-D solution aims at keeping countries of the 
Third World within the world economic system as trading partners. 
So, George thinks the 3-D solution has prudential value for the First 
World—she thinks, for example, that this is the only feasible way to 
l^See my Chapter 2, the section, 'George's Reasons Against Unconditional 
Cancellation or Repudiation'. 
In any case, the preferences of the lenders is only a small subset of the 
preferences of all affected parties. 
prevent Africa from withdrawing from the world system. "Unless 
creditors want Africa to slide off the world map, they should adopt 
creative reimbursement and the 3-D scenario....Everyone would 
gain as, little by little, they became more prosperous and paying 
customers" (George 1989, pp. 246 f.). First World lenders 
presumably would prefer to keep countries of the Third World like 
Africa within the world economic system as trading partners. 
Third, George thinks that, in time, countries which 
redeveloped in accordance with her 3-D solution (and its 
supplements) would not only be more egalitarian and democratic, 
they would be more economically viable, and so better trading 
partners in the world economic system. If this is correct, as seems 
plausible, this is another reason why First World lenders ought to 
welcome George's proposal over others. Her proposal, if applied, 
would turn the people of the Third World into better borrowers and 
better traders, somewhere down the track. 
Fourth, First World lenders ought to welcome the goodwill 
that would be generated in the Third World by their preparedness 
to renegotiate the repayment of debt in terms of 'creative 
reimbursement'. Business typically likes and cultivates goodwill 
among prospective borrowers and traders. 
Fifth, First World lenders typically value the bindingness of 
contracts. George's 3-D solution strikes a compromise that ought to 
be congenial to them. On the one hand, through renegotiation, it 
seeks to replace existing contracts for debt repayment. However, it 
does not recommend that existing contracts simply be broken or 
ignored.16 
In sum, at least this much seems plausible about the 
attractiveness of George's solution to the lenders of money to the 
Third World. George's 3-D solution (and its supplements) should be 
more welcome to many First World lenders than several of the 
competing solutions—for example, unconditional cancellation or 
even maintaining existing IMF strategies. One could therefore 
reasonably expect at least some of the lenders who currently 
favour present arrangements for debt repayment to change their 
preferences, given suitable reflection on the benefits, including 
global economic benefits, of George's proposal. 
It is worth remembering that George's approach to reimbursement is very 
concessional. Many contracts entered into between the First World and the 
Third World were not entered into freely and responsibly on both sides. For 
one thing, there was the coercive structural inequality between the First 
World and the Third World (Wilkins 1992, p. 173). Indeed Wilkins argues that, 
because of the disadvantaged position of the Third World, a model of mutually 
binding contracts that were freely entered into is inappropriate in assessing 
moral relations between the First World and the Third World in respect of 
debt repayment (Wilkins 1992, p. 179). Second, much of the Third World debt 
came about due to recklessness on behalf of both the bankers and borrowers. 
See Chapter 2, T h e Causes of Third World Debt', section iv, 'The money 
mongers'. I return to these issues in Ch. 6. 
Peter Bauer, on the other hand, argues that favourable treatment 
towards debtors in the form of debt concessions—because of deterioration in 
the external economic environment—is patronising and insubstantial. "It is 
patronising because it implies that Third World governments can be expected 
to behave like children with little thought of the morrow, or pop stars who 
promptly spend all they earn.. . .[and insubstantial because].. , .exports and 
export earnings of the debtors depend critically on the domestic conditions, 
especially government policies" (Bauer 1990, pp. 13 f.). In contrast to 
Wilkins and George, Bauer argues that debtor counties have a moral 
obligation to repay their debt. Bauer claims that " [ favourable treatment of 
defaulting governments politicises life and also enables defaulters to 
continue with damaging, and destructive policies" (Bauer 1990, p. 16). 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to consider George's 3-D 
solution to the Third World debt crisis in the light of Hare's theory 
of distributive justice. Hare offers a moderate egalitarian theory of 
substantial justice, the ultimate sanction of which is preference-
utilitarian. Arguably, George's 3-D solution is egalitarian, though it 
is difficult to judge conclusively whether the solution is moderate-
egali tarian in principle. In any case, Hare's own moderate 
egal i tar ianism is a relative substantial principle of jus t ice . 
Moderate egalitarianism is a substantial principle of justice for a 
given society—like a Western liberal one—given all the relevant, 
contingent facts, including all such facts about actual preferences. 
Hare allows that, in other social groupings, preference-uti l i ty 
ultimately might sanction social arrangements other than moderate 
egalitarian ones. 
The real issue therefore is the following. If George's 
egal i tar ian (possibly moderate egalitarian) 3-D solution were 
applied, would it best satisfy the preferences of all the parties 
affected—that is, those affected both in the Third and First Worlds? 
Given its egalitarian aspects, George's solution clearly would 
promote the satisfaction of many important preferences of the 
people of the Third World. However, it is arguable that, given its 
insistence on democratic values, the 3-D solution is insensitive to 
the preferences of some people in the Third World. These present 
preferences for nondemocratic socio-political arrangements could 
be outweighed by future preferences for democratic socio-political 
arrangements and so justify the implementation of democratic 
institutions. However, it cannot be glibly assumed, as George 
perhaps does, that this is how all the relevant preferences would 
sum up. 
In relation to the First World, I have developed an argument 
in two parts. First, given certain natural assumptions about 
people's preferences, it is plausible to suppose that George's 3-D 
solution would promote the preference satisfaction of many 
ordinary people in the First World who are adversely affected by 
the Third World debt crisis (those who are victims of the so called 
'debt boomerang'). Second, at least some First World lenders could 
be expected to come to prefer George's 3-D solution (and its 
supplements), upon reflection about its benefits, including its global 
economic benefits. In any event, the preferences of the lenders is 
only a small subset of the preferences of all affected parties. 
In sum, George's 3-D solution looks promising on several 
counts as a just solution to the Third World debt crisis, from a 
preference-utilitarian perspective on justice like Hare's. There is, 
however, a legitimate concern about value imperialism, which is not 
easily resolved. 
CHAPTER 5 
ONORA O'NEILL'S THEORY OF JUSTICE 
In this chapter, I outline Onora O'Neill's Kantian-inspired 
theory of justice. In Chapter 6, I assess George's 3-D solution in 
relation to this theory. O'Neill's theory (like Hare's) is applicable 
internationally and interculturally, which is essential to deliberation 
about just solutions to problems of Third World debt. A further 
promising feature of applying O'Neill's theory of justice to the Third 
World debt crisis is that she applies her own theory to a closely 
related topic, namely world hunger. O'Neill is also of interest 
because of her criticisms of utilitarianism (especially preference 
utilitarianism). 
What O'Neill Takes To Be the Virtues of a Good Moral 
Theory 
O'Neill argues for three requirements to which ethical 
reasoning about the public domain should aspire. Tfaese three 
requirements (discussed below) can be encapsulated in the 
following comprehensive requirement: relevant ethical theory must 
put forward principles which can be justified to relevant agents 
with varied moral starting points; but it must also incorporate 
critical ways of reasoning which assist moves beyond initial 
appraisals of problems faced (O'Neill 1986, pp. 49 f.). In the light of 
her three requirements, O'Neill assesses consequentialism, rights 
theory, and moral theory based on obligation and need (Kantian 
Theory) . 
O'NeilFs project in her book Faces of Hunger is to articulate 
the major premises (ethical principles) that apply to problems of 
famine and world hunger—that is, premises or principles that meet 
her three standards. She does not set out to be definitive about the 
relevant minor premises (that is, all the relevant particular facts) 
(O'Neill 1986, 51 f.). 
CNeill 's Three Standards of Good Ethical Reasoning 
O'Neill's three standards relating to moral deliberation about 
problems of the public domain are constraints of practicality or 
action-guidingness. They are: (i) that there be an accurate, 
nonidealized account of agency that allows for a plurality of agents; 
(ii) that ethical reasoning be accessible but critical; and (iii) that 
ethical reasoning rely on ethical principles which have considerable 
power to resolve practical problems. 
(i) The first standard 
O'Neill's first standard requires that there be an accurate, 
nonidealized account of agency, which allows for the agency of 
institutions and collectives as well as the agency of individuals 
(O'Neill 1986, p. 49.). 
One potential problem for social ethical theory is selective 
omission of many of the actual features of human reasoning and 
choice (abstraction). Another, which O'Neill takes more seriously, is 
the selective addition of features (like perfect rationality) which is 
inaccurate or misleading (idealization) (O'Neill 1986, pp. 29 f.). For 
O'Neill, ethical deliberation which introduces idealized conceptions 
of rationality is inappropriate for guiding human action since 
humans do not typically reason and make choices in an ideally 
rational way. Further, ethical deliberation which stems from an 
account of idealized agency will not be accessible to a variety of 
actual agents and so will not cross ideological and social boundaries 
(O'Neill 1986, p. 31). 
Ethical reasoning in the public domain must acknowledge the 
variety of agents in the audience it addresses—institutions and 
collectives, as well as individuals (O'Neill 1986, pp. 33 ff.). 
Moreover, it must take account of the limited capacities for 
understanding and action which characterise all such actual agents 
(O'Neill 1986, pp. 34 ff.). In the case of global hunger, reasoning has 
to apply not only to agents but to agencies, since individual action 
alone cannot solve the problem. In some cases the practices of 
institutions have a causal role in the problem (O'Neill 1986, pp. 35 
ff.). Reasoning which is individualistic does not apply to the 
processes of decision-making of institutions. 
A proper account of human agency should take into account 
that individuals have finite, socially and ideologically formed 
cognitive capacities, and powers of action that are limited and 
defined by social context (O'Neill 1986, p. 35). At the same time, 
the ways agents and agencies differ must be taken into account. 
Agencies often have greater resistance to pressure, they can often 
articulate problems differently to individuals, and are more able to 
assimilate information (O'Neill 1986, p. 37). There are also some 
things that individuals can do only in the context of an institution. 
Individuals alone cannot "devalue a currency or irrigate a desert or 
have a debate on the best criteria for a soft loan policy. Individuals 
can only take part in such activities in appropriate social contexts" 
(O'Neill 1986, p. 38). 
(ii) The second standard 
O'Neill's second standard requires that ethical reasoning be 
accessible but critical. Ethical reasoning "should employ ethical and 
other categories which are or can be made accessible to the agents 
and agencies whose action is required, without being coopted by 
whatever ethical outlook is already established" (O'Neill 1986, p. 
49). 
For ethical deliberation to be action-guiding, it must be 
accessible to its audience so that the audience can see how it is 
relevant to them. Idealized accounts of human agency are not only 
inaccurate but often inaccessible to actual agents. O'Neill's standard 
of accessibility requires that practical moral reasoning use 
categories that are familiar to the relevant agents and agencies 
(O'Neill 1986, p. 28). Accounts of agency may be inaccessible to 
collectives and institutions when the reasoning is based on accounts 
of individual agency. Further, for ethical deliberation to be 
accessible, it must take account of the limited capacities of the 
agents and agencies it addresses, such as finite rationality and finite 
powers of action. 
At the same time, ethical reasoning should not assume 
existing frameworks which define problems and their solutions. In 
this way, ethical deliberation must be critical. O'Neill cites a 
number of criticisms of the policies of institutions such as the IMF, 
the World Bank and transnational companies (O'Neill 1986, p. 36). 
The problem in dealing with development strategies for such 
institutions, according to O'Neill, is that their view of agency is built 
around the principles that constitute their charter and mandate. 
Because of this they are unable to take a critical perspective of 
human agency. 
However, inherent dangers of conservatism attach to the 
accessibility requirement: restrictions to familiar categories may tie 
ethical reasoning to local and other restricted views (O'Neill 1986, 
pp. 28 & 39 f.). In order for practical reasoning to be accessible, it 
must use whatever categories (ethical or otherwise) are established 
in the modes of discourse of each agent or agency; so, it must be 
local, contextual and possibly sectorial (O'Neill 1986, pp. 38 ff.). 
However, by tying ethical deliberation to local and established 
categories, there is a potential for it not to be critical of established 
perceptions of problems (minor premises) and established ethical 
theories or principles (major premises) (O'Neill 1986, p. 28). 
According to O'Neill, "[t]wo steps are needed to prevent 
practical reasoning from becoming hostage to established and 
1 O'Neill goes on to argue that moral reasoning need not be sectorial. See my 
last comment, this section. 
establishment views of how situations should be construed and 
problems remedied. First, plausible ethical principles must be 
identified and shown to be both able to guide action and accessible 
to the relevant audiences, and yet more than projections of locally 
established categories and discourse. Secondly, the particular 
descriptions and appraisals of actual situations invoked—the minor 
premises of ethical reasoning—must also be shown accessible to 
whatever audiences the reasoning addresses, and yet more than the 
prefered perspectives of local outlook" (O'Neill 1986, p. 43, 
emphasis original).^ Reasoning may be accessible if it uses 
vocabulary that the relevant agents and agencies can come to 
understand and see as salient and important. Such practical 
reasoning—reasoning which is at once accessible and critical—is both 
ethical and political (O'Neill 1986, p. 45, emphasis original). 
According to O'Neill, there is a special problem of accessibility 
in the case of moral reasoning. Moral reasoning is in various ways 
disanalogous to other sorts of reasoning. The specific social and 
ideological context is usually clear in other sorts of reasoning. Legal 
reasoning takes place in the context of crimes, courts and juries, 
with principles in the form of laws and rules. The relevant agents 
and their roles are determined. Commercial reasoning takes place 
in the context of opportunities to buy, sell, work and invest, with 
principles such as contracts and bargaining. The relevant agents 
2 For reasoning to be practical, more than the ethical categories need to be 
accessible to the agents and agencies. There is also a need for some method of 
choosing which is the prefered description of a particular situation. "An 
adequate account of reasoning that can guide action must include not only 
principles of action (the major premises) but an account of judgement which 
explains why particular situations should be grasped under one rather than 
another possible description (the minor premises)" (O'Neill 1986, p. 29). 
and agencies and their roles are determined within a context. In 
the case of ethical problems and their possible solutions, there is no 
shared institutional or ideological context. Moral reasoning which 
addresses the issues of famine and endemic hunger has to be 
accessible to a variety of agents and agencies which cross 
ideological and social boundaries (O'Neill 1986, p. 31). 
In order adequately to address problems like famine and 
world hunger, relevant ethical reasoning must be accessible to a 
variety of agencies as well as agents. However, as well as being 
accessible, ethical reasoning must be able to be critical of existing 
construals of problems (O'Neill 1986, pp. 35 f.). So, while ethical 
reasoning must be connected with the various 'moral starting 
points' of the agents and agencies it addresses, "it may also 
transform both the principles and the perceptions of particular 
situations which constitute that starting point" (O'Neill 1986, p. 41). 
What enables such communication and transformation is that 
radical conceptual incommensurability is implausible (O'Neill 1986, 
pp. 41 f. & 45 ff.). That communication and transformation is 
possible gives O'Neill reason to claim that ethical reasoning need not 
be sectorial. 
(Hi) The third standard 
O'Neill's third standard requires that ethical reasoning should 
operate with "ethical principles which have considerable—not 
necessarily algorithmic—power to resolve dilemmas" (O'Neill 1986, 
p. 49). 
The issue here is action-guidingness. O'Neill puts the matter 
this way: "Reasoning which is fully practical must also be able to 
guide action. The underlying, major premises...must combine with 
appropriate minor premises...to provide reasons for some rather 
than other policies or actions to be pursued or avoided by particular 
agents and agencies. Reasoning which is not in any way action-
guiding just is not practical reasoning. It provides no principles by 
which actual deliberation can lead to judgements about actions or 
policies" (O'Neill 1986, p. 47). However, the requirement on ethical 
principles (combined with relevant minor premises) that they be 
action-guiding (provide reasons for action) need not amount to the 
requirement that such principles provide a practical algorithm 
(O'Neill 1986, p. 48). 
The algorithmic nature of consequentialism is meant to make 
it precise in its action-guidingness. However, in practice, due to the 
incompleteness and imprecision of the available information, 
consequentialism can, and often does, fail to guide action (I discuss 
this in the next section). O'Neill points out that algorithms are not 
needed to guide action and that a decision theory that offers a test 
which indicates which actions are obligatory and which are 
forbidden may be sufficiently action-guiding. O'Neill maintains that 
a Kantian-inspired ethic can be action-guiding in this way. (I 
discuss this in a later section.) 
O'Neill on the Virtues and Vices of Consequentialism 
In her discussion of consequentialism, O'Neill focuses on 
utilitarianism—particularly preference-utilitarianism of the sort 
defended by Hare. O'Neill maintains that utilitarianism fully meets 
only her first standard of ethical reasoning and so does not fare 
well as an adequate moral theory, especially for deliberating on 
ethical issues such as world hunger. 
(i) Virtues of consequentialism 
According to O'Neill, consequentialism has at least four 
virtues. One virtue is that consequentialist reasoning has obvious 
relevance to practical issues like famine, hunger and poverty: 
"Consequentialist patterns of ethical reasoning offer evident 
advantages for discussing both famine and persistent poverty and 
hunger. Since the results of whatever is done—or not done—are 
evidently grave here, reasoning which centres on results seem to 
the point" (O'Neill 1986, p. 52). 
A second virtue of consequentialism, according to O'Neill, is 
that consequentialism "is not tied to a stringent or narrow account 
of agency" (O'Neill 1986, p. 53; cf. O'Neill's first standard of 
adequacy for a moral theory). A third virtue concerns accessibility. 
Aspects of consequentialist reasoning are accessible for many 
agents and social agencies (O'Neill 1986, p. 53; cf. O'Neill's second 
standard of adequacy for a moral theory). A fourth virtue of 
consequentialist reasoning is that it has a powerful decision-
procedure for settling questions of what action is right to do (O'Neill 
1986, p. 56; cf. O'Neill's third standard of adequacy for a moral 
theory) . 
According to O'Neill , while these four aspects of 
consequentialist reasoning at first seem promising with respect to 
consequent ia l ism's being an adequate moral theory, closer 
reflection shows that in many ways consequentialism falls short of 
being an adequate moral theory. The only standard of adequacy it 
seems fully to meet is the first standard, the requirement of a 
nonidealized account of agency which applies to individuals and 
collectives. 
(ii) Vices of Consequentialism 
In the abstract, consequentialist reasoning begins with the 
idea that action is right if it leads to good consequences. However, 
O'Neill claims that there are at least four additions which are 
indispensable for consequentialist deliberation: First, some account 
of what makes results good is needed. O'Neill claims that modern 
consequentialists typically give an empirical but subjective account 
of what makes actions good. She adds, further, that utilitarians 
tend to differ on what makes the results of actions good (O'Neill, 
1986, pp. 54 f.).3 Second, utilitarianism needs to be able to identify 
the possible courses of action available. Third, there is a need for 
enough causal knowledge, so that probable results of the available 
courses of action can be known with reasonable accuracy. Fourth, 
there needs to be clear account of the relationship between what is 
3 It is at this point that O'Neill claims that most consequentialists are 
utilitarians. In her discussion of consequentialism it seems that she usually 
uses the terms consequentialist and utilitarian interchangeably. 
good and what is right. Classical utilitarians hold that whichever 
action produces the best result is not only the best action but the 
one that it is obligatory. Other utilitarians, according to O'Neill, 
reject such maximising principles and consider also the distribution 
of good results. Other utilitarians again take account of agents 
cognitive or other capacities, or emphasize the minimising of 
disutility (O'Neill 1986, p. 55). O'Neill claims that these four 
additional features of consequentialist reasoning make it seem a 
powerful system of deliberation. However, what is noticeable is 
that there are widely diverse conclusions reached when 
consequent ia l i s t s discuss practical issues like hunger and 
development. This can be illustrated by the divergence in the 
conclusions between Singer, Hardin and Jackson. 
In his article 'Famine, Affluence and Morality', Peter Singer 
concludes that the rich, and even the moderately well-off, ought to 
give their surplus to the poor until they have reduced their 
standard of living to the point of marginal utility such that further 
giving would sacrifice 'something of comparable moral importance' 
(O'Neill 1986, p. 56). So, according to Singer, utilitarianism demands 
that the rich and the relatively well-off (which would include most 
of those living in First World countries) sacrifice a sizeable portion 
of their income. 
Other consequentialists such as Garrett Hardin reach a very 
different conclusion on the issue of Third World aid. In his article, 
'Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor', Hardin claims 
that gifts and aid given to the Third World are wrong on 
consequentialist grounds because they produce greater harm than 
benefits in the long run. In brief, Hardin claims that feeding the 
poor now will result in the poor having more children; and so, in the 
future, there will be further suffering in that there will be more 
people to feed and eventually there will not be enough food to go 
around (O'Neill 1986, pp. 58 ff.). 
Tony Jackson also argues that various forms of food aid are 
damaging to the recipients in the long run. In Against the Grain, 
Jackson argues that supplying free or subsidised food can damage 
the livelihood of the local farmers. Providing free or cheap food 
results in the local farmers not being able to compete in an already 
fragile economy (O'Neill 1986, pp. 61 f.). 
In view of these diverse conclusions, O'Neill identifies two 
central difficulties for (utilitarian) consequentialism as an applied 
moral theory. These difficulties concern calculating benefits and 
reckoning consequences. 
(a) Calculating benefits and O'Neill's third standard 
In relation to calculating benefits there is, according to O'Neill, 
a problem of subjectivity. (Non-Benthamite) utilitarianism starts 
from a subjective account of value. Essentially, whether a result is 
a benefit or a harm depends on how it is seen by relevant subjects: 
on their actual desires or preferences (O'Neill 1986, pp. 64 f.). 
The problem this generates is that it leaves "judgements of 
actual benef i t and harm.. . large scope for subject ive and 
impressionistic claims about what others would consider to be 
benefit or harm" (O'Neill 1986, p. 65). O'Neill charges that 
utilitarians have often made unwarranted assumptions about what 
the poor would care about most. For example, such things as secure 
food supplies, shelter, clean water, education, medical services and 
other basic needs typically have been assumed to be uppermost 
concerns when precise information has been unavailable. Such 
assumptions, about what the poor care most about, however, have 
often been made by appeal to some other outlook than that of the 
poor themselves. O'Neill maintains that, if the actual preferences of 
the poor were looked at closely, one might often find that land, 
caste, tribe, traditional way of life and religious affiliations are 
valued more or as much as material needs. Acute needs ought to 
matter in utilitarian thinking only when they are perceived as 
harms by the sufferers (O'Neill 1986, p. 61)A 
Theoretically, (utilitarian) consequentialism looks promising 
in respect of O'Neill's third standard. "As a pattern of thought, 
consequentialism promises both wide scope and precise resolution 
of problems." (O'Neill 1986, p. 62). However, O'Neill claims that, 
because of problems associated with the nonbiased identification of 
preferences, consequentialism is vulnerable, in its application, to 
high inaccuracies about which acts and policies would maximise 
4O'Neill identifies a number of other problems that arise from starting with a 
subjective account of value. Obligations, which depend on optimal outcomes, 
change because desires and preferences change. Also there is no way of 
being critical of whatever desires or preferences someone has. Altruistic, 
selfish and vindictive desires are to be weighed equally (O'Neill 1986, pp. 67 
f.). Barbaric courses of action can only be judged wrong if there is an 
alternative course of action which will lead to greater satisfaction of actual 
preferences. There is also a tendency in utilitarian thinking to ignore 
present preferences. This is because the scope of utilitarianism includes all 
preferences, including future preferences. Future preferences include the 
future preferences of those immediately affected by some course of action 
and of those to be born. Given all the preferences to be weighed in 
calculation, all present preferences are likely to be outweighed by future 
p r e f e r e n c e s . 
aggregate benefit (O'Neill 1986, p. 69). So, on O'Neill's account, one 
conspicuous defect of consequentialism is that it falls short of her 
third standard for a good moral theory. 
(b) Reckoning the consequences and O'Neill's second standard 
O'Neill thinks that utilitarian consequentialism, when applied 
to problems like hunger, famine and development, cannot measure 
up in relation to her second standard of accessibility with critical 
power: "utilitarian ethical reasoning must either be abstract and 
inaccess ib le—or accessible but uncri t ical of establ ished and 
establishment grids of categories" (O'Neill 1986, p. 78). 
The problem here is another aspect of the problem of 
subjectivity. Preference utilitarianism is committed to construing 
benefit and harm in terms of the preferences of those affected (how 
those affected see things). This commitment to the points of view 
of those affected also makes such consequentialism liable to be 
restricted to how those affected identify ethical problems and 
reckon the consequences of alternative lines of action and policies 
(O'Neill 1986, pp. 71 f.). What consequentialism needs is (i) 
accurate, perspectiveless empirical and causal knowledge (supplied 
by an objective social science) and (ii) such knowledge to remain 
accessible to the affected parties (O'Neill 1986, pp. 72 f.). Both of 
these conditions, O'Neill claims, are demanding. 
Cons ider her second, accessibi l i ty condi t ion . Much 
consequential is t reasoning on practical problems is conducted 
within the constraints of established categories, perceptions and 
values. Possible courses of action and policies are evaluated in 
terms of how well they meet the objectives of particular 
inst i tut ions. 
Institutions are not responsive to consequential reasoning 
in general, but to consequentialist reasoning that fits their 
working practices and mandate. For example, if a 
development loan is to be evaluated in consequentialist 
terms it will be judged and assessed under specific 
headings, to see whether this proposed use of funds is 
indeed optimal (or at least better than other propsed uses) 
in terms of a limited grid of categories which are embodied 
in the working practices of a particular institution. In some 
cases these may be purely commercial criteria—How secure 
is the loan? Will it be repaid? What rate of interest can be 
negotiated? Consequentialist reasoning of this sort is 
hardly to be thought of as ethical reasoning, since the 
conception of benefit used is that of commercial advantage 
to the loan making institution (O'Neill 1986, p. 74). 
O'Neill points out that the categories used by institutions vary 
and are not always restricted to considerations of profit. Her point, 
however, is that consequentialist reasoning is conducted within 
constraints. Such constraints enable some sorts of considerations 
rather than others to be accessible to those whose action may make 
a difference. In the process of consequentialist reasoning, policies 
are made which lose focus on the central issue. Accessible ethical 
reasoning must reach actual agents whose perceptions of problems. 
possibilities for action and knowledge of causes will be restricted. 
So, accessible reasoning becomes tied to the status quo, and unable 
to be critical (O'Neill, 1986, p. 78). 
Consider next the need utilitarianism has for accurate, 
perspectiveless, empirical and causal knowledge. There are several 
issues here. First, it is indeed questionable whether expert 
neutrality is possible. What is needed here is not just motivational 
neutrality, but also cognitive neutrality. If experts cannot secure 
cognitive neutrality then they will be confined to established 
categories of thought (O'Neill 1986, pp. 83 f.). Second, there is the 
issue of whether there could be expert neutral advice about 
instrumental reasoning, which was conducted in a language that 
was universally or widely accessible (O'Neill 1986, pp. 84 ff.). 
O'Neill argues that such "instrumental reasoning unavoidably 
deploys one or another specific grid of categories which is partly 
alien to many agents and agencies whose action is needed" (O'Neill 
1986, p. 86). It seems that such advice would be accessible only to 
the experts. So, if expert advice aims at global generalizations, it is 
accessible only to the community of experts—or, if it restricts itself 
to agents' categories (as in interpretive or hermeneutic approaches 
to social inquiry), it will have only local accessibility (O'Neill 1986, 
pp. 87 f.). 
Third, it might be suggested that the neutral idiom of social 
science could be spread, and so accessibility increased (O'Neill 1986, 
p.88). O'Neill, however, disputes that any social science currently 
available in development studies can lay any plausible claim to 
value neutrality. A common example of this, which O'Neill 
mentions, is the description of holdings as "property of some 
landowner who rents them to his tenants" (O'Neill 1986, p. 89). 
Such a description is not value-neutral, according to O'Neill, as it 
invites questions in relation to fair rental prices, but suppresses the 
question of whether any owner and rental relations are unjust. 
"From a utilitarian perspective it cannot be an ethically neutral 
matter to spread the categories and outlook of social science....Only 
if utilitarian thinking could provide reasons for spreading one 
rather than another group of social, and ethical categories would it 
be reasonable to make utilitarian deliberation more widely 
accessible by spreading a common set of categories which can then 
underpin widely accessible instrumental reasoning" (O'Neill 1986, p. 
91). 
To sum up, u t i l i t a r i an i sm needs both accura te , 
perspectiveless, empirical and causal knowledge and accessibility of 
that knowledge. Both requirements, however, are in conflict. 
Accessibility of ethical reasoning seems tied to perspectivity in 
ways that would render so-called neutral, expert empirical and 
causal advice largely inaccessible. And, in any event, such expert 
advice would not really be perspectiveless; it would be perspectival 
in a way that limited its accessibility to other experts. So it seems 
that utilitarian conequentialism cannot satisfy O'Neill's second 
standard for a good moral theory.^ 
5There is another problem which afflicts utilitarian consequentialism as an 
applied theory, when applied to large-scale problems. It places cognitive 
demands on us in respect of comprehensive instrumental calculations which 
standardly exceed what relevant information is available to us. This is 
because it requires "that the benefit of all available acts and policies be 
compared" (O'Neill 1986, p. 91, emphasis original). 
(c) Justice 
O'Neill maintains that the defects of utilitarianism spread to 
its accounts of justice, since any utilitarian account of justice is 
ultimately dependent on the Principle of Utility. Utilitarians "see 
the rules of justice simply as those rules of action whose breach is 
likely to have the worst results" (O'Neill 1986, p. 93). O'Neill 
criticises utilitarian justice on the same grounds as she criticises 
utilitarianism more generally. The utilitarian theory of justice 
"depends on an account of social science which is either resolutely 
bounded by currently established categories, so uncritical of them, 
or defiantly oblivious of those categories, so inaccessible to actual 
agents and agencies of social change" (O'Neill 1986, p. 95). 
O'Neiirs Favoured Moral Theory: Neo-Kantianism^ 
O'Neill sets three standards for ethical reasoning about 
problems of the public domain. First, that there be an accurate, 
nonidealized account of agency, which allows for agential 
heterogeneity. Second, that ethical reasoning be accessible but 
critical. Third, that ethical reasoning should appeal to principles 
that have considerable power to resolve dilemmas, without 
necessarily being algorithmic. 
6Sometimes the term 'neo-Kantianism' is used narrowly to characterise 
several philosophical movements in Germany in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. However, I use the term 'neo-Kantian' more broadly to identify 
the Kantian inspired nature of O'Neill's prefered moral theory. O'Neill claims 
that her proposed theory "is mainly Kantian in origin and in aspiration" but 
that it is also supplemented in some ways (O'Neill 1986, p. xiii). 
(i) Neo-Kantianism and O'Neill's first standard 
According to O'Neill, a neo-Kantian approach to ethical 
reasoning can accommodate agential heterogeneity. First, the 
Categorical Imperative, which imposes moral obligations on agents 
who are finitely rational and have limited powers of action, applies 
equally well to human institutions and collectivities as to human 
individuals. "Kant's theory of obligation is by definition a theory of 
principles of action for beings of limited rationality. Human beings 
are evidently finitely rational; but so are human institutions and 
collectivities. Since Kantian obligations are supposed to guide the 
action of agents with partial rather than idealized capacities to 
understand and to act, they may equally serve the deliberating of 
institutions and collectives with limited rationality and powers of 
action. If the Categorical Imperative is relevant for partially 
rational and autonomous beings, it can be made relevant for 
institutional and collective as well as for individual deliberation" 
(O'Neill 1986, p. 132). 
Second, Kantian theory construes action as done on maxims or 
principles of action, and proposes, in the Categorical Imperative, 
that action be performed only on maxims that could also be adopted 
by others. Maxims, O'Neill suggests, are plausibly construed, not as 
introspectible, individual intentions, but as "the fundamental 
principles which guide actions, policies and practices, whether 
individual, institutional or collective" (O'Neill 1986, p. 132, emphasis 
original). 
(ii) Neo-Kantianism and O'Neill's second standard 
O'Neill's second constraint on applied ethical reasoning is that 
it be accessible but retain critical power. She argues that Kant-
inspired ethical deliberation satisfies this constraint. 
Such deliberation can avail itself of Kant's distinction between 
determinant and reflective judgement. Determinant judgements 
work out whether relatively abstract descriptions of situations and 
principles of action would be satisfied by particular cases. 
Reflective judgements determine whether or not particular cases, 
seen as falling under specific descriptions, would satisfy certain 
more abstract descriptions or principles (O'Neill 1986, p. 125). 
According to O'Neill, reflective and determinant judging standardly 
begins with locally established grids of categories. However, they 
do not need to be limited by established categories. "Just as 
Socrates and his friends found themselves probing and questioning 
a view of justice that was established in Athens, so we can ask 
whether a proposed account of what it takes to live up to some 
abstract principle of justice or beneficence is adequate in a given 
context, and (if it is not) can hunt for a better account" (O'Neill 
1986, p. 126). 
O'Neill defends Kantian ethics against the charge that it is too 
abstract to be accessible and so guide action. It is true that Kantian 
ethics is characterised by its commitment to the Categorical 
Imperative, the 'supreme principle of practical reasoning'. But, 
O'Neill argues, the Categorical Imperative is where practical 
deliberation begins rather than ends. Kantian deliberation requires 
as well the application and assessment of minor premises— 
particular maxims of action. The selection of such maxims invokes 
a critical use of local and contextual categories. This ensures the 
accessibility of such maxims. "No agent or agency can use the 
Categorical Imperative except by applying it to some maxim of 
action. All complete Kantian deliberation requires the minor 
premise of practical reasoning—the proposed maxim of action—to be 
formulated, and then critically assessed in terms of the Categorical 
Imperative. Agents and agencies select the minor premises of their 
deliberations partly by using the grid of categories that constitutes 
their local idiom and moral starting point, and partly by criticizing 
that specification of problems, allocations of problems and claims 
about available action in the light of wider considerations, including 
ethical principles" (O'Neill 1986, p. 134). 
As opposed to resu l t -or ien ted th inking (such as 
consequential ism) action-oriented reasoning (such as Kantian 
deliberat ion) is considerably less demanding and so more 
accessible. O'Neill claims that result-orientated thinking is either 
inescapably tied to established or establishment ethical categories 
or requires a value-neutral and scientific perspective which won't 
be widely accessible. All that is required in action-oriented 
reasoning, according to O'Neill, is "to assume that the agents and 
agencies in a particular context have a 'moral starting point'—the 
grid of categories of some outlook or milieu—which allows them to 
raise at least some questions whose answers may provide reasons 
for shifting the starting point" (O'Neill 1986, p. 127). 
In sum, applied Kantian deliberation apparently meets 
O'Neill's second standard of ethical reasoning. It employs ethical 
and other categories which are accessible to actual agents and 
agencies; at the same time, it allows agents and agencies to be 
critical of their established views. 
(in) Neo-Kantianism and O'Neill's third standard 
O'Neill's third constraint on applied ethical reasoning is that it 
should invoke principles that have considerable power to resolve 
di lemmas, without necessarily being algorithmic. Kantian 
deliberation, conducted in the light of the abstract Categorical 
Imperative, seeks to identify maxims which could not be 
universally shared—especially by beings of limited rationality and 
powers. The fundamental requirement of any Kantian theory of 
obligation is that one avoid acting on such unsharable maxims and 
that one act on the converse of nonsharable ones. According to 
O'Neill, nonsharable (i.e., nonuniversalizable) maxims, fall into two 
main groups. There are principles which justice must reject, 
including principles of coercion and principles of deceit, and 
principles which our wider, imperfect obligations must reject, 
i nc lud ing p r inc ip le s of d is respect , nonbene f i cence and 
nondeve lopment . 
Correspondingly, Kant divides principles of obligation into two 
categories—principles for determining perfect duties and principles 
for determining imperfect duties. Perfect duties are actions which 
are required in order to avoid acting on fundamental principles 
which are nonuniversalizable without inconsistency—and are 
nonuniversalizable on logical or conceptual grounds.7 Imperfect 
duties are actions which are required in order to avoid acting on 
fundamental principles which are nonuniversalizable on rational 
grounds because of the limited capacities and reliance on others of 
needy and finitely rational beings. For disembodied, mutually 
invulnerable rational beings, O'Neill claims, there might be no 
principles of imperfect duties. However, for mutually dependant 
and finitely rational beings, there is a need for some respect and 
help from others, and the development of some talents (O'Neill 
1986, pp. 141 f. & pp. 159 ff.).8 
Kantian-style deliberation can in principle be made relevant 
to the deliberation of actual, non-idealized agents and agencies 
"provided that there are context-sensitive ways of specifying what 
it takes to conform to principles such as those of noncoercion and 
nondeception in the actual situations in which we find ourselves" 
(O'Neill 1986, p. 138). Kantian deliberation is not tied to any 
particular institutional or ideological form of what is right for all 
times and situations. It begins by showing which relatively 
abstract principles cannot in principle be acted on by all and so 
ought not to guide action. It can be extended to show which 
particular acts, policies or institutions are forbidden or obligatory in 
a given situation (O'Neill 1986, p. 136). Though such deliberation 
has considerable action-guiding power, it is not algorithmic. For 
^For discussion of why coercion and deception are nonuniversaUzable, see 
O'Neill, 1986, p. 139. 
8 The focus of this thesis is justice and so little attention is given here to the 
moral principles which dictate our imperfect duties. Suffice to say, Kantian 
imperfect duties are selective obligations. An imperfect duty like 
beneficence is, on the Kantian schema, less fundamental than justice (O'Neill 
1986, pp. 160 ff.). See below for more discussion. 
one, it does not rank all possible actions—it is a decision procedure 
for detecting forbidden and obligatory action. Also, its deployment 
in particular contexts of action calls for nonmechanical judgement 
and sensitivity (O'Neill 1986, p. 136). 
Noncoercion and Nondeception and the Centrality of 
Material Justice 
According to O'Neill, the obligations of invulnerable rational 
beings would be exhausted by principles of justice. Human 
vulnerabil i ty and insufficiency account for the principles of 
imperfect duties. However, in the case of vulnerable, rational 
beings such as human agents, even principles of justice must 
centrally take account of material needs (O'Neill 1968, p. 140 f., 
emphasis original). Embodied humans have material needs which 
are vulnerable to intervention and to damage. They can therefore 
be coerced in ways which disembodied beings cannot.^ Embodied 
human beings also have "limited, perspective knowledge—they 
comprehend their world through limited grids of categories". This 
contingent human condition renders them "vulnerable to many 
forms of deception that would not affect ideally rational or 
disembodied beings" (O'Neill 1986, pp. 140 f.). Any just global 
order, according to O'Neill, must at least provide for the basic 
material needs without which human beings "are overwhelmingly 
vulnerable to coercion and deception" (O'Neill 1986, p. 141). 
^O'Neill points out that there may be occasions when "a fundamental 
commitment to noncoercion might require action which in subsidiary 
respects was coercive or deceptive" (O'Neill 1986, p. 139, emphasis original; 
see also p. 158). 
O'Neill maintains that the moral theory that she is sponsoring 
can yield detailed recommendations and proposals for action, but 
that these will vary with context. In general terms, justice requires 
"public institutions and policies which secure freedom from deep 
forms of coercion and deception" (O'Neill 1986, p. 146).lo O'Neill 
claims that there is a need for change in the present international 
economic order as it is "patently an institutional structure whose 
normal operation does not eliminate coercion or deception but often 
institutionalises them" (O'Neill 1986, p. 145). In this way, the 
present international economic order is unjust. Justice requires 
institutional conditions which systematically meet the material 
needs of the poor, thus helping to ensure their freedom from 
fundamental coercion and deception. Though it is her focus, 
material justice is not the whole of justice. Complete Kantian 
justice, according to O'Neill, would also require that social and 
political life among the poor be organised in ways that avoid 
fundamental coercion and deception (O'Neill 1986, p. 154). O'Neill 
further adds that in an unjust and needy world there is both more 
opportunity and greater need for the fulfilment of imperfect duties, 
such as respect and the developing of required skills and talents 
(O'Neill 1986, p. 146). 
Kantian ethics of the kind sponsored by O'Neill is revisionary 
because it is concerned with fundamental principles. An action 
which is in accordance with some institutional framework such as 
lORlsewhere in her writings, O'Neill refers to the principles of justice as 
including at least principles of nondeception and nonvictimisation. 
Principles of victimisation include principles of coercion and principles of 
violence. O'Neill maintains that victimisation damages the agency of some 
others (O'Neill 1992, pp. 64 ff.). 
commercial bargaining might still be fundamentally coercive. 
Negotiations which adhere to principles of standard commercial 
categories may still be fundamentally coercive. While such 
categories might not coerce ideally rational or materially self-
sufficient beings, they may be coercive when one party is 
representing people whose needs are desperate. According to 
O'Neill "[n]egotiators coerce unless they leave opening for others, 
however desperate their actual circumstances, to refuse as well as 
accept their offer" (O'Neill 1986, p. 147). When people accept the 
conditions of an offer because they are too poor or vulnerable to 
refuse then the offer is exploitative and c o e r c i v e . I n such cases, 
there is a need for a revised 'moral starting point' which makes 
noncoercion and nondeception fundamental . While some 
contemporary economic and democratic political institutions have 
supposed barriers which are meant to prevent coercion and 
deception, they often fall short or being geinuinely noncoercive or 
nondeceptive. O'Neill maintains that "[i]f the context and the 
content of individual decisions is determined by social and 
economic structures which even sometimes rely on others' need in 
order to secure 'consent' or 'agreement', these arrangements may be 
fundamentally coercive and deceptive" (O'Neill 1986, p. 148). 
O'Neill outlines what she claims to be some important features 
of a just material w o r l d , First, a just economic order must provide 
O'Neill claims that "justice requires that institutions, like acts, allows those 
on the receiving end, even if frail and dependant, to refuse or renegotiate 
any variable aspects of the roles and tasks assigned to them" (O'Neill 1992, p. 
68). She adds further that more is required in order to be just to those who 
are vulnerable to deception or victimization. 
12O'Neill points out that principles of justice in times of abundance may 
differ to principles of justice in times of scarcity. 
for the production of the material goods which are needed to meet 
the material needs of humans. Secondly, sustained production must 
be provided for since material needs are recurrent. This means 
that the means for future reproduction must be made available and 
that environmental damage or degradation must be avoided to 
secure the possibility of a just economic order in the future. 
Thirdly, "a just set of institutions must secure a distribution which 
meets autonomy-destroying needs. Since human beings are rarely 
self-sufficient in material respects, and vary in productive capacity 
and opportunity, a just distribution is not likely to arise 
spontaneously from an adequate organisation of production" (O'Neill 
1986, p. 150). O'Neill adds that ideal-typical capitalist institutions 
may fail these criteria because they provide no guarantee that 
distribution will meet needs, and that ideal-typical socialist 
institutions may fail these criteria because they provide no 
guarantee that production will meet needs. 
O'Neill claims that a Kantian conception of material justice can 
be used to provide direction for the debate of international politics 
and economical arrangements. "It can offer reasons for rejecting 
any account of the problems of world hunger, their allocation and 
their remedy, which merely mirrors existing economic or power 
relations, or which would be appropriate only for idealized agents 
with limitless capacities and no unmet needs" (O'Neill 1986, p. 151). 
Some examples of current economic categories which could be 
rejected are: transfers referred to as 'aid', which implies that the 
transfer was not required by justice; and the term 'loan' which 
implies that the receivers may justly be required to repay with 
interest. It is clear that such matters could be differently 
understood. On an intranational scale, even in capitalistic societies, 
transfer payments in the form of taxation are not usually thought of 
as 'aid' or as 'gifts' but rather as a form of just redistribution. 
O'Neill maintains that the implementation of international 
justice affords "innumerable contexts of action" (O'Neill 1986, p. 
152). She comments that those "who contribute to economic or 
social life in any way from manufacturing to education, from 
journalists to government service, or from professional service to 
activity in the women's or trade union movement, have 
opportunities to advocate and further conceptual, institutional and 
legal forms that reduce the power and acceptance of unjust 
arrangements" (O'Neill 1986, p. 152). While such agents and 
agencies may be able to act in more or less direct ways in 
progressing towards global material justice, there are many indirect 
ways that agents can contribute to material justice. O'Neill claims 
that indirect action "by means of education, publicity, normal 
'political' involvement and maintaining a clear and public 
commitment to standards of justice may produce enormous 
changes" <0'Neill 1986, p. 153) to levels of material justice. 
Justice and Imperfect Duties 
According to O'Neill, a Kantianly just world is one which has 
its economic, social and political structures based on universalizable 
principles. However, a world which was merely just would not be 
sufficient for needy beings to reach their full potentiality. Because 
of their limited capacities, human beings need the help of others 
and could not rationally will for principles of perfect duty only. 
"Since actual human beings are not self-sufficient, they (unlike 
idealized rational beings) could never rationally seek a merely just 
society" (O'Neill 1986, p. 159). 
O'Neill maintains that under conditions such as those that 
obtain at present, where international institutional structures are 
far from just, "imperfect duty may be the only, if incomplete, 
response to human needs" (O'Neill 1986 p. 160). For example, 
action which supports famine relief and development work may 
often be a good way to fulfil one's imperfect obligations of respect 
and beneficence, especially when needs are unmet because of 
unjust political structures. In circumstances of injustice, where 
people are vulnerable to exploitation, coercion and deception, O'Neill 
recommends efforts which "aim to improve literacy, health, 
farming, or other technical skills, or to foster autonomy or self-help" 
(O'Neill 1986, p. 160).i3 
O'Neill emphasises that imperfect duties are selective 
obligations which are subordinate to and supplement the demands 
of justice. "Justice is the more fundamental obligation because it 
O'Neill also points out that in some societies women (wives and daughters) 
are especially vulnerable because they often have little control of resources 
but have heavy commitments to meet others' needs. "Where women are 
isolated, secluded, bared from education or wage earning, or have access to 
information only via the filter of more powerful family members, their 
judgement is weakened and their independence stunted" (O'Neill 1992, pp. 70 
f.). This gives reason to focus one's efforts on empowering women so that 
they become less vulnerable. 
l ^o 'Ne i l l comments: "Kantian imperfect duties are selective obligations. A 
fundamental maxim of neglecting neither respect nor needed help, nor the 
development of talents and other capacities, cannot be expressed in a policy 
of meeting all needs or developing all talents The selectivity of beneficence 
and of the development of talents is unavoidable given the unlimited sorts of 
concerns the framework of institutions and practices which form 
the context of action and make certain problems salient, certain 
solutions possible and certain modes of thought available" (O'Neill 
1986, p. 161). O'Neill thinks that a serious commitment to 
beneficent action requires a commitment to material justice and so 
to the political change of unjust institutions. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have outlined what O'Neill takes to be the 
requirements on ethical reasoning about the public domain and 
why she favours a revised version of Kantian moral theory. I have 
paid special attention to what O'Neill sees as the defects of 
consequentialism as a competing theory—especially the version 
Hare endorses, preference-utilitarianism. In the chapter that 
follows, I consider how well George's 3-D solution fares as a just 
solution to the Third World debt crisis, in the light of O'Neill's 
Kantian-inspired moral theory. 
help and support that human action may need in various circumstances. 
Although Kantian beneficence and development require only that agents 
and agencies secure others' capacities for action, and not that they enable 
them to achieve specific plans or aims, they demand more than any agent or 
agency can secure for all others. This selectivity is not ethically offensive if 
imperfect obligations supplement and do not substitute for justice" (O'Neill 
1986, pp. 161 f.). 
CHAPTER 6 
ASSESSMENT OF GEORGE'S 3-D SOLUTION IN THE LIGHT OF 
O'NEILLS THEORY OF JUSTICE 
In this chapter I discuss whether George's 3-D solution is a 
just solution in the light of O'Neill's theory of justice. My discussion 
falls into four sections. First, I discuss how the various features of 
George's proposed solution to the Third World debt crisis aim to 
meet people's material needs. Material needs play a central role in 
O'Neill's theory of justice. Second, one of O'Neill's primary principles 
of justice is the principle of noncoercion. In this section, I explore 
some significant accounts of the concept of coercion, locate these in 
relation to O'Neill's few clarificatory remarks about the concept, and 
discuss whether George's proposal is coercive. Third, imperfect 
duties also play an important role in O'Neill's moral theory more 
generally. In this section, I discuss whether George's proposal is 
conducive to the fulfilment of one's imperfect duties, as O'Neill 
conceives them. Finally, I discuss whether the various aspects of 
George's proposed 3-D solution are accessible to all affected parties, 
despite being revisionary. It will be remembered that O'Neill 
makes it a constraint on applied moral solutions that they be 
accessible to the affected parties, without being inherently 
conservative. 
Material Needs 
O'Neill maintains that moral reasoning must take the notions 
of obligation and need as central (O'Neill 1986, p. 49). Justice, 
according to O'Neill, requires that policies and institutions neither 
coerce nor deceive in fundamental ways. Human beings are 
especially vulnerable to deception and coercion if their material 
needs are not met. "The details of human justice must take account 
of the most basic needs that must be met if other human beings are 
not to be fundamentally deceived or coerced. Any just global order 
must at least meet standards of material justice and provide for the 
basic material needs in whose absence all human beings are 
overwhelmingly vulnerable to coercion and deception (O'Neill 1986, 
p. 141).1 O'Neill maintains further that a just economic order must 
provide for the production of goods, the sustained production of 
goods, and the distribution of the goods, in a way which meets those 
needs required for autonomy (O'Neill 1986, pp. 149 ff.).^ 
Autonomous human action is dependent on the satisfaction of 
certain needs. When these needs are not met or are insecure, 
human autonomy is threatened and people are vulnerable to 
deception and coercion. 
O'Neill's moral theory contrasts with other moral theories, 
such as utilitarianism, where actions are judged in terms of results 
produced. O'Neill's theory is also not rights-based. O'Neill claims 
1 O'Neill points out that in circumstances of global scarcity it would not be 
possible to meet all material needs (O'Neill 1986, p. 149). 
2See my Ch. 5, the section 'Noncoercion and Nondeception and the Centrality 
of Material Justice'. 
that rights-based theories avoid the question of agency.^ Rather, 
O'Neill's moral theory is an obligation-based theory, which makes 
"human autonomy (in its actual, partial forms) and human needs (in 
their actual pressing variety) central, and that provides an account 
both of justice and of beneficence" (O'Neill 1986, p. 142, emphasis 
original). 
In assessing whether or not George's proposed solution to the 
Third World debt crisis is just on O'Neill's account of justice, it is 
important to see whether or not the 3-D solution includes in its 
aims at least the meeting of people's basic material needs.4 It is 
clear that George's proposed solution does have this among its 
central aims. According to George, her 3-D solution requires 
governments of Third World countries to "direct economic activity 
away from international markets and towards the satisfaction of 
their own people's real needs" (George 1989, p. 245). George 
maintains that "[a] more, inner-directed economy would mean (for 
the least developed countries of Africa in particular) a strong 
agricultural sector as the basis for growth, providing both food 
crops and renewable sources of energy. The cornerstones of social 
policy would become primary health care, literacy, education and 
the empowering of women; all investments in the future. Available 
foreign exchange would be used to acquire capital goods and basic 
equipment—not to pay for debt service, arms or prestige items" 
(George 1989, p. 245). In the sections (i)-(iv) below, I indicate the 
3 See my Ch. 1, the section 'Rights', the subsection '(Hi) Disadvantages of 
appeal to rights'. 
4Of course, this is only a necessary condition for meeting O'Neill's standards 
of justice. 
ways in which George's proposed solution to the Third World debt 
crisis seeks to meet people's basic material needs. 
(i) Reimbursement in cash 
As part of her 3-D solution, George proposes that each debtor 
government make regular payments into a national development 
fund. Unlike present arrangements under the IMF, the fund would 
be co-managed with authentic representatives from the civil 
society. This is meant to include representatives from the rural 
sector in proportion to their numbers. George includes rural 
representation in her proposal because, she maintains, under 
present arrangements the basic needs of people from rural areas 
are typically neglected. By being forced into the production of cash 
crops, for example, which are replacing traditional and more varied 
crops, rural people are missing out on their nutritional needs. 
Further, since the money they receive for their production of the 
crops is often low, and the prices for commodities that need to be 
imported often increase, it is also difficult for them to meet their 
other basic material needs. 
Another important feature included in George's 3-D solution is 
that women, ethnic minorities and rural people are given fairer 
representation. Representation of women is important in meeting 
basic needs, especially in poor economic conditions, since women 
are often given the role and responsibility of providing for the 
needs of other dependants. In many cases, especially in poor 
economies, decision-making is often left in the hands of males, both 
at a grass roots level and at an executive level. According to O'Neill, 
women are often relegated to, and subordinated within, a domestic 
sphere. "They are impoverished but often providers. They are 
powerless, yet others who are yet more vulnerable depend on them 
for protection" (O'Neill 1992, p. 51). To meet the basic needs of 
impoverished women and their dependants, representation in a 
way prescribed by George is much more favourable than present 
arrangements. In some cases, ethnic minorities and rural people 
are also marginalised since they can lack the opportunities to gain 
access to the political system. In many cases, those who are best 
able to identify the basic needs of a particular group are likely to be 
the members of the group.5 So, representation of women, ethnic 
minorities and rural people, as prescribed by George, is likely to be 
important in meeting people's basic needs. George's proposal then 
includes a shift from decision-making by the power elites to a more 
broadly based executive. Government participation in the decision-
making of the broadly based development fund is included in 
George's proposal primarily to supply its own technical expertise. 
With an emphasis on agriculture, renewable energy sources, 
health care, literacy and education as part of the 3-D solution, 
people's needs are more likely to be met under that solution than 
under present arrangements, which focus on an international 
market economy. This is so for present needs and also for 
foreseeable future needs, which rely on energy sources not being 
depleted and on education, which in various ways can lead to a 
^While many basic needs, such as food, water and adequate medical care, are 
fixed, some basic needs are tied to particular cultures. For example, within 
Australian Aboriginal culture, the need for traditional land is a basic need 
because there are such strong spiritual associations with the land. 'Outsiders' 
are not likely to identify these culturally relative basic needs. 
better understanding of problems faced and their possible solutions. 
Education also empowers people as it opens up more positions that 
would otherwise be left to the privileged few. 
(ii) Reimbursement in kind 
The aim of reimbursement in kind is to give recognition to, 
and remuneration for, past and future contributions of indigenous 
peoples to natural, material and cultural treasures, which are part 
of our common heritage. While not all the proposed initiatives 
George promotes here relate directly to the meeting of people's 
basic material needs, there are some that do, and the remuneration 
she has in mind for those working on such programs would also 
assist in meeting people's basic needs. As part of this initiative, 
ecological conservation and renewal play an important role, 
especially as the natural environment^ is being irrevocably 
destroyed under present arrangements. As mentioned earlier, 
ecological conservation and renewal are important in meeting 
present and future needs. 
(Hi) Latin American auxiliary measures 
The first of George's proposed strategies, relating to Latin 
American debt, is to restrict purchases of foreign goods to those 
which are vital to development, such as fertilizers, food stuffs and 
machinery. Such a strategy is very much in line with the centrality 
that O'Neill attaches to meeting people's basic needs. First, it shifts 
the priorities within Latin American countries from the purchasing 
6By 'natural environment' I simply mean that which "includes everything 
except man and what obviously bears the mark of man's handiwork" 
(Passmore 1974, p. 5). 
of prestigious products to purchasing products that are likely to 
meet people's basic needs in the Third World. Second, the money 
generated in the First World is likely to benefit industrial suppliers 
and farmers there who, because of the debt crisis, have lost 
markets to the Third World. This would be of some help to 
ordinary people in the First World whose basic needs are also going 
unmet because they have become unemployed with markets lost to 
the Third World (George 1989, p. 256). 
George's second and third proposed auxiliary strategies are to 
increase commodity prices and to return flight capital. By 
increasing commodity prices, there would be more opportunity for 
ordinary workers to receive higher pay which would then assist in 
making more affordable that which is required to meet basic 
material needs. Both these auxiliary strategies would, in effect, 
reduce the amount of money which leaves Latin American 
countries. This would free up governmental funds which could be 
used on such things as schooling and medical assistance (which the 
IMF often target with their adjustment programs). 
(iv) Environmentalism 
O'Neill maintains that sustained production must be provided 
for, since material needs are recurrent. This means that the means 
of fu ture production must be made available and that 
environmental damage or degradation must be avoided to secure 
the possibility of a just economic order in the future. George's 
proposed 3-D solution would measure up favourably on this 
requirement of O'Neill's, since George also emphasises the need for 
'sustainable' production (O'Neill 1986, p. 149 f.). 
As I indicated in Chapter 2, George illustrates how Third 
World debt contributes to global environmental destruction.^ As 
part of her 3-D solution, particularly in relation to reimbursement 
in kind, George prescribes that the debt crisis be used to curb 
environmental destruction. 
First, George recommends the "collection, conservation and 
reproduction of genetic species and varieties (both animal and 
vegetable)" (George 1989, p. 250). Such an initiative would assist in 
the maintenance of bio-diversity of the environment, which is 
important to ecological sustainability. Furthermore, many botanic 
species, not yet explored, may hold keys in the future for meeting 
medical needs. George maintains that "[t]ropical forests are the 
great unexplored botanic frontiers: we simply have no idea what 
future foods and medicines they may contain" (George 1992, p. 22). 
Second, remuneration for soil conservation and anti-erosion 
measures, which is part of George's proposal, is important since it 
allows people to work towards the sustainable production of crops. 
Under present arrangements, where there is a need to earn export 
dollars, agricultural techniques are geared towards short term gains 
which often irrevocably destroy fertile soils. Deforestation also 
plays a devastating role in the destruction of fertile soils, often 
converting bio-rich forests into deserts. 
7See also George 1992, Ch. 1. 
Third, George emphasises the need for reforestation, which is 
important in meeting future needs as it helps maintain bio-
diversity. Reforestation also plays an important role in recyling 
greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, which could otherwise 
produce global warming, an outcome which "would place 
unprecedented stresses on natural and social systems, precipitating 
major dislocations of agriculture, industry, and coastal areas while 
posing grave threats to species survival, human health, geographical 
stability, and so on" (George 1992, p. 6). 
Fourth, George proposes that people in the Third World be 
remunerated for the "development of new bio-mass sources for 
energy purposes as an alternative to wood and charcoal...and as an 
alternative source of income for poor people" (George 1989, p. 250). 
Not only would this measure assist in meeting the needs of the poor 
directly by giving them access to affordable fuel, but it could allow 
for the regeneration of fuels. Such alternative energy sources could 
be sustained for future generations and these initiatives could be 
conducive to a reduction in the rate of deforestation. Another 
alternative to bio-mass energy sources has been nuclear power. 
Not only does nuclear power production come with the risk of 
nuclear disasters,^ it is not sustainable as it produces an increasing 
amount of toxic nuclear waste that cannot be stored safely. 
Fifth, George's proposal includes the "development and 
improvement of wells and small-scale irrigation techniques" 
(George 1989, p. 250). Such initiatives assist in meeting people's 
8One well-pubhcised nuclear disaster is the Chernobyl disaster, which caused 
radioactive contamination in a number of countries in Europe. 
present needs by supplying them with clean water and allowing for 
the production of water to satisfy future needs. Small-scale 
irrigation normally comes at a lower environmental cost than large-
scale irrigation. Indeed, in a recent visit to Australia, George 
criticised the large-scale irrigation and hydro-electric project 
proposed by the IMF in India.9 Not only are large-scale irrigation 
projects environmentally detrimental, they are costly and can put 
Third World countries further into debt. 
In general, a primary focus of George's 3-D proposal is that 
the Third World move away from an export-oriented economy 
which imitates the West to one that has sustained production. 
Coercion (and Deception) 
So far I have been tracing the way in which George's 3-D 
solution gives a primary place to meeting people's basic material 
needs and thus accords with a central element in O'Neill's theory of 
social justice. In this section, I continue to examine whether 
George's proposed solution to the Third World debt crisis is just by 
O'Neill's standards. 
Two main features of O'Neill's theory of justice are that 
principles on which people act ought not to be deceptive or 
coercive. There is no good reason to think that George's proposal 
9In 1994 George conducted a seminar as part of the Green Left Conference at 
UNSW, where she criticised the project. She also made some critical remarks 
on the matter in a subsequent interview with Kerry O'Brien on Late Line, 
ABC television. Her criticisms included both the displacement of people and 
the environmental impact. 
relies on principles of deception. The charge of coercion, however, 
is less easily dismissed. George apparently does not see her 
proposal as coercive. She maintains that "[g]overnments would, 
however, have a choice. Those refusing democratic development 
could continue to service their debt in hard currency" (George 1989, 
p. 247). However, there is some reason to think that aspects of 
George's proposal are coercive; and I discuss these below. 
Even though the concept of coercion plays a central role in her 
theory of justice, O'Neill does not give a full account of what she 
takes coercion to be. So it is difficult to make a safe assessment of 
whether O'Neill would see George's proposal as coercive. What I 
propose to do is to look at several important pholosophical accounts 
of coercion in order to assess whether George's proposal could count 
as coercive. First, I will examine George's proposal in the light of 
Nozick's account of coercion. Nozick's account is the point of 
departure for much contemporary discussion of that notion. I will 
then examine George's proposal in the light of an account of 
coercion provided by one of Nozick's chief critics, Harry Frankfurt. 
Like Nozick and others, Frankfurt maintains that coercion 
compromises freedom of choice or action; but unlike most 
commentators, he thinks that the compromise must be total and 
that coercion entails compulsion. Third, I shall assemble the few 
clarificatory remarks O'Neill does make about coercion and locate 
these in relation to Nozick, Frankfurt, and some other commentators 
on coercion. I shall then assess George's proposal in the light of 
central ideas about coercion which emerge from this process. 
Among the other commentators on coercion whom I shall consider, 
O'Neill's account is perhaps closest to that of Virginia Held. 
(i) Nozick's account of coercion 
In his article, 'Coercion', Nozick sets out the following 
necessary and sufficient conditions for 'core' or 'central' cases of 
coercion. 
P coerces Q into not doing A if and only if: 
(1) P threatens to bring about or have brought about some 
consequence if Q does A (and knows he's threatening to do 
this). 
(2) A with this threatened consequence is rendered 
substantially less eligible as a course of conduct for Q than A 
was without the threatened consequence. 
(3) Part of P's reason for deciding to bring about the 
consequence or have it brought about, if Q does A, is that P 
believes this consequence worsens Q's alternative of doing A 
(i.e. that P believes that this consequence worsens Q's 
alternative of doing A, or that Q would believe it does). 
(4) Q does not do A. 
(5) Part of Q's reason for not doing A is to avoid (or lessen 
the likelihood of) the consequence which P has threatened to 
bring about or have brought about. 
(6) Q knows that P has threatened to do the something 
mentioned in (1), if he, Q, does A. 
(7) Q believes that, and P believes that Q believes that, P's 
threatened consequence would leave Q worse off, having 
done A, than if Q didn't do A and P didn't bring about the 
consequence (Nozick 1969, pp. 141 ff.). 
In this account of the conditions of coercion, the concept of 
threat plays a central role. Nozick distinguishes between threats 
and offers and illustrates the role threats play in coercion by means 
of the following examples: 
(a) P is Q's usual supplier of drugs, and today when he 
comes to Q he says that he will not sell them to Q, as he 
normally does, for $20, but rather will give them to Q if and 
only if Q beats up a certain person. 
(b) P is a stranger who has been observing Q, and knows that 
Q is a drug addict. Both know that Q's usual supplier of 
drugs was arrested this morning and that P had nothing to 
do with his arrest. P approaches Q and says that he will give 
Q drugs if and only if Q beats up a certain person (Nozick 
1969, p. 447). 
The two cases illustrate a principle about the difference 
between threats and offers. This threat versus offer principle is: 
(TOP) If P intentionally changes the consequences of two actions 
A1 and A2 available to Q so as to lessen the desirability of 
the consequences of Al , and so as to increase the 
desirability of the consequences of A2, and part of P's 
reason for acting as he does is to lessen and increase the 
desireabilities of the respective consequences then 
(a) This resultant change predominantly involves a threat to 
Q if he does A1 if Q prefers doing the old A1 (without the 
worsened consequences) to doing the new A2 (with the 
improved consequences). 
(b) This resultant change predominantly involves an offer to 
Q to do A2 if Q prefers doing the new A2 (with the improved 
consequences) to the old A1 (without the worsened 
consequences) (Nozick 1969, p. 449). 
According to Nozick, the difference between threats and 
offers, as set out in this principle, explains why threats rather than 
offers are central to coercion. When P threatens Q, Q is normally 
unwilling that the change be made. By contrast when P makes Q an 
offer, Q is normally willing that the change be made (Nozick 1969, 
p. 449). Nozick maintains that it is in terms of such willingness or 
unwillingness to make the change that one can elucidate how 
threats rather than offers normally compromise freedom of choice 
or action. Normally, when Q does A because of a threat by P, Q 
l^Nozick tries to elucidate his claim in terms of the normal dispositions of a 
partially described person—The Rational Man. Nozick calls the situation 
before a threat or offer is made, the prethreat or preoffer situation. He calls 
the situation after the threat or offer is made, the threat situation or the 
offer situation. Then he compares these choices: 
(1) To move from the preoffer to the offer situation, and to do A in the offer 
s i tuat ion; 
(2) To move from the prethreat to the threat situation, and to do A in the 
threat situation. 
The Rational Man is normally willing to make both choices in (1), whereas 
he would not be willing to make both choices in (2) (Nozick, 1969, pp. 461 f.). 
(because he acts unwillingly) is subject to P's will—Q's action is not 
fully voluntary. By contrast, normally, when Q does A because of 
an offer from P, Q (because he acts willingly) is not subject to P's 
will—Q's action is fully voluntary (Nozick 1969, p. 459). 
Nozick maintains that, whether a change is a threat or an offer 
depends on how it affects the normal or expected course of events. 
According to Nozick, it can be unclear whether a change is a threat 
or an offer because it can be unclear what the normal and expected 
course of events is (Nozick 1969, pp. 449 ff.). Consider the 
following example of such a case. Suppose that it is in P's power to 
save some promise keeping villain Q from drowning,^ and P knows 
that Q will go on to do monstrous things if rescued. Nonetheless P 
says to Q '"I will take you in my boat and bring you to shore if and 
only if you first promise to pay me $10,000 within three days of 
reaching shore with my aid'" (Nozick 1969, p. 449).^^ In this case it 
is not clear what P is morally expected to do and so it is not clear 
whether P is making Q an offer or a threat. 
Although, he maintains that threats are necessary for 'core' 
coercion, Nozick allows that some offers may be coercive. Nozick 
considers the following example: "Suppose that P knows that Q has 
committed a murder which the police are investigating, and knows 
of evidence sufficient to convict Q of this murder. P says to Q, 'If 
you give me $10,000 I will not turn over the information I have to 
11 For the sake of the example, we need to suppose that Q is a villain who 
would go on to do monstrous things if rescued but that this villain has one 
redeming feature, that he always keeps his promises, and P knows about this 
only redeming feature of Q. 
l^This example is an adaptation of an example given by Nozick. See Nozick 
1969, pp. 449 f.. 
the police'" (Nozick 1969, pp. 452 f.). Nozick argues that this is an 
example of an offer since in the normal and expected course of 
events, the information about Q is turned over to the police. 
Nonetheless, Nozick is inclined to view this offer as coercive. 
(ii) Nozick's account of coercion and George's 3-D solution 
George's 3-D proposal consists of giving people an option of 
either complying with the measures of the IMF strategy or engaging 
in such strategies as reimbursement in cash, reimbursement in 
kind, and the supplementary proposals. Does George's proposal 
count, by Nozick's reckoning, as a coercive threat—or even coercive 
offer—to any of the affected interest groups in either the Third or 
First Worlds? 
Ordinary people in the Third World. George's proposal might 
be viewed as a coercive threat (or even a coercive offer) on Nozick's 
account. Consider the following example from Nozick's discussion. 
"Suppose that usually a slave owner beats his slave each morning, 
for no reason connected with the slave's behaviour. Today he says 
to his slave, 'Tomorrow I will not beat you if and only if you now do 
A'" (Nozick 1969, p. 450). Nozick counts the proposal of the slave 
owner here as a threat because the normal and expected course of 
events, which is included as an option in the proposal, is worse than 
the morally expected course of events, and he clearly counts the 
Nozick concedes that it is an issue whether the example is a threat or an 
offer. He claims that "[o]ne is tempted to view this as a threat, and one is also 
tempted to view this as an offer. I attribute these conflicting temptations to 
the divergence between the normal course of events, in which the slave is 
beaten each morning, and the (morally) expected course of events, in which 
he is not. And I suggest that we have here a situation of a threat, and that 
here the morally expected course of events takes precedence over the normal 
slave owner's threat as coercive because the slave himself would 
prefer the morally expected to the normal course of events (Nozick 
1969, pp. 450 f., cf. 448 f.; 459 ff.).!^ Consider, now, George's 
proposal. This arguably can be cast as a conditional of the form, 'If 
you don't comply with the 3-D solution then repay the debt in hard 
currency under the IMF strategies'. In the case of ordinary people 
in the Third World, the normal and expected course of events under 
the IMF strategies, which is included as an option in George's 
proposal , seems worse than the morally expected course of 
e v e n t s . Considered in this light, George's proposal looks 
coercively threatening, in Nozick's terms. 
The power elites. On George's account, the power elites (in 
both the Third World and the First World) may be reluctant to take 
up the initiatives of George's 3-D solution. After all, they have a lot 
to gain from the status quo. In cases where the power elites do not 
cooperate, George proposes that pressure be placed on such 
individuals, both externally and by the people from within the 
particular countries. It is very likely that such pressure would be 
threatening and coercive, in Nozick's terms. First, it threatens the 
power elites because were they not to comply (in the face of 
pressure from both within and without), they would lose out very 
badly, with respect to the normal (and perhaps even the morally 
course of events in assessing whether we have a threat or an offer" (Nozick 
1969, p. 450). 
14in case one counts the slave owner's proposal as an offer, Nozick 
apparently would count it as a coercive offer (Nozick 1969, p. 452). 
l aunder the IMF strategies ordinary people in the Third Word often suffer 
from undernourishment due to lack of food, have high mortality rates among 
infants, have low life-expectancies and endure widespread suffering 
brought about by poverty. See my Ch. 2, fn.4, and the section The IMF 
Suluiipn to Third World Debt'. The morally expected course of events would 
include atleast enough food for substantial nourishment. 
expected) course of events. Second, it is coercive because the power 
elites would prefer the normal course of events, and not to move 
from the prethreat to the threat situation, However, it is 
noteworthy that this situation—coercively threatening the power 
elites—may still be just on O'Neill's theory of justice. For O'Neill, 
cases of coercion may be just if they spring from some principle of 
noncoercion. O'Neill maintains that "[s]ometimes a fundamental 
commitment to noncoercion might require action which in 
subsidiary respects was coercive or deceptive" (O'Neill 1986, p. 
139). Furthermore, "in harsh circumstances lesser coercion might 
be the only way to avoid fundamental coercion" (O'Neill 1986, p. 
158). A paradigm example of this would be coercing Hitler into not 
coercing the Jews.i'^ So, even if George's proposal counted as 
coercive in relation to the affected power elites, it would be 
fundamentally noncoercive and so arguably just for O'Neill (in case 
she conceded Nozick's account of coercion). 
Ordinary people in the First World. George's proposal affects 
ordinary people in the First World. First World institutions would 
be countermanding the money owed to them by Third World 
countries. The money that ordinary people in the First World paid 
16cf . fn. 10, this chapter. 
l^This distinction between fundamental and subsidiary coercion may be 
understood in terms of means and ends. A coercive policy may not count as 
unjust, on O'Neill's theory, if it conduces to noncoercion. In the case of 
Hitler, who was causally responsible for the monstrous coercion of the Jews, 
a fundamental commitment to noncoercion could require some instrumental 
coercion. Similarly, a fundamental commitment to noncoercion could 
require some instrumental coercion, in the case of the power elites. 
Ordinary people in the Third World are typically in a position where their 
basic needs are not met, which makes them vulnerable to coercion. In this 
case, a fundamental commitment to noncoercion would favour principles 
which ultimately aimed at meeting ordinary people's needs and would be 
compatible with coercion of the power elites which conduced to this end. 
in the form of taxes which went to the World Bank and the IMF, 
and that they invested in banks which loaned money to the Third 
World, would no longer be called on.i^ As George remarks. First 
World "taxpayers will, one way or another, ultimately foot the bill 
of official debt reduction" (O'Neill 1992, p. 63). On the other hand, 
under George's proposal, the money that Third World countries 
were otherwise spending on debt repayments would be used to 
p u r c h a s e bas ic impor ts such as " fe r t i l i ze r , f o o d s t u f f s , 
pharmaceuticals, machine tools, spare parts, transportation and 
communications equipment, etc." (George 1989, p. 256). This would 
mean more jobs for ordinary people in the First World. George 
maintains that "[b]ecause of debt, farming and manufacturing have 
lost significant markets, just as those employed in these sectors 
have lost their jobs by the hundreds and thousands" (George 1992, 
p. 93).i9 
According to the scenario created by George, ordinary 
workers in the First World would have more to gain than to lose 
from the implementation of her 3-D proposal. Given that the 
money which returns to the First World would be spread between 
Northern industrial suppliers, farmers and the like, ordinary people 
in the First World are likely to reap the benefits from maintaining 
l^The point here is difficult to track and is contentious. Do ordinary people in 
the First World gain anything from the status quo? Even if there are some 
benefi ts f rom their governments lending money to Third World countries, 
and from the banks in which they have invested having as an asset the debt 
owed to them by the Third World, the overall effect of the debt crisis is to 
their detriment. I have given a more detailed account of how George sees the 
debt crisis as being to the disadvantage of ordinary people in the First World 
in Ch. 2, in the section 'Why Third World Debt is Such a Problem'. See also 
George 1992, pp. 63 ff.. 
Again, George gives more detail as to how people in the First World are 
losing out because of the debt crisis in The Debt Boomerang. 
jobs that are being lost under current arrangements (George 1989, 
p. 256; 1992, Ch. 4). There does not seem to be anything significant 
that ordinary workers in the First World would miss out on that 
they would receive in the normal or morally expected course of 
events. So, there does not seem to be any reason, on Nozick's 
account of coercion, to think that ordinary workers in the First 
World would be coerced, by threat or offer, into the 3-D solution. 
Rather, that solution seems to be simply an attractive offer to this 
interested group. 
To sum up. In terms of Nozick's account of coercion, the 
assessment of George's 3-D solution—given the avoidance of coercion 
and the promotion of noncoercion as principles of justice—is 
somewhat mixed. Her proposal can be seen as involving a coercive 
threat (or perhaps even a coercive offer) to ordinary people in the 
Third World. Further, her proposal very likely does involve a 
coercive threat to the power elites in both the First and Third 
Worlds. However, from O'Neill's point of view, even if George's 
proposal is coercively threatening in certain aspects, it will not 
count as unjust if it is fundamentally noncoercive. Indeed, it may 
even count as just. Finally, in the case of ordinary people in the 
First World, George's 3-D solution is an attractive offer and not 
coercive. 
The above assessment of George's 3-D solution utilises 
Nozick's conception of coercion. However, Nozick's conception of 
coercion has its critics. One important critic is Harry G. Frankfurt.^o 
20For Frankfurt's critical discussion of Nozick on threats, offers and 
coercion, see Frankfurt 1973, pp. 67 ff.. 
(ni) Frankfurt on coercion 
Frankfurt ties the notion of coercion to that of compulsion. "A 
person who is coerced is compelled to do what he does. He has no 
choice but to do it" (Frankfurt 1973, p. 75). Frankfurt takes 
coercion to imply compulsion because he takes coercion to imply 
freedom from moral responsibility. Frankfurt's account of coercion 
is unusual in the way it ties coercion to compulsion. 
According to Frankfurt's account of coercion, both offers and 
threats can be coercive. An offer is coercive "when the person who 
receives it is moved into compliance by a desire which is not only 
irresistible but which he would overcome if he could" (Frankfurt 
1973, p. 80). In such a case, the person's will is overcome by a 
desire he wants not to have: "[h]e acts under a compulsion which 
violates his own desires" (Frankfurt 1973, p. 81). 
For Frankfurt, a threat is coercive when the victim is moved 
against his will to comply with the threat by an irresistible desire to 
avoid what is being threatened. "A coercive threat, like a coercive 
offer, is only coercive because it also violates its victim's autonomy" 
(Frankfurt 1973, p. 81). When one is coerced by a threat, one's 
motive to comply with the threat is to prevent one's condition from 
worsening. By contrast, when one is coerced by an offer, one's 
motive to comply is to improve one's condition. 
(iv) Frankfurt's account of coercion and George's proposal 
On Frankfurt's account of coercion, there is no good reason for 
thinking that ordinary people in the Third World or ordinary people 
in the First World would be coerced into complying with George's 
proposal. George assumes that people have the open choice of 
participating in the programs set out in the 3-D solution or opting 
out and complying with the status quo (such as the IMF strategies); 
and it is just psychologically unrealistic to suppose either that any 
benefits on offer, in relation to the choice of whether to participate 
in the 3-D solution, are psychologically irresistible for ordinary 
people or that any penalties threatened in relation to this choice are 
such that the desire to avoid them is psychologically irresistible 
among ordinary folk. 
Could it be argued that a coercive threat is being placed on 
the power elites who have an interest in maintaining the status 
quol The will of the (reluctant) power elites would indeed be 
subjected, in some degree, to the will of those who implemented the 
strategies of the 3-D solution. George's proposal includes placing 
pressure on the power elites of the First World and the Third World 
to change their ways. It is unlikely, however, that this pressure, 
which presumably would amount at least to duress, would also 
count as coercion in Frankfurt's terms—in most cases, at any rate. 
Indeed, such pressure, even if compelling, might well be just, on 
O'Neill's theory of justice, because it would spring from a 
commitment to fundamental noncoercion. 
(v) O'Neill's conception of coercion 
O'Neill herself is not very forthcoming about how she 
understands the concept of coercion. In discussing why coercion is 
forbidden, O'Neill claims that coercion "pre-empts others' action; it 
treats others as things or tools and exacts their compliance....The 
victims are not genuinely treated as agents, who would be able to 
consent to or to refuse the other's action" (O'Neill 1986, p. 139). So, 
central to O'Neill's conception of coercion is the idea that coercion 
radically undermines—even precludes—autonomous agency. 
Further, it is clear that O'Neill thinks that offers can be 
coercive. She maintains that "[njegotiators coerce unless they leave 
opening for others, however desperate their actual circumstances, 
to refuse as well as to accept their offer" (O'Neill 1986, p. 147). 
Needy beings may accept an offer that a self-sufficient and ideally 
rational agent would not. On O'Neill's view, bargainers who exploit 
this by making the needy an 'offer they could not refuse' are acting 
on a principle of coercion. Relying on "others' need in order to 
secure 'consent' or 'agreement'...may be fundamentally coercive" 
(O'Neill 1986, p. 148). 
For O'Neill, actual context—especially in relation to 
vulnerability—is important in determining whether some action (or 
proposal) counts as coercive. O'Neill maintains that "[t]he most 
significant features of actual situations that must be taken into 
account in judgements of justice are the security or vulnerability 
that allow actual others to dissent from and to seek change in 
variable aspects of the arrangements which structure their lives" 
(O'Neill 1992, p. 73). So, in making any judgement on whether a 
proposal counts as unjust because it is coercive, the vulnerability of 
the recipient plays an important role. The more vulnerable a 
person is, the more care is needed in making a proposal that does 
not coerce. This is why O'Neill maintains that when judging 
proposa l s "/i demands more, not less, to he just to the 
vulnerable... .[M]ore will be demanded when others are vulnerable 
than when they are secure and most when they are most 
vulnerable" (O'Neill 1992, p. 69, emphasis original). 
It is also noteworthy that O'Neill apparently allows that 
physical circumstances can be coercive. For example, in her 
discussion of just population control measures, she speaks of 
widespread destitution and hunger as fundamentally coercive 
(O'Neill 1986, p. 158). 
Finally, as indicated earlier, in discussing whether or not 
George's 3-D solution counts as just on O'Neill's theory of justice, it is 
important to assess whether that proposal is fundamentally 
coercive. For O'Neill, something may be coercive in some subsidiary 
respect and yet be consistent with justice because it is 
fundamentally noncoercive.21 
(vi) O'Neill, Nozick and Frankfurt 
How close to O'Neill's conception of coercion are Nozick's and 
Frankfurt's? Nozick's example of a putative non-coercive offer (by 
the stranger to the drug addict) is likely to count as coercive on 
O'Neill's theory. Offering to give drugs to a drug addict, on the 
condition that they beat up a certain person, exploits the addict's 
impaired capacity to resist. It seems that taking advantage of 
human vulnerability in this way would count as coercive for 
21 See my Ch. 5, fn. 9. 
O'Neill.22 It seems irrelevant for her whether the example involves 
a threat or an offer. 
Frankfurt's account of coercion seems far too restrictive, by 
O'Neill's lights. O'Neill argues that coercion impairs autonomy—even 
to the point of compulsion—but she does not require that autonomy 
be impaired to the point of an inability to resist for there to be 
coercion.23 
(vii) O'Neill and some other conceptions of coercion 
Gert. Frankfurt treats coerced action as (psychologically) 
compelled action. By contrast, Bernard Gert argues, in "Coercion and 
Freedom", that a necessary condition for coercion is that the agent's 
actions are voluntary. Gert maintains that "only someone with the 
ability to will can act freely or can act under coercion, that is only 
voluntary actions are done freely or under coercion" (Gert 1972, p. 
32).24 Gert maintains that all coercion involves a threat of some 
evil. He distinguishes between a wide and a narrow sense of 
22Even Nozick, who thinks that the drug offerer does not coerce because he 
does not threaten, concedes that, "the fact that P did not coerce Q into beating 
up the person does not mean that it would not be true for Q to say, in some 
legitimate sense of the phrase: 'I had no choice'" (Nozick 1969, p. 448). 
231 take it that, when she speaks of making offers to the needy that they 
'could not refuse', she mostly means that they could not reasonably be 
expected to refuse. 
J. McCloskey also emphasises that the coerced person acts. One thing 
that is essential here is agency. "The person who is subject to force, the 
physical force of another, or to natural forces, has things happen to him" 
(McCloskey 1980, p. 336). On this view, the person who is physically forced 
into the police van, for example, is subjected to a force but is not coerced. In 
contrast, "the coerced person does what he does; he chooses to do it. What 
occurs to him does not simply happen to him; it occurs as a result of his 
action" (McCloskey 1980, p. 336). Suzanne Uniacke thinks that the concept of 
coercion is very closely tied to the concept of duress. Uniacke maintains that 
duress requires the person acting under duress to decide to perform the 
action. Coercion, on Uniacke's view, is a broader concept than duress, and 
can include some positive inducements, such as bribes (Uniacke 1989, p. 54). 
coercion. Coercion in the wide sense is the result of any threat of 
evil. Coercion in the narrow sense is the result of a threat of evil 
that provides an unreasonable incentive. On Gert's view, offers do 
not count as coercive; rather they count as enticements. 
Held. Against Gert, Virginia Held maintains that "[a]n 
unreasonable incentive to accept a good might be no less coercive 
than an unreasonable incentive to avoid an evil." (Held 1972, p. 58). 
According to Held, "[cjoercion is the activity of causing someone to 
do something against his will, or of bringing about his doing what 
he does against his will." (Held 1972, pp. 50 f.). As an example of 
coercion without a threat of any sort. Held maintains that "one 
person may coerce another into remaining in a room by locking the 
only door, or coercion may have been used to transport a person 
from one location to another although no injury was inflicted or 
even threatened" (Held 1972, p. 51). Under such a broad 
conception of coercion, coercion can involve threats, offers, and 
other actions (or circumstances) which involve neither. 
Central to Held's notion of coercion is that to coerce someone 
is to make them act against their will. According to Held, people 
can act against their will in various ways. By way of example, she 
considers the contrast between seduction and rape, and maintains 
that "[i]n one case constraint and threat are operative, in the other 
inducement and offer. If the degree of inducement is set high 
enough in the case of seduction, there may seem to be little 
difference in the extent of coercion involved" (Held 1972, p. 58). 
Not only does Held think that offers or inducements can be coercive; 
she also thinks that offers or inducements can be coercive, even 
when the coerced person might have supplied the deficiency of will 
(Held 1972, pp. 58 ff.). So Held, unlike Frankfurt, does not think 
that (psychological) compulsion is essential to coercion, even though 
she thinks that coerced persons act against their will. 
O'Neill. O'Neill's conception of coercion—insofar as this can be 
deciphered from her relatively few scattered comments—seems 
very close to Held's. First, both O'Neill and Held allow it as 
unproblematic that there can be coercive threats and offers, but 
they do not limit coercion to cases involving threats or offers. For 
example, both allow for mere physical coercion which may come 
about by other actions (or circumstances). Second, for both O'Neill 
and Held, the central defining feature of coerced action is that the 
agent's autonomy is seriously impaired—but both (unlike Frankfurt) 
allow that this may fall short of compulsion. Further, unlike Gert, 
Held and O'Neill allow that coerced action may be compelled action. 
(viii) Back to George's proposal and O'Neill's theory of justice 
In order to consider George's proposal in the light of O'Neill's 
theory of justice, it is necessary to find the most plausible 
reconstruction of O'Neill's account of coercion. All in all, it seems 
that O'Neill's conception of coercion strongly overlaps with Held's, 
and that the central idea is that coerced action is action performed 
under another's influence (or in a circumstance), where that 
influence (or circumstance) seriously compromises—and may on 
occasion even completely override—the agent's autonomy or free 
choice. Is George's 3-D solution coercive when considered in the 
light of such a conception of coercion? 
Ordinary people in the Third World. On O'Neill's view, it may 
be fundamentally coercive to rely on others' need in order to secure 
their 'consent' to a proposal (O'Neill 1986, p. 148). However, there 
is reason to think that O'Neill would not count George's proposal as 
fundamentally coercive of ordinary people in the Third World, since 
that proposal aims to undo the status quo of underprivilege in the 
Third World. 
O'Neill allows that physical circumstances can themselves be 
coercive and that widespread destitution and hunger is 
fundamentally coercive. Under present arrangements, destitution 
and hunger is widespread in the Third World. So, the actual 
present conditions in the Third World are, in O'Neill's view, 
fundamentally coercive. O'Neill maintains that "in harsh 
circumstances lesser coercion might be the only way to avoid 
fundamental coercion" (O'Neill 1986, p. 158). George's proposal 
seeks to eliminate those conditions which make the status quo for 
ordinary people in the Third World fundamentally coercive. It is 
noteworthy, therefore, that even if George's solution to the problem 
of destitution and hunger is coercive in some^ subsidiary way 
because it relies on the neediness of ordinary people in the Third 
World to secure their cooperation, it does not follow that O'Neill 
would see it as unjust because it is coercive. For if subsidiary 
coercion is the only practicable way to avoid the fundamental 
coercion of widespread destitution and hunger (which constitutes 
the neediness of ordinary people in the Third World), then not only 
is that aspect of George's proposal not forbidden by O'Neill (on the 
grounds that it is coercive), it is obligatory. 
However, there is one way in which George's proposal runs 
the risk of counting as unacceptably coercive. The terms of George's 
proposal are conditional on démocratisation. She insists that the 
proposed development funds be democratically run. For those 
ordinary people in the Third World who value justice but who do 
not embrace democracy as a value, this aspect of George's proposal 
looks c o e r c i v e . 2 5 it seems implausible to suppose that the solution 
to the physically coercive circumstances of destitution and hunger 
in the Third World requires that politico-economic structures in the 
Third World be democratised. 
Power elites in the First and Third Worlds. The power elites 
have a lot to gain from the fundamentally coercive status quo. 
Arguably, there would need to be considerable pressure placed on 
the power elites in both the First and Third Worlds to get them to 
comply with George's proposal. Does the pressure proposed by 
George count as coercive on O'Neill's account of coercion? 
It is fairly clear what O'Neill's position would be here. Even if 
the will of the power elites was forced, such coercion would not 
count as unjust on O'Neill's theory. For, as noted, O'Neill maintains 
that justice may even require that we be coercive in some 
subsidiary respects in order to promote fundamental noncoercion. 
25Arguably, there are some undemocratic, but well-ordered, hierarchical 
societies which make decisions for the members of their societies, which 
reflect the interests of those members and maintain the requisite standards 
of justice. Rawls uses the term 'well-ordered hierarchical society' to mean a 
society which is "peaceful and not expansionist; its legal system satisfies 
certain requisite conditions of legitimacy in the eyes of its own people" 
(Rawls 1993, p. 43). 
Ordinary people in the First World. Many ordinary people in 
First World countries are vulnerable to such things as losing their 
jobs. Markets which traditionally belonged to the First World are 
being lost and transnat ional companies are moving their 
manufacturing from the First to the Third World where they can 
f ind cheaper labour. In some respects , under present 
arrangements, ordinary people in the First World are vulnerable to 
such things as losing their jobs or a worsening in their conditions of 
employment. George's proposal is sensitive to this vulnerability, 
and includes in its aims the protection of jobs for ordinary people in 
the First World by increasing the export of basic commodities such 
as "fertilizers, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, machine tools, spare 
parts, transportation and communications equipment" (George 
1989, p. 248). While these measures help protect the jobs of 
ordinary people in the First World, less competition for markets 
with workers in the Third World could quite possibly further help 
workers in the First World by protecting their conditions of 
employment, such as basic w a g e s . 2 6 This aspect of George's proposal 
is a move towards making ordinary people in First World countries 
less vulnerable and so puts them in a position where they are less 
likely to be coerced. So, O'Neill is likely to approve of this aspect of 
George's proposal. 
Another issue worth addressing is whether George's proposal 
is putting acceptable pressure on ordinary people in the First World 
26The point here is that in order for the manufacturing of labour intensive 
products in the First World to be competitive with Third World manufacturers 
(which have relatively low labour costs), wages are often driven down which 
is to the detriment of ordinary people in the First World such as workers and 
their dependants. 
to support her 3-D solution. Since the 3-D solution holds out the 
promise of more jobs and more secure jobs, it seems like an 
attractive offer. The offer that George is putting to this interest 
group is one which they are likely to favour; but they are hardly 
likely to find that George's proposal offers an unreasonable 
incentive that they couldn't refuse or couldn't refuse without 
extreme difficulty. So, George's offer seems to be one which leaves 
open the possibility of autonomous acceptance or refusal. Hence, 
George's proposal does not seem to undermine the autonomy of 
ordinary people in the First World and is likely to be seen by O'Neill 
as noncoercive. 
An essential part of George's proposal is that it relies on the 
democratic co-operation of ordinary people and collectives in the 
First World. To overcome the status quo of debt, hunger and 
destitution, there is need for a political will from ordinary people 
and collectives in the First World to change the international 
economic and political system, by putting pressure on the power 
elites and large international agencies such as the IMF. Given that 
the democratic will of ordinary people and collectives in the First 
World is necessary for the implementation of George's proposal, it 
seems implausible to think that its implementation would be 
coercive of them because it would undermine their autonomy or 
free choice. 
Conclusion. The status quo of underprivilege among ordinary 
people in the Third World is arguably fundamentally coercive. 
Even if there are aspects of George's proposal that are coercive of 
ordinary people in the Third World in subsidiary ways, O'Neill 
would see such subsidiary coercion as mandatory, if necessary to 
e rad ica te the condi t ions of underpr iv i lege that cons t i tu te 
fundamental coercion. However, it is not clear that George's 
proposal is coercive of ordinary people in the Third World in only 
subsidiary ways. For example, her demand for democratic 
restructuring has the potential to be fundamentally coercive of 
those whose traditional lifestyles embrace justice as a value within 
a hierarchical context. George's proposal does seem coercive of the 
power elites, but such coercion may even be a requirement of 
justice, by O'Neill's lights. Finally, it does not seem plausible to 
suppose that George's proposal compromises the autonomy of 
ordinary people in the First World. It looks like an attractive offer 
that they could perfectly well refuse, if they so pleased. 
Imperfect Duties 
O'Neill distinguishes obligations which are determined by our 
perfect duties from obligations which are determined by our 
imperfect duties. Perfect duties are actions which are required in 
order to avoid acting on fundamental principles (for example, 
coercion and deception) which are nonuniversalizable on logical or 
conceptual grounds. Imperfect duties are actions which are 
required in order to avoid acting on fundamental principles which 
are nonuniversalizable because of our limited capacities, finite 
rationality and reliance on others to meet needs (O'Neill 1986, pp. 
141 f. & pp. 159 ff.). In an unjust and needy world, O'Neill 
maintains, there is greater need for fulfilment of imperfect duties 
such as the development of basic social and productive skills. 
George's solution accords with this aspect of O'Neill's theory in that 
she emphasises the need to develop the skills required to meet 
basic needs. 
Action which supports famine relief and development work 
may often be a good way to fulfil one's imperfect obligations of 
respect and beneficence, especially when needs are unmet because 
of unjust political structures. O'Neill maintains that "[in] an unjust 
and needy world, there is more scope and need for respect and help 
to those in need and more potential for developing required skills" 
(O'Neill 1986, p. 146). While principles of noncoercion and 
nondeception are central to justice on O'Neill's theory, in a world 
where people are vulnerable to coercion and deception, the 
fostering of people's talents is very important in reducing the 
weight of injustice, and so will stand high among one's imperfect 
d u t i e s . 2 7 "At present, when institutional structures are far from 
just, imperfect duty may often be the only, if incomplete, response 
to human need. Respect and beneficence in present conditions may 
often be well expressed in acting to support famine relief and 
development work, especially where present political structures do 
not address unmet needs" (O'Neill 1986, p. 160). O'Neill maintains 
further that, in such cases, what is most urgent is the development 
of basic social and productive skills and institutions that can reduce 
the weight of injustice. This would include improving literacy, 
health, farming and other technical skills. 
27whi le imperfect duties are selective, arguably there will be better reasons 
for sponsoring some talents than for sponsoring others. One criterion by 
which one might select which talents of others to sponsor is which talents 
will help to satisfy the more pressing of needs. 
Even in conditions of established just institutions, on O'Neill's 
account there is still a requirement to conform to such principles as 
help and development, which fall under the umbrella of 'imperfect 
duties'. Principles of nondevelopment are nonuniversalizable for 
needy beings since needy beings require the help of others to 
secure their agency (O'Neill 1986, pp. 141 & 145). While 
beneficence and justice are in principle distinct, a commitment to 
justice may require a commitment to beneficence. This is especially 
the case when unjust social and political structures are so 
entrenched that fulfilling imperfect duties is the only possible 
response to human needs. 
George's proposed solution conforms very much with this 
aspect of O'Neill's theory. While George recognises that the 
international social and political structures are unjust, she includes 
in her proposal ways of empowering ordinary people in the Third 
World. George's proposal includes the sponsoring of others' talents 
and the promotion of help and development. Basically, the sorts of 
things that George includes in her proposed solution are geared to 
make people less vulnerable to injustices by sponsoring projects 
which maintain (or establish) their autonomous agency. For 
example, "[v]arious groups (village councils, associations of young 
people, women, peasants, etc.) could apply to the fund for seed 
money to undertake their own self-managed projects" (George 
1989, p. 248). 'Modest' loans could be given to farmers and small-
scale entrepreneurs, with priority given to women and to the 
landless. Also, the promotion or creation and development of 
nongovernment organisations play an important part in George's 3-
D solution, since George maintains that they have a good track 
record in assisting in genuine development. George also maintains 
that, through the initiatives of reimbursement in kind, she aims to 
"strengthen particularly the peasantry, the pastoralists and the 
agriculture sector and thus work towards the elimination of hunger, 
and the poverty on which hunger thrives" (George 1989, p. 251). 
On O'Neill's theory, all these initiatives proposed by George stand 
high among our imperfect duties of beneficence. 
CNei l l ' s 'Accessible but Critical' Requirement 
According to O'Neill's second standard for applied ethical 
reasoning, ethical and other categories need to be accessible to the 
parties concerned. While George's solution focuses on meeting 
people's needs, her 3-D solution might be thought to be inaccessible 
to some affected parties in the First World as it fails to embrace 
such values as fair trade and lending and a free market system. 
George's 3-D solution might also be thought to be value-
imperialistic towards many in the Third World as it enshrines 
certain First World values that they may not share, such as 
democracy and gender liberalism. Her 3-D solution might also be 
open to the criticism that it is insensitive to what the relevant 
parties identify as the problem or as their needs. 
In assessing these criticisms of George's solution, however, it 
is important to remember that O'Neill sets an 'accessible but critical' 
requirement on applied ethical reasoning. While the relevant grids 
and categories need to be accessible to the parties concerned, they 
do not need to be restricted to any established or establishment 
values. O'Neill comments: 
All complete Kantian deliberation requires the minor 
premises of practical reasoning—the proposed maxim of 
action—to be formulated, and then critically assessed in 
terms of the Categorical Imperative. Agents and agencies 
select the minor premises of their deliberations partly by 
using the grid of categories that constitutes their local 
idiom and moral starting point, and partly by criticizing that 
specification of problems, allocations of problems and 
claims about available action in the light of wider 
considerations, including ethical principles (O'Neill 1986, p. 
134). 
(i) First World categories. 
It could be argued that George's proposed solution to the 
Third World debt crisis does not take proper account of the grids 
and categories of people in the First World, which are manifest in 
the policies and strategies of the IMF. Many people in the First 
World may well see the Third World debt 'crisis' in terms of Third 
World countries not repaying the money that they borrowed and so 
not fulfilling their end of the bargain. Such complainants may claim 
that George's solution allows Third World countries to forgo their 
end of the bargain because they are not repaying their debts in 
hard currency (i.e., US dollars).^« 
28of course, George's 3-D solution does include Third World countries 
repaying their debt, albeit in nonconventional forms like reimbursement in 
k i n d . 
One line of response here is that the standards and categories 
that First World individuals and institutions embrace regarding fair 
trade and fair lending are unlikely to apply in most instances of 
Third World debt. Those who partook in the financial agreements 
surrounding Third World debt are typically not those who bear the 
burden of repayment. In many cases, money was borrowed for 
prestige projects, which were of little or no benefit to ordinary 
people in the Third World. In other cases, the money was spent on 
arms, which were in turn used to oppress ordinary people in the 
Third World. In some cases the money was siphoned off by power 
elites in the Third World and returned to the First World in flight 
c a p i t a l . 2 9 When these aspects of the history of the debt are 
considered, it would be difficult to justify repayment of much of the 
debt, in terms of fair trading and fair lending. 
Another point, in response to the claim that Third World 
countries are forgoing their end of the bargain, is that in many 
cases those who borrowed the money were not democratically 
elected representatives of those who bear the burden. In First 
World democratic countries, on the other hand, projects for which 
loans are made by governments are more likely to be reflective of 
the interests of those who bear the burden of the debt. So, whereas 
the burden of international debt incurred by First World countries 
may justifiably fall on ordinary people in the First World (allowing 
that they benefited from the borrowed money or would foreseeably 
have benefited from the borrowed money), such principles of fair 
lending are less likely to apply in the cases of Third World debt. 
29see my Ch. 2, The Causes of Third World Debt', the section, '(ii) Capital 
flight and corruption'. 
Another criticism that may be made of George's proposal is 
that it fails to embrace a free market model and so goes against a 
predominant First World establishment view.30 The sorts of 
projects that George proposes with reimbursement in kind require 
funding which would not typically come about in a free market 
system. Indeed, her whole inner-directed economic approach goes 
against a free market model. 
Criticisms of George's 3-D solution such as the two just 
outlined, namely, that it does not take fair trading and lending 
seriously and that it fails to embrace a free market system are 
unlikely to move O'Neill. For O'Neill is committed to the view that, 
even if full repayment of Third World debt could be justified within 
First World establishment categories, there is still the question of 
whether the categories of First World institutions ought to be 
revised. For O'Neill, it is important not to tie deliberation 
permanently to some locally established categories (though it is also 
important to O'Neill, in revising any ethical and other categories, 
that the relevant agents or agencies find the shift accessible). 
However, on O'Neill's theory, the categories which surround a free 
market system do need revision as they impede the satisfaction of 
people's basic needs. O'Neill even gives some illustration of how a 
shift in the way of thinking about economic categories may be 
possible: 
30of course, it may be argued that even in First World countries there is 
nowhere in existence a free market system. Taxes and redistribution of 
resources by a welfare system are typical of many First World countries. My 
point here is that those in the First World often value an approximation of a 
free market system and, in many ways, their own economies are run on such 
an approximation. 
When transfers to the hungry are described as 'gifts' they 
are not seen as required by justice. We know that these 
matters could be differently understood, because they are 
differently understood within certain national states. Even 
in capitalist societies, where commercial categories provide 
one standard way of looking at the world, transfer p a y m e n t s 
made by processes of taxation are seldom seen either as 'aid' 
or as 'gifts'. Nor on the other hand are they seen (except by a 
few libertarians) as unjust confiscations (O'Neill 1986, p. 151). 
So, on O'Neill's theory, even if full repayment of Third World 
debt was required by established First World categories, and 
George's proposal went against establishment values such as free 
market systems and fair trading and lending, that would not be 
reason enough to reject George's proposed solution. Indeed, O'Neill 
thinks that, in the case of Third World debt, there are good reasons 
to be critical and revisionary of such establishment grids and 
categories. 
(ii) Southern categories. 
Criticisms of George. It could be argued that George's proposal 
is not accessible to certain groups in the Third World because it is 
paternalistic and value-imperialistic. For example, the proposal 
enshrines democratic values. If democracy is not embraced by a 
group, then ethical deliberation which hinges on democratic values 
is likely to fall short of accessibility for that group. Such ethical 
reasoning would then not meet O'Neill's second standard of practical 
reasoning. Similarly, since George's proposal focuses on 
empowering women, it may not be accessible to certain patriarchal 
groups. 
These criticisms of George's proposal can perhaps be put most 
generally in this wayi her proposal risks being inaccessible to 
certain peoples of the Third World because it risks imposing on 
them 'alien' values. While it aims to satisfy the needs of people in 
the Third World, it may not be sensitive to their needs and values 
as they perceive them. For example, the 3-D solution emphasises a 
move away from an international market economy. However, 
people in the Third World may have come to identify their own 
values or perceived needs in ways which involve 'Westernising' and 
becoming more internationally competitive. 
The most basic needs, such as food and shelter, remain the 
same for everyone and are culturally nonspecific, being a function 
of the fact that we are all embodied. However, other values and 
perceived needs, which may be considered to be more or less basic, 
may be more culturally dependent—such as the need for 
communication (including telecommunication) as a means of 
acquiring information, and the need for infrastructure, such as 
roads, as a means of travel and of exchanging and supplying basic 
goods. As cultures change, often through the influence of 
Westernisation, people's values and the way people perceive their 
needs can change. 
It could be argued that George's proposal is not sensitive to 
changes of values within cultures and so is not sensitive to the ways 
in which people in Third World countries now perceive their needs. 
Some may maintain that, through such strategies as reimbursement 
in kind, George is being value-imperialistic by imposing some 
values on people in Third World countries that they cannot be 
guaranteed to share now—even if they once did share such values. 
Response to criticisms of George. It has to be conceded that 
there is an element of value-imperialistic paternalism in George's 3-
D proposal, though it certainly seems much less paternalistic than 
alternative solutions, especially the IMF solution. George respects 
the need for replacement views to be accessible to all affected 
parties, but she is convinced that democracy (for example) is an 
accessible value to people in the Third World. According to George, 
once democracy has been embraced, people are unlikely to give it 
up. Her aim is to use democracy as a means to meeting people's 
basic and other needs, and thus to help secure the autonomy of 
ordinary people in the Third World. However, although George's 
insistence on democracy is well-intended, it seems implausible to 
suppose that the only practicable way to overcome widespread 
hunger and destitution in the Third World is to institute democratic 
pol i t ico-economic structures. In 'well-ordered hierarchical 
s o c i e t i e s ' , f o r example, the fight against famine and poverty could 
be located (with more respect for autonomy) within more 
accessible, traditional, nondemocratic, politico-economic structures. 
George's proposal also emphasises the need to empower 
women—as among the most vulnerable of the vulnerable—in the 
Third World. It seems that O'Neill likewise would reject practices 
which keep women in subjection, whatever the local established 
See fn. 25, this chapter. 
view is. "The most significant features of actual situations that 
must be taken into account in judgements of justice are the security 
or vulnerability that allow actual others to dissent from and to seek 
change in variable aspects of the arrangements which structure 
their lives" (O'Neill 1992, p. 73). Unless they are empowered, 
women will not be able to dissent from or to seek change in many 
aspects of their life, and so present, disempowering arrangements 
will always count as unjust on O'Neill's theory. No matter how 
established a cultural value that subjects women may be, on 
O'Neill's theory there will be a strong imperative to revise such an 
established value. What is required is some deliberation with 
alternative grids and categories that are accessible, or could become 
accessible, to the relevant parties. 
Consider, finally, the criticism that George's 3-D solution is 
insensitive to the values and needs of people in the Third World as 
they now perceive them and that George is perhaps even imposing 
her own conception of contemporary Third World values on people 
in the Third World. At least this much can be said on George's 
behalf in response to this criticism. George is sensitive to this issue. 
Part of the point of her (problematic) promotion of democracy is 
that it would empower people to choose for themselves what 
projects they want to pursue, in the light of what they perceive 
their needs to be. While George proposes a method by which needs 
could be met, the sorts of projects she cites as "some examples of 
possible payments in kind" are those she thinks ordinary people in 
the Third World would agree to under some considerable 
judgement (George 1989, p. 250). Such recommendations are not 
essential to George's 3-D solution. George might very well approve 
of democratically endorsed alternative proposals. 
Conclusion 
George's proposed 3-D solution has many virtues under 
O'Neill's theory. First, for O'Neill the meeting of people's basic needs 
is central to meeting the requirements of justice. George's proposal 
includes a number of initiatives which are primarily focused on 
meeting people's basic needs. (The IMF strategies, by contrast, 
ostensibly thwart the meeting of people's basic needs.) Second, even 
if George's proposal is coercive in certain respects, in relation to 
ordinary people in the Third World and the power elites in both 
Worlds, it seems that such coercion mostly would count for O'Neill 
as subsidiary coercion in the service of fundamental noncoercion, 
and so would be permitted (and perhaps even required). Third, 
George's proposal seems to respect the conditions of free consent 
with respect to ordinary people in the First World. Fourth, George's 
3-D solution offers a good way for agents and agencies to fulfil their 
imperfect duties. Fifth, George's proposal acquits itself in certain 
respects in relation to O'Neill's 'accessible but critical' requirement 
on applied ethical theory. 
However, George's 3-D solution has an evident 
problematic feature when assessed in the light of O'Neill's theory of 
justice. The proposal requires the démocratisation of politico-
economic structures in the Third World. Arguably, this 
requirement has the potential to be fundamentally coercive of 
certain communities in the Third World. It also limits the 
accessibility of George's proposal to these communities. 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
My objective in this thesis has been to assess George's 
proposed 3-D solution in the light of two competing, significant, 
contemporary theories of justice that have international application. 
These theories are R. M. Hare's preference utilitarianism and Onora 
O'Neill's Kantian-inspired theory of justice. 
Whilst, for the most part, George's 3-D solution fares well on 
Hare's theory of justice, the aspect of the solution that is conditional 
on démocratisation is problematic. Hare is a preference utilitarian 
who (at the intuitive level) endorses moderate egalitarianism as his 
pr inciple of substantial just ice (given certain empirical 
assumptions). As I have argued in Chapter 4, George's proposal is 
apparently egalitarian, and perhaps is even moderately egalitarian. 
The proposal is egalitarian in that it promotes greater equality in 
both economic and political power than exists under present 
arrangements. However, it is difficult to determine whether the 
proposal is moderately egalitarian because it is left unclear just how 
much inequality George's proposal will allow. In any event, the 
central issue for Hare (at the critical level) is whether George's 
proposal would best satisfy the preferences of all the affected 
parties, if applied. 
George's solution looks promising in many ways, from a 
preference-utilitarian perspective, because of its egalitarian nature. 
However, George's proposed strategies are tied to conditions of 
démocratisation; and it is arguable that such conditions are 
insensitive to certain cultural values and preferences among those 
who live in currently preferred, nondemocratic societies. George 
seems to assume that if these societies were to become democratic 
the present preferences for a nondemocratic socio-political order 
would be outweighed by future preferences for a democratic socio-
political order. It is not at all clear that the weighing of preferences 
would turn out this way. 
George's proposal also seems promising on several counts 
when assessed according to O'Neill's theory of justice. However, 
George's insistence on démocratisation again raises certain 
problems. George's proposal is promising on O'Neill's theory in the 
way it aims to meet people's basic needs (a central feature of justice 
for O'Neill), respects the autonomy of ordinary folk in the First 
World, and provides for agents and agencies to fulfil their imperfect 
duties. Even though arguably there is a certain coercive aspect to 
George's solution—such as her reliance on the neediness of ordinary 
people in the Third World in order to secure their consent—I argue 
in Chapter 6 that, for the most part, her solution seems to be 
fundamentally noncoercive. 
However, there is a coercive aspect to George's proposal that 
looks unacceptable when assessed on O'Neill's theory. George 
makes the terms of her proposal conditional on démocratisation. 
Such a condition seems fundamentally coercive of those 
communities who value justice but who do not include democracy 
as a value, and so apparently fails to meet a central criterion of 
O'Neill's account of justice. Furthermore, because it depends on 
démocratisation, George's proposal fails to meet another important 
demand that O'Neill sets on applied solutions to ethical problems— 
namely, that such solutions be accessible to the affected parties. 
In all, while most aspects of George's proposal meet the 
requirements of both Hare's and O'Neill's competing theories of 
justice, one problematic feature common to both is that her 
proposal is conditional on démocratisation. 
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